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This dissertation seeks to understand what role opposition parties play in a hybrid 
regime, focusing on sub-Saharan Africa. Opposition parties can curtail incumbents’ 
control over the pace of democratisation (e.g. Bunce & Wolchik 2010; LeBas 2013; 
Loada 2020). However, it is still unclear to what extent they actually do so, and a 
common preconception is that these opposition parties are ‘weak’ (e.g. Olukoshi 
1998a; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009). In this dissertation, 
I explore this notion empirically by assessing various dimensions of opposition party 
weakness described in the literature, including their non-programmatic and short-lived 
nature, lack of local structures, under-performance, and fragmentation.  
Based on a comparative, qualitative, and inductive approach, I study four 
opposition parties across two countries, Burkina Faso and Uganda. This allows me to 
observe hybrid regimes in their diversity. My research is based on extensive fieldwork 
in both countries, which notably included 146 semi-structured interviews in capital 
cities and opposition strongholds.  
By unpacking what opposition parties are formed around, how they are organised 
and how they operate, I analyse the complex dynamics driving opposition parties’ 
ability to endure and to coalesce in order to effectively challenge the incumbent and 
influence regime trajectories. The analysis shows that even ‘weak’ opposition parties 
can play a part in challenging the incumbent’s control over institutions.  
My dissertation contributes to a new wave of empirical research on (opposition) 
parties in Africa (e.g. Souaré 2010; Bob-Milliar 2012b; Kelly 2014; Beardsworth 
2018). It identifies new sources of a party’s organisational identity, defined as their 
‘core’, and analyses how this informs a party’s survival chances. It investigates both 
internal organisational processes and external mobilisation strategies used to engage 
the regime, and concludes that opposition parties perform key functions within a 
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Figure 2: Map of Uganda* 
 
 
* Source: United Nations. [https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/uganda.pdf] 




‘… quand bien même les partis d’Afrique seraient faibles et la démocratisation en 
demi-teinte, ces situations méritent d’être explorées plus en avant. Les partis ne 
pourraient-ils pas être des objets de recherche intrinsèques et un site d’analyse utile 
des transformations ou des contraintes qui pèsent sur les processus politiques en 
Afrique ? En un mot, ne faut-il pas étudier les partis sans préjugés, le temps de 
montrer l’intérêt scientifique d’une telle étude.’ (Gazibo 2006: 10) 
‘… regardless of the weakness of African parties and the mixed success of 
democratisation, these situations deserve to be scrutinised further. Can’t parties be 
primordial objects of research and a site for the useful analysis of the 
transformations and constraints weighing on political processes in Africa? In a 
nutshell, should we not study parties without prejudice, to demonstrate the scientific 
interest of such a study.’ (My translation) 
In 2006, Mamoudou Gazibo made a vehement case in favour of returning to the 
study of political parties in Africa, until then largely overlooked. For a long time, both 
comparativists working on political parties and Africanist researchers tended to ignore 
or side-line African parties, particularly those in the opposition. The former because 
they found them ill-fitting in pre-existing typologies and definitions (e.g. Diamond & 
Gunther 2001b), and the latter because they often perceived opposition parties as a 
weak link in the democratisation process on the continent (Randall & Svåsand 2002c). 
These scholars focused instead on other stakeholders such as civil society, social 
movements, or ‘big men’ in their analyses of political dynamics and democratisation 
in Africa (Bayart et al. (eds) 1992; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Chabal & Daloz 
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1999). African opposition parties have received even less attention than ruling parties, 
and have long been perceived as mere vehicles for individuals looking for patronage 
opportunities, empty shells created to provide the regime with legitimacy, or weak 
actors incapable of playing a major role in their country’s politics (e.g. Chabal & Daloz 
1999; Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Manning 2005). 
African citizens themselves appear to share this sentiment, as illustrated by the low 
level of trust in opposition parties across the continent (Logan 2008; Bratton & Logan 
2015). Rakner and Van de Walle (2009: 109) summarised this predicament when they 
argued that ‘the persistent weakness of the opposition is both a consequence of 
democratic deficits and a cause of their continuation’.  
The last decade has seen a shift, however, both on the ground and in academic 
studies. In October 2014, opposition-led protests toppled the 27-year-old regime of 
Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, opposition parties unexpectedly 
defeated incumbents at the polls in Nigeria (April 2015) and The Gambia (December 
2016). Moreover, while opposition parties elsewhere have not been so successful at 
bringing about change and democracy, they are still at work. Opposition protests and 
their violent repression by the state are a regular feature of Ugandan political life, while 
defeated opponents have successfully challenged election results in court in Kenya 
(September 2017) and Malawi (February 2020).  
These events have been accompanied by a renewed academic focus on African 
parties, with a new generation of scholars driving this momentum. In particular, 
Elischer’s (2013) and LeBas’s (2013) influential books have paved the way for more 
grounded and comparative research, and have quickly become ‘classics’ in the field. 
Elischer’s comparative review of political parties across the continent demonstrated 
the great diversity in the nature of parties across the continent. Meanwhile, LeBas 
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argued that parties could derive organisational strength from having historical roots in 
pre-existing institutional structures, such as labour movements, and overturned the 
idea that opposition parties are necessarily ‘weak’. Other researchers have conducted 
doctoral work following in their footsteps, producing high-quality empirical and 
theoretical knowledge and contributing to an emergent field of literature on African 
parties. For example, Souaré (2010, 2017) and Beardsworth (2018) have shed light on 
opposition coalition-building processes across the continent using a comparative 
approach. Other academics have worked on political parties more broadly but in single 
countries, such as Paget’s (2018) fine-grained analysis of the use of rallies as an 
electioneering strategy in Tanzania, Bob-Milliar’s (2011, 2012b, 2014, 2019) 
extensive work on Ghanaian parties, and Kelly’s (2014, 2020) inquiry into the motives 
behind party proliferation in Senegal. Meanwhile, Perrot (2016), Wilkins (2018) and 
Collord (2019) have contributed to our understanding of ruling parties and institutions 
through their work on Eastern African countries.  
All these scholars and others have contributed to an improved appreciation of how 
political parties are formed and how they operate (see Chapter 1). Yet further research 
is still required in order to properly understand African parties, what they do for 
citizens within the confines of the space they inhabit, and how they can contribute to 
democratic transition or consolidation. In particular, the role and capacity of 
opposition parties in hybrid regimes is under-explored. This is despite Bunce and 
Wolchik’s (2010) finding that opposition parties’ strength and strategy is a decisive 
factor in explaining change in competitive authoritarian regimes – contradicting a 
lasting tendency to focus on the role of incumbents (Levitsky & Way 2010a).  
This dissertation addresses this gap by unpacking the role of opposition parties in 
African hybrid regimes. In this introduction, I lay out the research questions my thesis 
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aims to answer and the main arguments I present. I then outline the methods used to 
conduct my research. Finally, I provide the reader with an outline of the seven 
empirical chapters that make up this thesis. 
 Research questions and argument 
This thesis seeks to understand the role that opposition parties play in the context 
of a hybrid regime, which in essence does not meet the minimum threshold of 
democracy but can neither be considered fully authoritarian. More specifically, the 
dissertation looks at how opposition parties exist and operate within the purview of the 
existing system and constraints that they face. In doing so, I unpack the ‘weakness’ 
generally attributed to opposition parties in hybrid regimes, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and provide insights into how opposition parties may actually be able to 
contribute to regime change and democratisation.  
My research deals with opposition parties in hybrid regimes located in Africa, 
therefore combining two overlapping but distinct foci: a conceptual one (contributing 
to knowledge of opposition parties in hybrid regimes around the world) and a 
geographical one (improving the analysis of African political parties). Hybrid regimes 
combine elements of a democracy (usually a liberal constitution, regular elections in 
which opposition parties are allowed to run, a more or less active civil society, and 
some level of freedom of the press) with practices of an autocracy, such as nepotism, 
corruption, electoral fraud, executive control over the legislative and judicial branches, 
political violence, and elimination of opponents (Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2006; 
Bogaards 2009; Levitsky & Way 2010a). The scholarship on hybrid regimes has 
flourished since the end of the 20th century, leading to the proliferation of concepts 
and catchphrases to qualify and describe these regimes, often summarised as 
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‘democracy with adjectives’ or ‘authoritarianism with adjectives’ (Collier & Levitsky 
1997; Bogaards 2009; Gilbert & Mohseni 2011).  
Earlier authors optimistically considered those regimes as incomplete forms of 
democracy in transition and used concepts such as ‘semi-democracy’ (Diamond et al. 
1988) and ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 1997). However, it soon became clear that 
the enthusiasm characterising the transitional paradigm was at odds with regimes in 
which incumbents retained power and could not be removed by democratic means 
(Carothers 2002). Even though these regimes are more open than full-blown 
autocracies, they are not democratic, not even partially, at least when referring to a 
substantive definition of democracy.  
Indeed, democracy has been defined in various ways, some conceptualisations 
being broader and others narrower. Some scholars have defended a minimalist 
definition of democracy focused on procedural aspects such as competitive elections 
(see e.g. Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1998; Przeworski 1999), sometimes also including 
civil liberties as a necessary component of a liberal democracy (e.g. Zakaria 1997; 
Diamond 1999). In contrast, other scholars, including prominent Africans and 
Africanists, have argued for a more substantive definition encompassing not only 
procedural matters but also social and economic outcomes (see Ake 1996; Lumumba-
Kasongo 2005; Zuern 2009). Nwosu (2012: 12) demonstrated how the procedural 
approach to democratisation allowed many authoritarian incumbents in Africa to 
‘mimic the formal requirements’ of a minimalist conception of democracy and to retain 
power or pass it on to an appointed heir or proxy, therefore reproducing authoritarian 
rule. As these authors argue, I believe that a substantive approach to democracy is 
necessary when we consider what people actually want and how they define 
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democracy on the ground (Zuern 2009), something that has long been ignored in the 
conceptualisation and measurement of democracy (Doorenspleet 2015).  
Hybrid regimes are therefore not democratic. Furthermore, they are not necessarily 
transitioning towards democracy either: as Levitsky and Way (2010a: 4) have argued, 
‘the assumption that hybrid regimes are (or should be) moving in a democratic 
direction lacks empirical foundation’. The persistence of those regimes led some 
scholars to emphasise their authoritarian traits, and to the emergence of terms such as 
‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway 2003), ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006), 
and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky & Way 2010a). These authors argue that 
hybrid regimes adopt some level of a democratic façade but without endangering – 
and on the contrary, in order to sustain – authoritarian governance.  
While Ottaway (2003: 15) highlights that ‘elections are not the source of the 
government’s power’ and do not enable transfer of this power to a new elite, Schedler 
(2006: 3) argues that they are ‘instruments of authoritarian rule’ rather than of 
democracy, manipulated as to contain the uncertainty of their outcome, and used as 
opportunities to distribute patronage, reinforce the ruling coalition, and project a 
legitimate image. Levitsky and Way (2010a: 297) define competitive authoritarian 
regimes as ‘civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are 
widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbent’s abuse 
of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponent’. They 
characterised the incumbent’s significant advantage as an ‘uneven playing field’, 
which makes the existing political competition unfair and undemocratic.  
This overlap of a conceptual and a geographical foci should not be confused with 
an association of hybrid regimes and African states: some African countries can be 
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considered democracies or closed autocracies, and hybrid regimes can be found in 
other parts of the world. However, the focus on African hybrid regimes is well-suited 
to my enquiries due to the prevalence of such systems on the African continent (Lynch 
& Crawford 2011; Bogaards & Elischer 2016). As in the rest of the world, hybrid 
regimes in Africa became prominent after the Cold War when the combination of 
external factors (disappearance of the Eastern bloc, rise of aid conditionality, 
hegemony of liberal democracy) and internal pressures finally brought in the so-called 
Third Wave of Democratisation (Huntington 1993; see also Doorenspleet 2000).  
However, instead of democracies, the autocracies of the past gave way, in many 
cases, to hybrid regimes which became the most prominent regime type in sub-Saharan 
Africa. At the outset of my research, in 2014, 25 out of 44 African countries included 
in the Polity IV dataset were considered ‘anocracies’, meaning mixed or incoherent 
authority regimes.3 Though multiparty elections are now regular occurrences across 
the continent, former autocrats have, in many cases, managed to hold on to power far 
beyond their mandate, such as Yoweri Museveni in Uganda or Paul Biya in Cameroon. 
Others have arranged their succession, often keeping it in the family such as in Togo 
or Gabon (Nwosu 2012), or by making a last-minute deal with a former opponent as 
in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (see Berwouts & Reyntjens 
2019).  
The utility of the hybrid regime concept has been obscured by the multiplication of 
categorisations, which all highlight different significant features but not drastically 
 
3 Polity IV is a data series covering 167 countries between 1800 and 2014 to monitor regime change 
and assess regime types annually based upon criteria measuring executive recruitment, constraints on 
executive authority and political competition. The ‘Polity Score’ captures the regime authority spectrum 
on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The 
Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a suggested three-part categorization of 
‘autocracies’ (-10 to -6), ‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5), and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10). 
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distinct categories. This rich literature has refined our collective understanding of the 
complex ways these regimes work, by highlighting different dynamics at play and 
discussing subtle conceptual differences. However, the proliferation of terms has also 
led to a confused conceptual debate which has hampered fine-grained comparison 
(Morlino 2009; Cassani 2014).  
Aside from these conceptual debates, the literature on hybrid regimes generally 
aims at analysing these regimes’ ability to resist democratisation pressure and to 
endure or not (Lindberg 2006b; Brownlee 2009; Smith 2014). While the quantitative 
approaches used by these scholars have the benefit of drawing from larger datasets, 
their findings have often been contradictory, hampered by conceptual disagreements 
and differing classifications (Cassani 2014). They have also tended to focus on 
institutions and incumbents, giving little consideration to the strategies of opposition 
parties, beyond binary variables such as the decision to boycott an election or to form 
a pre-electoral coalition (Wahman 2013; Smith 2014).  
In contrast, qualitative analyses have been better able to analyse a broader range of 
strategies adopted by opposition parties and other stakeholders within hybrid regimes, 
and their effects (Bunce & Wolchik 2010; Mazepus et al. 2016). The use of in-depth 
case studies has allowed researchers to account for historical legacies (LeBas 2013), 
while others have used process tracing methods to explain regime trajectories 
(Wienkoop 2019). These approaches have their own weaknesses however, in 
particular the limited number of cases they can account for and the difficult replication 
or generalisation of their findings (Landman & Carvalho 2017: 83). Yet, they allow us 
to have a more complex and comprehensive understanding of how hybrid regimes 
work, how institutions and stakeholders operate within them, and how they can be 
sustained or challenged over time – something my thesis builds upon. 
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Some scholars have criticised the hybrid concept itself, arguing that so-called full 
autocracies also included features such as local elections or parties, and have therefore 
favoured broad categories such as non-democracies (see in particular Wilkins 2018: 
29–30). Still, I believe the hybrid regime framework remains useful because it 
underlines that there is space available to opposition parties – albeit a limited and 
shifting one. It is true that institutions in hybrid regimes tend to be manipulated by 
incumbents to their advantage: for example, they organise elections to please the 
international community (Schedler 2006: 13) and to enable some controlled circulation 
of elite (Wilkins 2018), but they also use various strategies to ensure their own power 
base is not threatened (Cheeseman & Klaas 2019). They tolerate a parliament, which 
can be a way to distribute patronage and bargain with elites (Collord 2016), but they 
retain control of debates and votes through patronage and party caucuses. Yet, these 
institutions still provide an avenue for meaningful engagement of the regime by the 
opposition. Moreover, in my view, the hybrid nature of the regime must be explored 
to understand opposition parties. Those parties do not exist and operate in a vacuum, 
but have to adapt to the shifting and restrictive environment they exist and operate in. 
This is why it is also important to address this context and understand how it impacts 
opposition parties’ formation, organisation, and activities, and more broadly what role 
they end up playing.  
Observing opposition parties in hybrid regimes presents a double puzzle. On the 
one hand, hybrid regimes offer a very limited chance to opposition parties to access 
power through elections and other processes inscribed in their constitutions, mostly 
because of the lack of a level playing field (Levitsky & Way 2010b; Helle 2016). Yet 
opponents still organise themselves as parties and have, in many countries, discarded 
boycott as a strategy in order to take part in elections and legislatures. On the other 
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hand, opposition parties often criticise the regime as a whole, and its lack of democracy 
and transparency, as a way to criticise the ruling elite and to attract support. As a result, 
the distinction ‘between opposing the state and opposing the ministers of the state’ 
observed by Parry (1997) in Western parliamentary history is less applicable to hybrid 
regimes. Nonetheless, the opposition still participates in the system, by registering as 
recognised parties, running candidates in elections, sitting in national institutions, and 
sometimes receiving public funding (Bardall 2016: 55). Many opposition leaders also 
belonged to the state apparatus or ruling party before switching sides. Despite 
Cheeseman’s (2015: 151) observation that ‘widespread repression encouraged the 
opposition to form links with militias or factions of the military in order to resist – and 
in some cases overthrow – the government’, in many cases, opposition parties have 
favoured non-violent means, such as participation in election, civil disobedience, or a 
mix of both.  
The question of what role opposition parties actually play in hybrid regimes – either 
towards democratisation or within the system – is therefore an important one. Because 
hybrid regimes have specific characteristics and provide a different space to opposition 
parties from democracies, the role of opposition parties within hybrid regimes is likely 
to be different as well. Even if they might have the same aims, the restrictions inherent 
to hybrid regimes will affect their role. In the context of hybrid regimes, the distinction 
between ‘classic’, ‘loyal’ or ‘legitimate’ opposition who recognise the rules of the 
games on the one hand, and ‘principled’, ‘anti-system’, or ‘irresponsible’ opposition 
who challenge the regime on the other (e.g. Dahl (ed.) 1966; Sartori 1966; Parry 1997) 
becomes blurred.  
The argument I build throughout this thesis is three-fold. First, I argue that 
opposition parties’ weakness must be considered in context: opposition parties have to 
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adapt to face a fused incumbent-state, which should be considered a key characteristic 
of hybrid regimes rather than a case-specific historical legacy. This quasi-fusion of 
state institutions and the ruling party allows the incumbent to derive power either from 
monopolising the capacity of the state apparatus or by benefitting from the ruling 
party’s organisational strength. The Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
illustrates the first model of a rather weak ruling party relying on the control of public 
resources for coercion or patronage distribution purposes, while Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania has benefited from investments into party 
institutionalisation during the single-party era that contribute to its dominance today 
(Morse 2014; Collord 2019). This fusion of the state and the incumbent blurs the line 
between loyal and irresponsible opposition: it forces opposition parties to use a mix of 
protest and participation, and to be loyal and anti-system at the same time. These 
parties take part in formal institutions and attempt to manipulate them to their 
advantage (e.g. by using electoral campaigns as a platform to criticise the regime or 
by using their seats in Parliament to relay information and obtain resources), whilst 
they concomitantly use informal, anti-system strategies such as boycott, protests, or 
civil disobedience to maintain pressure on the incumbent.  
Second, while it is undeniable that opposition parties tend to be poorly organised, 
prone to fragmentation, and to have low mobilisation capacity outside of a few 
strongholds and apart from electoral periods, I question the way they have been 
portrayed as universally ‘weak’, and argue that opposition parties across African 
hybrid regimes are diverse and complex. Some are better organised than others, some 
have a stronger identity that contribute to their institutionalisation, and some have 
higher mobilisation capacity for protests. They have an organisational identity that 
goes beyond ethnic ties, clientelist endeavours, or personal charisma. They display 
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various levels of internal organisation, which need to be unpacked to better understand 
the way in which they operate. They use various strategies to resist and confront the 
regime they face, adapting to the restrictive environment they operate in. I paint a 
multi-faceted portrait of how these opposition parties emerge, organise, and operate, 
contributing to a more complex and fine-grained understanding of what these parties 
do and what they can achieve. 
Finally, despite various weaknesses, opposition parties can endure as organisations, 
and play a role in pushing for change. These parties perform important functions that 
enable them to, at least, embarrass the regime. At best, it allows them to offer an 
alternative and defeat the incumbent – either at the polls or in the streets. 
Understanding the factors driving individual parties’ endurance and their ability to 
coalesce is important to assess the role they can play for the regime’s trajectory overall. 
As such, this dissertation makes a series of theoretical contributions. While they are 
further discussed in the conclusion, I outline them briefly here. First, my research adds 
to a growing but still very limited literature on African political parties: these parties 
have indeed been largely ignored by party comparativists and Africanist scholars, and 
it is only in the last decade that we have seen a meaningful shift (see Chapter 1). 
Second, I dismiss a series of overused tropes that tend to bias our analysis of African 
parties: that they are universally ‘weak’, necessarily ‘ethnic’, only ‘personalistic’, and 
not ‘programmatic’. Instead, I analyse what these parties actually do in an inductive 
manner, rather than what they should do based upon normative expectations, and find 
that these parties have an identity and legitimacy rooted in a certain ‘core’ and can 
perform important functions. Third, in contrast to the prevalent literature on hybrid 
regimes which focuses on how incumbents manipulate democratic institutions 
(Ottaway 2003; Levitsky & Way 2010a), I observe how opposition parties fare and 
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operate within these regimes, a dimension until now too little explored. Finally, I 
contribute to our collective understanding of democratisation processes by outlining 
the role that opposition parties, weak as they are, can play in them. This dissertation 
also makes empirical and methodological contributions, which I outline after 
providing an overview of my research methods.  
 Overview of methods 
This dissertation is based upon a comparative and inductive approach to research. 
It revolves around two country-case studies where I collected primary qualitative data 
during extended periods of fieldwork. The first case is Uganda under Yoweri 
Museveni, 1986 to present, with a particular focus on the period since 2005, when the 
Movement system was abandoned and political parties could again participate in the 
country’s politics. The second is Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaoré, from the return 
to multipartyism in 1991 to the popular insurrection that toppled him in 2014. Both 
have been recognised as hybrid regimes in indices such as Polity IV and Freedom 
House’s score, as well as by respective country experts.  
Uganda has been governed by Museveni since he assumed power in 1986 in the 
midst of a rebellion. Though once acclaimed by Western allies for bringing stability 
and economic growth to Uganda, his involvement in neighbouring conflicts and the 
political restrictions characterising his regime are reminders of the nature of his rule 
(Tripp 2004). He first set up a ‘no-party democracy’, in which parties existed, but saw 
their activities curbed. These restrictions were lifted in 2005 by a referendum, which 
also repealed constitutional term-limits. Despite the formal abandonment of the 
Movement system and the official recognition of political parties’ rights to fully 
participate in Ugandan politics, Museveni’s NRM has maintained a strong grip on 
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power and Uganda is still considered a hybrid regime (Kiiza et al. (eds) 2008; Tripp 
2010; Keating 2011; Perrot et al. (eds) 2014a; Makara 2016).  
Meanwhile, Burkina Faso under Compaoré was a prime example of a hybrid regime 
(Hilgers and Mazzocchetti (eds) 2010; Harsch 2017; Loada 2020). He gained power 
in 1987 through a coup d’état and set up a new constitutional regime in 1991, which 
opened the door to multiparty politics. He successfully manipulated the country’s 
institutions and used various co-optation mechanisms and divisive tactics to remain in 
power for 27 years. However, his last attempt to extend his rule, which required a 
change of the constitution’s term-limits, led to a popular uprising that forced 
Compaoré to resign in October 2014. This was followed by a one-year political 
transition involving ad-hoc institutions and an inclusive government. Elections were 
held in November 2015, and brought to power Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, a former 
official of Compaoré’s party who had defected to the opposition shortly before the 
2014 insurrection. Because the transition did not involve a ‘ruling majority’ and an 
‘opposition’ as such, and considering the reconfiguration of the party landscape 
following the 2015 elections, I decided to focus on opposition parties during 
Compaoré’s regime (1987-2014) in order to allow for both a longer-term and 
comparative analysis. 
Despite the fact that both regimes share features as hybrid regimes, they 
simultaneously display different contexts and dynamics, which allows me to draw a 
broader picture by comparing these cases. This country selection, which will be further 
explained in Chapter 2, was based upon several considerations including a different 
colonial history and linguistic legacy, and the absence of ongoing conflict. The 
temporal difference between the two regimes under study – one ending in 2014 and 
the other being contemporary – creates difficulties for comparison, but these are 
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minimised in several ways. My focus is on long-term processes over the course of the 
regime, and on dynamics that have not significantly changed over the time-period 
between the 2014 uprising in Burkina Faso and the time of data-collection, though I 
have remained aware of such changes (e.g. the increasing role of social media and new 
technologies in the activities of parties). I have also taken steps to avoid ‘rewriting 
history’ in Burkina Faso during data collection and analysis (see Chapter 2).    
In each country I collected data on the activities of, and rhetoric used by, two 
opposition parties: one which emerged from a split within the ruling party and one 
older, historical opponent. The parties under study in Burkina Faso are the Union pour 
le Progrès et le Changement (UPC) which was created following a split from the ruling 
Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) in 2010, and the Union pour la 
Renaissance-Parti Sankariste (UNIR-PS), a smaller party that draws upon the legacy 
of the 1980s’ Sankarist revolution. In Uganda, the spotlight is on the Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC) founded in 2004 by disgruntled members of Museveni’s 
NRM around the figure of Kizza Besigye, and the Democratic Party (DP), Uganda’s 
oldest party founded prior to independence, in 1954. 
I have used qualitative methods, relying chiefly on semi-structured interviews with 
146 key informants (see Appendix 1 for a full list). These include opposition party 
elites and activists, as well as other political observers (such as academics, journalists, 
and civil society activists). The information collected through these interviews was 
complemented with a review of the media’s political coverage in each country, as well 
as party resources and secondary literature. The second chapter of this dissertation 
provides a more detailed account of the methodological framework used, and 




The approach I used makes important empirical and methodological contributions. 
This dissertation provides new empirical knowledge about political dynamics in 
Uganda and Burkina Faso, and more specifically on four little-studied political parties. 
The DP in Uganda has previously been analysed by Carbone (2003), but this was 
during the Movement era. While Besigye as an individual, and the opposition in 
Uganda more broadly, have received some attention (see Kalinaki 2014; Beardsworth 
2018), we know little about the FDC and other opposition parties as organisations. For 
their part, Burkinabè political parties have not been studied in depth, except for a rather 
dated research note produced by the Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique (CGD 
2009).  
Methodologically, I depart from an unfortunate tendency in the comparative study 
of the African continent, which has been to remain within the boundaries of regional 
and linguistic realms. Focusing on neighbouring countries who share a colonial legacy, 
a common language, and membership of the same regional organisations can be 
justified by a most-similar-system design requiring such a case selection. But a case 
selection cutting across both regional and linguistic boundaries avoids the pitfall of 
generalising dynamics found in a handful of rather similar and over-studied cases to 
the rest of the continent (Briggs 2017). My case selection also enables me to bring 
together the francophone and anglophone bodies of literature, still very much divided 
by linguistic and epistemological differences (see Cheeseman 2018). Colonial history 
has influenced the predominant interests in each circle, while differences in academic 
traditions, linguistic barriers, and the still limited number of collaboration 
opportunities have constrained exchanges of ideas and mutual influence. There are of 
course a few important exceptions, scholars whose interests have developed outside of 
the traditional sphere of their national scholarship and who have been willing and able 
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to publish their work and collaborate outside their circles (see for example the work of 
Van de Walle (2009) on democratisation and development, Bach (2011) on 
neopatrimonialism, and more recently Perrot (2016) on Ugandan elections). Still, my 
work contributes to a very small pool of studies cutting across both regional and 
linguistic lines (Doorenspleet and Nijzink (eds) 2013; Riedl 2014). 
Outline of the thesis 
As Rakner and Van de Walle (2009: 108) have argued, the ‘strength and strategies 
[of opposition parties] are intrinsically linked to the dynamics of contemporary 
democratization in Africa’. This dissertation therefore analyses the role that opposition 
parties actually do and can play by unpacking the perceived ‘weakness’ of opposition 
parties. This attributed ‘weakness’ has referred to a range of different issues. For 
example, opposition parties are often considered weak because they are seen as mere 
vehicles used to promote individual and parochial interests (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 
42; Chabal & Daloz 1999: 151; Van de Walle & Butler 1999); because they are poorly 
organised and scarcely present across the national territory (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 
37); because they fail to perform expected functions derived from the classic literature 
(Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 30–31); or because they suffer from fragmentation and a 
lack of endurance, and fail to coalesce (Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Van de Walle 
2006). By addressing each of these dynamics throughout this dissertation, I refine our 
understanding of how opposition parties emerge and operate within hybrid regimes 
and how they can contribute to regime change. This thesis comprises seven chapters, 
and an additional conclusion.  
The first chapter lays out the theoretical framework in which my work is located. I 
start by reviewing how and why African parties have been relatively neglected in the 
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literature, as Gazibo – quoted at the start of this introduction – lamented. I then 
highlight how a new generation of scholars, including Elischer (2013), LeBas (2013), 
and Bob-Milliar (2012a, 2014, 2019), but also Beardsworth (2018), Souaré (2017), 
and Kelly (2020), have challenged long-standing assumptions that African party 
politics can be reduced to an ethnic census or clientelist exchanges. I then draw from 
the existing literature on political parties to assess the role parties may be expected to 
play in a hybrid regime and how their contribution to democratisation has been rated. 
The chapter reveals how, aside from a few exceptions such as LeBas (2013), 
opposition parties have been largely treated as universally weak, a conception I unpack 
over the course of this dissertation.  
The second chapter provides details of my methodological framework. I start by 
offering an overview of my qualitative, inductive, and comparative approach, and 
explain the selection of my country- and party-cases. I then introduce the methods used 
for data collection and analysis. In a third section, I discuss the conduct of ‘fieldwork’, 
in terms of logistics, safety, and local collaboration. Finally, I discuss the ethical 
considerations of this research project, in particular the protection of participants and 
my own positionality and potential biases.  
The third chapter analyses the political environment in Uganda and Burkina Faso 
and the specific constraints faced by opposition parties, and argues that the uneven 
playing field that characterises hybrid regimes (Levitsky & Way 2010a) is fuelled by 
a state-incumbent fusion. I first provide an overview of each country’s political history 
since independence, to equip the reader with the necessary background information on 
important dynamics and key events relevant for the rest of the thesis, and demonstrate 
why these countries can be considered to be hybrid regimes. I then compare the main 
obstacles faced by opposition parties in both countries, and argue that these difficulties 
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are connected with the fusion of state institutions, the incumbent party, and the 
governing elite. While this dynamic has been acknowledged and explained by 
historical legacies, I argue that it should be recognised as a common trait in such 
political systems.  
In Chapter 4, I analyse the ‘core’ of opposition parties, or the substance that they 
are formed, and mobilise, around. A notion related to a party’s brand (Lupu 2016) or 
goals (Strøm 1990), the idea of a party ‘core’ is nonetheless distinct and focuses on 
what parties are built upon, and on what provides them with a coherent identity and 
legitimacy. Existing research has shown that some opposition parties emerge from pre-
existing structures, such as rebel groups (Manning 1998) or labour movements (LeBas 
2013) From my empirical research, I find that opposition parties can derive such 
identity and legitimacy from two other types of core. Some parties, such as the DP in 
Uganda and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso, are built around historical values that these 
parties publicly commit to. Others, such as the Ugandan FDC and the Burkinabè UPC, 
are formed, first and foremost, around an ill-defined but appealing idea of change, and 
position themselves as credible actors able to bring this change about, drawing from 
their elite’s experience, networks, or resources. These cores better capture a party’s 
identity than classic cleavages such as ideology and sectional identity, and demonstrate 
how these parties are more than just a vehicle for an individual leader. In fact, issues, 
ethnicity, or personalistic ties are shown to be used to mobilise activists and supporters 
in connexion with the party’s core, rather than being the cleavages around which 
parties are organised in the first place. This analysis enables us to move beyond the 
narrow view of political parties as either (rarely) ‘programmatic’ or (more often) not 
so, and to understand parties as more complex organisations. 
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Chapter 5 investigates how opposition parties are built within a hybrid regime. 
Contributing to a growing scholarship on party formation processes (Manning 1998; 
LeBas 2006; Osei 2016; Paget 2019b), it focuses on a little explored aspect: the 
relations between the party in central office and the party on the ground, to use the 
framework devised by Katz and Mair (1993). Analysing how parties are organised 
internally allows us to understand what type of party they are, and how power is shared 
within the organisation. I focus on three key aspects of party organisation, which are 
particularly important elements for a party to operate: the set-up of local structures, its 
financial resources, and decision-making processes. I look at these three elements from 
a broad perspective, instead of focusing on their operations solely during electoral 
campaigns. I find that while these parties tend to be structured in a top-down manner 
and funded by their elite like cadre parties, they also need to mobilise support – during 
and outside elections – across the country and, therefore, to set up some sort of party 
branches, which helps to give rise to local party figures. These local leaders have more 
or less control over their local structures, and can leverage this control vis-à-vis the 
central leadership. This consideration of how local and national dynamics are 
intertwined echoes the work of other young scholars using a similar approach, in 
particular Wilkins (2018) and McLellan (2019).  
In Chapter 6, I turn my attention to what opposition parties actually do, what 
functions they perform through their activities. As I discuss in Chapter 1, opposition 
parties are generally considered weak because they fail to perform classic party 
functions such as representing and aggregating voters’ interests or holding 
governments to account (Randall & Svåsand 2002a). Worse, they arguably play a part 
in sustaining the authoritarian regime by providing legitimacy and diffusing dissent 
(Albrecht 2005). Yet, I argue that opposition parties’ functions should be analysed 
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differently, based upon the contribution they can make in pushing the boundaries of 
the hybrid regime, and ultimately in favouring democratisation. While opposition 
parties may use a broad range of activities, I focus in this chapter on four types of 
activities that emerged as particularly important in my research: electoral boycotts, 
election campaigns, parliamentary representation, and anti-incumbent protest. These 
tactics, and others, enable opposition parties to carve out and defend a space for 
themselves within the constrained system and to play a role in pushing for regime 
change. I analyse this role by addressing three functions that these parties perform: the 
denunciation of the regime, the mobilisation of dissent, and the preparation for 
succession. I assess the capacity of opposition parties to achieve this in Uganda and 
Burkina Faso. Furthermore, I argue that while participation and protest strategies are 
sometimes seen as contradictory and counter-productive, as in Uganda, these 
approaches can also sustain each other and intersect positively, therefore posing a real 
threat to the regime, as in Burkina Faso. 
The seventh chapter addresses the implications of opposition parties’ foundations, 
internal organisations, and activities on their ability to endure as individual parties and 
to perform as a collective opposition. Party endurance and opposition coordination are 
seen as desirable outcomes to promote democracy, yet the relation between the two is 
not necessarily as straight-forward as it seems. I first argue that the capacity of 
opposition parties to endure within a hybrid regime is informed by a combination of 
inter-related elements: the sustainability of their core, their ability to detach from their 
founding leader, and the nature – rather than the amount – of their financial resources. 
Then, I analyse patterns of opposition coordination and how this may contribute to 
democratisation within such systems. Opposition parties can arguably bring forth a 
regime change either through the ballot box – by defeating the incumbent in an election 
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– or following sustained protests leading to an insurrection. Both these scenarios 
require a level of coordination among opposition parties and with other stakeholders. 
From the cases of Uganda and Burkina Faso, I find that inter-party collaboration is 
easier when it is about protests than about participation. Building upon Beardsworth’s 
(2018) argument that coalition-building can be undermined by internal party 
processes, such as factionalism and the leverage of newly-elected party presidents, I 
find that inter-party cooperation cannot be understood without considering individual 
parties’ organisational identity and interests, as well as the internal power dynamics at 
play among factions and between the party’s centre and its periphery.  
Finally, a short conclusion summarises the key points of this thesis, highlights its 
theoretical contribution, and paves the way for further research on the subject of 
opposition parties in African hybrid regimes. Throughout this dissertation, I 
demonstrate the diversity at play among opposition parties in terms of their capacity 
to mobilise cohesive support, develop institutions and branches, and meaningfully 
engage the regime, calling in to question the universal ‘weakness’ commonly 




Back to basics: the return of political parties 
My work contributes to a long tradition in the literature interested in political 
parties. Indeed, parties are a classic object of research in political science, and have 
now been studied for over a century. The simply massive amount of scholarly work on 
the subject has been reviewed elsewhere, for example by Montero and Gunther (2004: 
3–4) who painted this portrait of the state of the literature on the topic: 
‘We must begin by conceding [...] that there is no shortage of books and articles 
on parties. As Strøm and Müller have noted (1999: 5), ‘the scholarly literature 
that examines political parties is enormous’. Indeed, parties were among the first 
subjects of analysis at the very birth of modern political science, as exemplified 
by the classic works of Ostrogorski (1964 [1902]), Michels (1962 [1911]) and 
Weber (1968 [1922]). Over the following years, a number of extremely important 
works were published (e.g. Merriam 1922; Schattschneider 1942; Key 1949), but 
it was really in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s when studies of parties fully 
blossomed as a subfield in political science. Such works as those of Duverger 
(1954), Ranney (1954), Neumann (1956), Eldersveld (1964), Sorauf (1964), La 
Palombara and Weiner (1966, which included Kirchheimer's seminal 
contribution), Epstein (1967), Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) and Sartori (1976) 




From the creation of the first African political parties in the 1860s in Liberia 
(Kaydor 2014: 19–20), through to the ‘explosion of political parties in all African 
countries’ around the time of decolonisation (Mozaffar 2005: 395), and the ‘spring of 
political parties’ taking place in Burkina Faso and elsewhere in the early 1990s 
(Ouattara 2014: 59), Africa has had a long history and wide variety of political parties. 
Yet, comparatively African parties have long been under-studied – something 
particularly true for opposition parties. Erdmann, Basedau and Mehler (2007: 9), 
among others, have decried the lack of sound empirical research on the development 
and functioning of political parties on the continent. Indeed, until the last decade, 
research on parties remained scarce, and work on opposition parties specifically rarer 
still. Parties in Africa tended to be side-lined by scholars working on parties more 
broadly, but also by ‘Africanists’ more interested in other actors.  
This chapter locates this thesis within the broader literature on political parties. I 
start by analysing why some authors, such as Gazibo (2006), have considered African 
parties a ‘neglected’ research object, and explain the relative side-lining of African 
parties in the party and Africanist fields alike. This omission can be explained by a 
Western bias in the political science literature and long-standing assumptions in the 
study of Africa, both of which have been challenged in the last decade. Led by young 
scholars, a new wave of research has reinvigorated the literature on African parties and 
shed new light on their organisation and activities, which my own work builds upon.  
The second half of the chapter focuses on the role opposition parties can be expected 
to play based upon existing scholarship. The functions of political parties are indeed a 
classic topic in the political science literature, and have been studied both in the context 
of democracies and, to a lesser extent, in autocracies. After a brief review of this 
important scholarship, I look more closely at the potential role opposition parties may 
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have in democratisation processes. As we will see, opposition parties have often been 
dismissed as weak actors with no real ability to contribute to democratisation – a 
misconception I unpack and challenge in this dissertation. 
1.1 Political parties in Africa: a ‘neglected’ research object? 
 A relative side-lining of African parties 
The literature on political parties has primarily derived from the study of liberal 
democracies in Europe and America (Montero & Gunther 2004). Leading scholars 
interested in political parties have often failed to engage with the African continent. 
The side-lining of African parties was particularly surprising in broad comparative 
work, such as the foundational volume edited by Diamond and Gunther (2001b) on 
parties and democracy. In the introduction to this collection, they claim that:  
‘One of the strengths of this volume is that it includes empirical studies of parties 
in a wide array of democratic systems, in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, Japan, India, Turkey, and Taiwan, as well as more theoretically 
oriented pieces with no specific geographical focus’ (Diamond & Gunther 2001a: 
xiv). 
In the light of this broad geographical coverage, Africa’s absence is conspicuous. Not 
only is there no specific case study located in Africa – in a volume published 40 years 
after most African countries gained independence, and a decade after the new wave of 
multipartyism across the continent – the comparative chapters opening and concluding 
the volume also fail to do more than mention a couple of African countries in passing.  
The lack of attention to African parties by party scholars may be explained by the 
fact that African parties did not always fit existing definitions and typologies. Indeed, 
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some accepted definitions of political parties, such as that of Downs (1957: 25), 
LaPalombara and Weiner (1966: 6–7)4, or Sartori (1976: 63) would not apply to many 
African parties. The emphasis on the necessity of contesting elections, for example, 
excludes single parties in one-party regimes, as well as opposition parties boycotting 
elections in multiparty systems, a problem previously highlighted by Osei (2012: 26). 
The classic party models, such as the cadre/elite and mass party (Duverger 1981), the 
catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1966), and the cartel party (Katz & Mair 1995, 2009) 
were also all heavily connected to the European context that saw them emerge.  
Elite parties were seen as minimally organised outside of their parliamentary 
caucus, displayed a weak ideology, and were associated with a context of restricted 
suffrage (Duverger 1981: 121). While some of these characteristics are reminiscent of 
many African parties – the distribution of privileges as the main objective, the low 
ideological cleavage and weak organisation (e.g. Kelly 2020) – the context is 
fundamentally different. Furthermore, political parties in contemporary Africa – at 
least the larger and most enduring ones like those at hand in this thesis – do attempt to 
mobilise support (for elections and other activities such as protests) more broadly than 
an elitist clique, even though their official membership is often difficult to assess.  
Mass parties came about to represent the emerging and recently enfranchised 
working class, and were therefore much broader and membership-centred (Duverger 
1981: 119). Parties in Africa are clearly very different from this kind of organisation 
that is built from the bottom up, funded by members’ fees and contributions, and 
displays a strong ideological stance.  
 
4 LaPalombara and Weiner’s volume still included two chapters on political parties in Africa, whose 
authors used a less restrictive definition. 
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The catch-all party concept describes a field of parties whose ideological difference 
has become blurred, with electoralist strategies revolving around effectiveness 
arguments rather than real policy alternatives. The ‘catch-all’ denomination has been 
used to describe some African parties, such as Elischer’s (2013: 29) refined ‘ethnic 
catch-all’ category, and Erdmann’s (2004: 79) description of the CCM in Tanzania 
and the Parti Socialiste (PS) in Senegal. Yet, ideological uniformity does not mean 
that there is no difference on other fronts between the ruling and opposition parties.  
Finally, the cartel party identified by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) presupposes that 
all parties get into power at some point, and that there is therefore some kind of 
cooperation between the alternating ruling and opposition parties, translated into 
public funding being the main source of income for parties. Once again, this is not the 
case in African hybrid regimes, where turnovers are rare and opposition parties 
generally stay in the opposition unless they are co-opted by the dominant party, and 
where public funding is extremely limited and monopolised by the ruling party, as we 
will see in Chapter 3. Even when hybrid regimes experience a turnover – such as the 
cases of Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, or Senegal – new elites benefit from the uneven 
playing field they inherit, but it does not necessarily lead to cooperation between 
parties disconnected from society. Overall, scholars’ focus on the European party 
models and formal institutions made their approach ill-adapted to studying African 
parties, which led comparativists to either exclude African parties from their field of 
study, or to create new categories (e.g. ‘quasi-parties’ or ‘semi-parties) in an uneasy 
attempt to fit them into their typologies (Erdmann 2004; Quantin 2009: 173–174).  
This failure to incorporate African parties into broader typologies was compounded 
by a relatively mild interest in these parties by researchers specialising in African 
affairs as well. Following the independence of most countries across the continent in 
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the 1960s, researchers interested in political development in Africa did look at the role 
of parties. Leading scholars in the field such as LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) and 
Huntington (1968) had acknowledged the importance of parties for the political 
development of new states. Some authors saw African ruling parties as possible agents 
of national unity (Zolberg 1960; Wallerstein 1966) and of the struggle against 
‘idleness’ and ‘under-development’ (Decraene 1963: 9–11). A few scholars produced 
mostly descriptive accounts of the main political parties emerging across the continent, 
such as the works of Sklar (1963) on Nigeria, Morgenthau (1967) on Francophone 
West Africa, and Leys (1967) on the Acholi region in Uganda. However, apart from 
the very succinct overview produced by Hodgkin (1961), no systematic and 
comparative study of African parties came out during that period, and knowledge of 
their actual operations and organisation remained limited (Erdmann et al. 2007: 9; 
Elischer 2013: 11).  
With the rapid demise of these electoral experiments and the set-up of many 
military or single-party regimes across Africa, research on parties on the continent 
became nearly impossible, either because parties were banned, or because the closed 
regimes tended to limit the access scholars needed to study parties empirically (Gazibo 
2006: 7–8). Aside from a few attempts to explain shifts to single-party regimes 
(Coleman & Rosberg 1966; Debbasch 1966; Mueller 1984), interest turned away from 
parties to other aspects of political realities, even in the few countries exhibiting 
(limited) multipartyism such as Burkina Faso in the 1970s and Senegal in the 1980s. 
Since the so-called third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1993; see also 
Doorenspleet 2000), the literature has started to encompass parties in new democracies 
around the world, notably in post-communist Eastern Europe (Pridham et al. 1996; 
Markowski 1997; Lewis 2000), Latin America (e.g. Cott 2005; Lupu 2014; Barndt 
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2016; Levitsky et al. 2016) and Asia (e.g. Mitra et al. 2004; Hellmann 2011; Tomsa 
& Ufen 2013). Meanwhile, research on African (opposition) parties has remained 
relatively scarce.  
From the continent, two edited volumes provide an important share of the collective 
knowledge available: a book edited by Olukoshi (1998b) on the politics of opposition, 
which emerged from a conference held in Accra, Ghana, in 1995, and an edited volume 
compiled by Salih (2003) on African political parties. The African National Congress 
(ANC) in South Africa is a special case that has received its fair share of attention (e.g. 
Dubow 2000; Lissoni & Soske 2012; Booysen 2018). A few other monographs have 
been written on selected parties (e.g. Fofona 2009; Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015), but they 
remain scarce and poorly distributed outside of their country of interest. Apart from 
these, research on the internal organisation and strategies of African parties, especially 
in the opposition, remained rather limited. Of course, important exceptions exist, such 
as the work of Manning (1998) on Angola, Carbone (2003) and Makara (2009) on 
Uganda, LeBas (2006) on Zimbabwe, and Larmer and Fraser (2007) and Cheeseman 
and Hinfelaar (2010) on Zambia. Meanwhile, others scholars have studied party 
systems rather than the internal organisation of parties themselves (Bogaards 2000; 
Manning 2005; Mozaffar & Scarritt 2005; Carbone 2007; Doorenspleet & Nijzink 
2014). However, these contributions are drops in the ocean when it comes to such a 
broad topic as the formation, operation, and contribution of political parties across the 
African continent over time.  
Even though opposition parties proliferated from the early 1990s, attention initially 
failed to shift in their direction. The growing literature on democratic backsliding or 
consolidation, hybrid regimes, and regime change, tended to focus instead on the 
impact of international actors (conditionality), people (protests), or incumbents 
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(strategy or lack thereof) (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Levitsky & Way 2010a). The 
few scholars who have pondered the role of parties for democratisation prospects have 
usually found them rather ‘weak’ (Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Randall & Svåsand 
2002c; Carothers 2006; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009).  
Scholars such as Erdmann (2004; see also Basedau et al. (eds) 2007) in Germany 
and Carbone (2006, 2007) in Italy made foundational contributions to the study of 
African parties and paved the way for further research on the matter, whereas in 
neighbouring France, classical political objects, including political parties, were 
overwhelmingly ignored by African Studies scholars. Indeed, as Quantin (2009: 167) 
and Cheeseman (2018: 16) have previously pointed out, the Africanist scholarship in 
France has been built on an anthropological tradition and heavily influenced by Bayart, 
Mbembe and Toulabor’s (1992) ‘politics from the bottom’ approach. Gathered around 
the journal Politique Africaine from the late 1970s, they attempted to explain dynamics 
of political expression by focusing on popular means of political action, sometimes 
also called ‘Unidentified Political Objects’ (Martin 1989), such as art or religion, and 
leaving aside institutions such as political parties. This context led Gazibo (2006) to 
argue in favour of ‘rehabilitating’ the study of parties in Africa in an issue of Politique 
Africaine that was specifically focused on African parties as a neglected topic. It is 
rather telling that two of the four articles included in this collection were translations 
rather than original francophone pieces (Carbone & Larouche St-Sauveur 2006; Osei 
& Pommerolle 2006), and that the few French scholars working on parties still tend to 





 Long-standing assumptions challenged by a new research wave  
This relative side-lining of parties in studies of African politics, and the particular 
dismissal of opposition parties as uniformly weak, has been driven by long-standing 
assumptions and research prisms used in the study of African politics, which have been 
challenged in the past decade. In particular, the reduction of African politics to either 
an ethnic census (Lever 1979; Horowitz 1985) or clientelist ties (e.g. Chabal & Daloz 
1999) – or a mix of both – weighed heavily on the study of parties for a long time. 
Several authors presented culturalist arguments that looked predominantly at ethnicity 
to explain party dynamics on the continent, a feature long exaggerated by scholars. 
Horowitz (1985), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), and Arriola (2013), for example, 
have considered African parties as inevitably ethnic in nature and, as such, detrimental 
to democratisation.  
However, scholars such as Gazibo (2006: 12) warned that it was time to put aside 
such prejudices to see what came out of field research. Meanwhile, Elischer (2013), in 
the first broad comparative study of African parties, showed that, although ethnic 
parties do exist, they do not dominate African politics, and non-ethnic parties are also 
important players across the continent. Van de Walle and Butler (1999) have also 
argued that not all party politics in Africa are necessarily ethnic, though they are 
intensely personalised. Burkina Faso is a prime example of a country where, despite a 
very diverse population – over 60 different ethnic groups – ethnicity is not a significant 
politically salient identity. Indeed, Stroh (2010: 9) argued that voting behaviour in 
Burkina Faso was more informed by local ties than by ethnic affiliation (see also 
Basedau & Stroh 2012). 
32 
 
Meanwhile, the predominant neopatrimonial view of the African state has led to the 
conclusion that African parties were devoid of programmatic values and chiefly 
revolved around clientelist ties with voters and supporters (Bratton & Van de Walle 
1997; Chabal & Daloz 1999). African political parties are often analysed through the 
lens of patron-client relationships, which are deemed to be a ‘persisting feature of 
African politics from the advent of independence until recently’ (Osei 2012: 86). 
Clientelism is usually understood as a dyadic, personal relationship between patrons 
and clients, bringing individual benefits to the latter (Erdmann & Engel 2007). In this 
view, the persistence of clientelist dynamics encourages big men with local influence 
and popularity to either join the ruling party – to enjoy favours and prebends deriving 
from holding power – or to create their own party to further their own political 
advancement (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 34). Osei (2012: 255–256) has studied party-
voter linkage in Senegal and Ghana and shown how politicians engage in ‘proximity 
politics’ – directly targeting voters – or count on local intermediaries, such as chiefs 
and marabouts.  
This can contribute to the dominance of the ruling party and to the fragmentation 
of the opposition. For example, Kelly (2020: 88) has argued that party proliferation in 
Senegal was fuelled by politicians’ desire not to contest and win elections, but rather 
to access state patronage. The endurance of clientelism and patronage networks 
contribute to the idea that parties are built around a person, rather than around a 
particular ideology, and are therefore perceived as mere ‘vehicles for ambitious 
politicians’ (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 42; see also Chabal & Daloz 1999: 151; 
Manning 2005: 715).  
However, while it is undeniable that leaders are important pull factors and are often 
their party’s main financial backer, and that clientelism can be an important feature of 
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parties’ behaviour, it is equally important to recognise that there are resilient 
opposition parties – large and small – across the continent, which cannot be reduced 
to their individual leader. Examples include Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo 
(Chadema) in Tanzania, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe, 
the DP in Uganda, or the Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération–
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (ADF-RDA) in Burkina Faso. While ethnicity 
and clientelism remain dimensions that need to be taken into account in studies of 
African politics, I agree with scholars such as Elischer (2013), who demonstrated that 
political parties are organised in a variety of ways, and use diverse strategies to 
mobilise support.  
This realisation has led a new generation of scholars to start tackling these issues in 
the last decade. My thesis therefore builds upon this growing body of literature on 
political parties’ internal organisation, political manoeuvring, and mobilisation 
strategies. This has included work on mobilisation manoeuvres (Larmer & Fraser 
2007; Koter 2013; Cheeseman & Larmer 2015; Taylor 2017), on partisan activities at 
the local/decentralised level (Green 2011; Muriaas 2011; Wilkins 2016; McLellan 
2019), and on opposition coalition-building (Souaré 2017; Beardsworth 2018).  
Furthermore, recent doctoral work by Collord (2016, 2019) and Wilkins (2018, 
2019) provides a complex understanding of the inner working of ruling parties and 
institutions in East African countries. Other scholars have looked at the motivations of 
politicians and parties. For example, Bob-Milliar (2011, 2012b, 2019) has produced a 
rich body of literature on Ghanaian party dynamics, looking at the two main parties as 
well as at smaller Nkrumahist organisations. Cooper (2014) has discussed the 
Namibian opposition’s strategic choice to pursue a parliamentary foothold, while 
Alfieri (2016b) has studied the motivations of party activists in Burundi. Bleck and 
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Van de Walle (2011) have sought to understand parties’ positioning and raised the 
question of their assumed lack of programmatic discourse, building a ‘theory of non-
mobilisation’ based upon data from Francophone West Africa (see also Bleck & Van 
de Walle 2013). Authors such as LeBas (2013), Riedl (2014, 2016), and Paget (2019b) 
have provided fascinating accounts of parties’ formation processes from across the 
continent using well-needed historical approaches. Finally, some authors have 
produced important reviews of the study of African parties as part of collective 
handbooks. For example, Stroh (2019) has highlighted the necessity for better 
empirical data on individual parties and a proper discussion of their programmatic 
foundations, and argued that flexibility is an important and overlooked aspect of party 
systems (see also Bogaards 2013; van Wyk 2018).  
This rich empirical work, emerging from long-term and embedded fieldwork in a 
variety of countries across the continent, has opened the door for a better understanding 
of political parties, multiplied the questions and topics to be studied, and contributed 
to theoretical debates more inclusive of the actual dynamics at play across Africa. This 
is why I refer to many elements of this new wave of scholarship throughout my 
dissertation. Yet, despite this burgeoning literature, there is still a gap waiting to be 
filled in the literature. Opposition parties specifically have received less attention, and 
when they have been studied, much of the focus has been on the workings of inter-
party coalitions rather than on their internal dynamics – though work on coalitions, 
especially that of Beardsworth (2018), has certainly uncovered and taken into account 
such internal dynamics. Meanwhile, most of the existing research is based upon 
individual case studies, while comparative work remains very much focused on 
particular regions (say Francophone Africa or East Africa). While this makes sense 
methodologically, this is a missed opportunity to bring together distinct bodies of 
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literature and research traditions and to compare and contrast cases with less similar 
historical legacies and cultural features.  
1.2 The role of opposition parties in hybrid regimes 
The literature provides suggestions as to what the role of parties is in a democracy 
and, to a more limited extent, in an authoritarian setting. This has often taken the shape 
of lists of functions that parties should perform in order to sustain the regime. The role 
that opposition parties, in particular, can play in the grey area represented by hybrid 
regimes is less clear, especially as the stated purpose of opposition parties in such a 
context usually involves regime change rather than its survival. Yet, the scholarship 
on democratisation has been rather dismissive of opposition parties’ contribution, 
feeding an emphatic categorisation of these parties as universally weak.  
 Functions of opposition parties in democracies and autocracies 
As I mentioned earlier, the role of political parties has been predominantly studied 
in democratic contexts. Political parties have been recognised as an important, even 
‘indispensable’ component of democracy contributing to democratic competition and 
government (Lipset 2000), while the development of an integrative and competitive 
party system is seen as a key indicator of democracy (Clapham 1993). Parties are 
‘ubiquitous’ because ‘they perform functions that are valuable to many political 
actors’ (Strøm & Müller 1999: 1).  
Different authors have compiled different lists of party functions, some broader 
than others, at times itemising activities rather than actual functions necessary for the 
system’s survival. I focus here on the most salient functions political parties perform 
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in a democracy and which have formed the basis of what parties are expected to do 
more generally, drawing particularly on the work of Gunther and Diamond (2001) and 
Randall and Svåsand (2002a).  
One of these functions is representation, which designates the fact that parties 
organise and take part in competitive elections, represent the aspirations of their 
constituents, and help them articulate their interests in political terms. This relates to 
what Gunther and Diamond (2001) call issue structuring. This function is considered 
key in consolidating democracy, as parties who fail to represent the interests of their 
constituents and address their preoccupations lay the ground for undemocratic take-
overs.  
A second important function is integration and mobilisation: political parties 
integrate citizens into the democratic system and mobilise them to enhance political 
participation, which is sometimes considered a defining characteristic of democracy. 
Indeed, if people feel integrated into the system – which can translate into higher voter 
turnout and political expression through accepted mechanisms like political parties – 
they will have an interest in ensuring its perpetuation and will be less likely to allow 
the democratic system to fall (Gunther & Diamond 2001: 8).  
A third function parties often perform is that of interest aggregation: parties 
combine the demands of groups or individuals into coherent programmes, which is 
deemed fundamental to ensuring the coherence of public policy (Randall & Svåsand 
2002a: 5–6). However, whether this function is being fulfilled even within established 
democracies has been questioned (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 33).  
Fourth, political parties are responsible for the recruitment and training of the elite: 
they identify and groom political leaders, by attracting and channelling political 
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representatives or focusing their ambition and by accustoming them to democratic 
processes and rules.  
Fifth, another key function of political parties in a democracy is that they facilitate 
government accountability: ruling parties channel popular demands and inform 
government decisions, and can therefore be held responsible for the government’s 
actions. While left aside by Gunther and Diamond, another party function of 
organising opposition is included by Randall and Svåsand (2002a) who see it as 
fundamental to ensuring horizontal accountability (see also Erdmann 2004: 69). This 
aspect is central as even parties that are unlikely to win power can monitor the 
government’s actions, present alternatives, and mobilise opposition, and thus 
contribute to democratic consolidation even in the absence of political turn-overs (Van 
Eerd 2017). 
In authoritarian settings, studies on the role of parties have focused largely on ruling 
parties. Authors such as Brownlee (2007), Gandhi (2008), Ezrow and Frantz (2011), 
or Pepinski (2014) have found that parties can help to consolidate an autocrat’s hold 
on power in various ways: parties may contain factional conflict among ruling elite, 
therefore preventing regime crises, by providing mechanisms to resolve disputes and 
to organise leadership succession (Brownlee 2007: 33; Gandhi 2008: 79–80; Ezrow & 
Frantz 2011). Political parties may also mobilise popular support for the regime by 
creating patronage and public good provision networks between the elite and 
opponents, and between the elite and citizens (Gandhi 2008: 76–77; Gandhi & Lust-
Okar 2009: 410; Ezrow & Frantz 2011: 4).  
Opposition parties have received far less attention from scholars working on non-
democratic settings. In the case of single-party, personalistic, or military regimes, the 
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reason why is rather self-explanatory: there is simply no opposition party to speak of 
– though opposition forces can exist in other forms. In other types of authoritarian 
regimes, this is more surprising. One exception is the work of Albrecht (2005, 2013), 
who studied how political opposition (including tolerated opposition parties, but also 
political NGOs and anti-system movements) contributed to the survival of Mubarak’s 
authoritarian regime in Egypt. Albrecht contends that the opposition does so by 
performing five functions which contribute to the legitimacy of the authoritarian 
regime and serve ‘as a mechanism for societal control beyond pure repression’ 
(Albrecht 2005: 391). He argues that the opposition helps to sustain the authoritarian 
regime by providing it with increased legitimacy domestically; improving its 
international image therefore allowing it to receive development funds (rent-seeking); 
enabling the co-optation of opposition leaders from parties and civil society; 
channelling societal dissent; and moderating the opposition and de-radicalising 
domestic resistance. Albrecht’s research unintendedly echoes the work conducted over 
thirty years earlier by Lavau (1969) on the French Communist Party (PCF) and his 
argument that the PCF, an anti-system party in the French Fifth Republic, actually 
performed regime-sustaining functions such as providing legitimacy, serving as a 
tribune, and diffusing dissent.  
While scholars have investigated the role of opposition parties in democracies and 
autocracies, their functions within hybrid regimes have been largely ignored. This may 
be due to difficulties in figuring out how to approach it. Opposition parties could play 





 A role to play for democratisation? 
The return to multipartyism in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s was 
accompanied with a proliferation of studies on democratisation, its causes, 
manifestations, and hurdles. Yet, within this scholarship, the role of political parties 
initially remained of little interest. As Elischer (2013: 261) notes, ‘Parties are the 
inevitable by-product of democratization, yet the reverse relationship is rarely, if ever, 
analyzed’. This may be partly explained by their notable absence in the period leading 
up to democratic transitions, as repressive conditions prevented parties from existing 
or being politically active, except for ruling single parties in one-party regimes. In this 
context, other actors – such as civil society, trade unions, and international partners – 
inevitably played a more important role at the start of the democratisation process and 
have consequently attracted more attention in the literature (e.g. Bratton & Van de 
Walle 1997; Daloz and Quantin (eds) 1997; Joseph 1999).  
Various authors have argued that opposition parties were weak and consequently 
could not contribute to democratisation processes in their country. For example, 
Rakner & Van de Walle (2009) identified opposition weakness as a key factor 
impeding ‘democratisation by election’ on the continent (see Lindberg (ed.) 2009). 
Levitsky and Way (2010a: 69–70), in their influential book on competitive 
authoritarianism, argued that the strength or weakness of an incumbent is a more 
important factor than the capacity of the opposition in explaining why some 
incumbents lose power and not others. Lotshwao (2011), in his study of Botswana, 
suggested that opposition parties were so weak that democratisation efforts should 
simply ignore them and focus instead on increasing internal democracy within the 
ruling party.  
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Yet, the idea that opposition parties fail to meaningfully contribute to regime 
change and democratisation has been challenged. Bunce and Wolchik (2010) see 
opposition parties’ use of novel and sophisticated strategies as a key factor in 
explaining incumbent defeat and electoral change in competitive authoritarian 
regimes. Meanwhile, Van Eerd (2017) found a positive effect of opposition 
competitiveness on democratic consolidation prospects in dominant party systems, 
even when opposition parties were too weak to actually win elections and take power. 
But a real pioneer who has looked at opposition parties in a new light, and in the 
specific context of hybrid regimes, has been LeBas. In her book From Protest to 
Parties (2013: 7), she argues that:  
‘Opposition parties play two roles in the ‘hybrid’ or semi-democratic regimes 
that have become prevalent in the late Third Wave of democracy. They compete 
in elections, but they also coordinate the popular mobilization and protests that 
push political change forward’.  
It means that in addition to fulfilling some of the same functions as their counterparts 
in established democracies, as listed earlier, they also play an important role in 
criticising the regime and leading battles for democratisation. It shows distinctively 
the paradox in which opposition parties find themselves within hybrid regimes: while 
they take part in the system, they also protest against it.  
In contrast to the prevailing trend in the democratisation scholarship, which has 
been to emphasise the role, strategies and skills of incumbents, LeBas assumes that 
regime change is primarily driven by popular mobilisation, which is why she focuses 
on protest and its links with party formation, even though such mobilisation can also 
feed conflict, violence and repression. She argues that the strength of opposition parties 
is a determining factor in whether a state enjoys competitive elections, which is itself 
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necessary for rooted and accountable government. She therefore argues that opposition 
parties can contribute to democratisation processes and that the weakness of opposition 
parties is the primary cause of authoritarian persistence. In her view, strong opposition 
parties lead to democratisation because they make it harder for incumbents to stay in 
power, while weak opposition parties enable incumbents to retain control of the pace 
and extent of democratisation, leading to semi-authoritarianism.  
At the core of the debate over opposition parties’ ability to contribute to 
democratisation is their perceived weakness. Many authors define the strength or 
weakness of the opposition in electoral terms, reducing it to their share of 
parliamentary seats (Rakner & Van de Walle 2009: 109; Lotshwao 2011: 104). They 
also pin this underperformance on opposition parties’ own failures, such as poor 
leadership and power struggles, lack of internal democracy, and their inability to form 
coalitions (Lotshwao 2011; Katundu 2018). However, are these features causes of 
opposition’s underperformance, or symptoms of their so-called weakness? Once again, 
LeBas adopts an insightful approach. She (2013: 23) defines party strength as ‘quite 
simply, the ability to effectively organize and represent societal interests’ and 
challenges the main paradigm that African opposition parties are universally weak. 
Indeed, this generalisation that prevails in the literature obscures some successes that 
show that the political opposition can matter: as has been said earlier, some opposition 
parties have been able to bring about presidential turnovers in their country, while 
others have enjoyed a stable and significant share of the votes and parliamentary seats 






In a nutshell, this dissertation contributes to a limited but growing scholarship on 
(opposition) parties in Africa and hybrid regimes more generally. While this regime 
type has been analysed with a focus on incumbents (Levitsky & Way 2010a), 
opposition parties on the African continent have been side-lined in the literature, due 
to the predominance of prisms such as ethnicity and clientelism, and to a stronger focus 
on other political stakeholders. However, the last decade has been marked by a shift, 
with a new generation of scholars becoming interested in political parties on the 
continent and starting to study them in a less dismissive manner. Authors such as 
Elischer (2013) and LeBas (2013) have quickly become classics in the field, and a new 
wave of partisan research has emerged from Europe, America, and the African 
continent itself (e.g. Alfieri 2016a; Kwofie & Bob-Milliar 2017; Souaré 2017; 
Beardsworth 2018; Paget 2018; McLellan 2019; Kelly 2020). 
Yet, the role of opposition parties in (African) hybrid regimes remain little or poorly 
explored. Except for the odd exception, such as the work of LeBas (2013) and Van 
Eerd (2017), scholars have tended to use an approach skewed by a normative 
component, focusing on what opposition parties should be doing to enable a 
democracy to emerge, and not interested in what parties actually do. Their role in 
democratisation processes was studied in this manner, based upon expectations 
derived from the role of parties in liberal democracies, which led to their dismissal as 
soon as they did not fit into the classic model. Van Eerd (2017) and LeBas (2013) 
provide much-needed alternatives to this discourse. It is undeniable that strong parties 
are needed to expand political participation in a stable, sustainable manner. This was 
highlighted by Huntington (1968: 409–410), who associates a party’s strength to its 
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institutionalisation, operated by its ability to survive its founder, the complexity of its 
internal organisation, and its capacity to mobilise support.  
But we need to look empirically at how opposition parties are founded, how they 
are organised and operate, and how they engage the regime they face – instead of 
hiding behind an ill-described ‘weakness’ shortcut. In doing so, I contribute to a 
broader scholarship that looks at how institutions actually work, including 
bureaucracies (Bierschen and De Sardan (eds) 2014), decentralisation processes 
(Mahieu & Yilmaz 2010; Waddilove 2019), legislatures (Barkan (ed.) 2009; Collord 
2019; Opalo 2019), and democratic institutions more broadly (Cheeseman (ed.) 2018; 
Villalón and Idrissa (eds) 2020). The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is 
discussed further in the conclusion – the intervening chapters providing an empirical 
analysis of how opposition parties emerge and operate in Burkina Faso and Uganda. 
Before diving into these empirics, however, the next chapter lays out the 






Before diving into the empirical heart of this thesis, I review in this chapter how the 
research was conducted – from the theoretical premises to the actual data collection 
and analysis processes. I first describe the methodological approach used for this 
project, a combination of qualitative research, induction, and comparison, and explain 
in detail how I selected the countries and parties used as case studies. I then describe 
my empirical methods, covering data collection, sampling, and analysis process. 
Afterwards, I discuss research logistics in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Finally, I address 
the potential ethical issues related to my project.  
2.1 A qualitative, inductive, and comparative approach 
This doctoral thesis is built upon a qualitative, inductive, and comparative 
approach, which I outline in this section.  
Qualitative research is a broad concept, an ‘umbrella term for a rich array of 
research practices and products’ which enable the researcher to ‘explore, describe, or 
explain social phenomenon; unpack the meanings people ascribe to activities, 
situations, events, or artefacts; build a depth of understanding about some aspect of 
social life’ (Leavy 2014: 2). In order to explore and assess opposition political parties’ 
organisation, institutionalisation, and mobilisation capacities and to unpack their 
attributed ‘weakness’, it appeared necessary to collect in-depth accounts from 
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stakeholders within or surrounding these parties. As already stated at the outset of this 
thesis, qualitative approaches have been better suited to analyse such questions than 
quantitative methods, because they can account for historical legacies and the complex 
ways regimes work and parties operate in a broader manner (Introduction). 
My approach involved extensive ‘fieldwork’, meaning a period of time during 
which I conducted research in the countries I was studying. During this time, I met and 
interviewed stakeholders to collect qualitative primary data, gathered secondary data 
such as locally published books and party documentation, and familiarised myself with 
the political context and culture through press monitoring and day-to-day interactions. 
‘Fieldwork’ as a concept and as a term has been the subject of debates (see for example 
Strohm 09/12/2019; Mertens et al. 27/01/2020). It is certainly problematic as far as it 
contributes to othering and denying the agency of the stakeholders involved in the 
research subject, by creating a dichotomy between ‘the field’ and ‘not-the-field’ (the 
researcher’s home country or institution for example), and fuels power hierarchies 
within academia.  
In my case, living for extended periods of time in Uganda (10 months) and Burkina 
Faso (2.5 years), including beyond the period of data collection, has blurred the 
difference between the field and not-the-field. Yet, despite the issues related to the 
‘fieldwork’ concept, I believe it remains important to recognise the value of human 
and physical data collection – as opposed to doing research remotely from one’s 
subject. The process of traveling to and getting to know the country one studies beyond 
the specific research question; using research methods that allow stakeholders to have 
voice and agency in sharing their accounts; and the acquisition of in-depth knowledge 
of the context and local dynamics all make a valuable contribution to one’s research 
findings and promote inter-connexion of researchers and stakeholders (Wood 2009). 
46 
 
This research was conducted in an inductive manner. I started out by enquiring 
about what opposition parties actually do, rather than by checking whether they did 
what they arguably ‘should’ do. Therefore, I collected information about parties’ own 
stated objectives and perceived role, as well as the constraints they face and means 
they use, in order to understand their internal organisation, the way they mobilise and 
engage the regime, and the functions they end up playing within this context. This 
approach follows in the footsteps of recent work reconsidering the significance and 
performance of institutions in a similar manner, such as the collective volumes edited 
by Bierschenk and De Sardan (2014), and Cheeseman (2018). 
Finally, my research approach is comparative. By comparing and contrasting 
different cases, a researcher can formulate findings that go beyond a single case-study 
and explain similar or divergent outcomes on the backdrop of similarities and 
differences in terms of context and attributes. My research rests upon a two-level 
comparison framework: I compare opposition parties across countries, and I compare 
opposition parties within countries. This allows me to analyse similarities and 
differences among different parties operating within the same system, and also to 
confront similar types of parties in different national settings. I have opted for a small-
N comparison, focusing on two country-cases and two party-cases in each country (so 
four party-cases in total). This allows for in-depth research and the consideration of 
historical dynamics which a higher number of cases would hamper, enabling a ‘lower 
level of abstraction and [the] inclusion of historical and cultural factors’ (Landman 






Comparison across countries must follow a certain logic. Hybrid regimes can be 
found on all continents – the 35 competitive-authoritarian regimes listed by Levitsky 
and Way (2010a: 21) include for example Russia, Peru, Mexico, Taiwan and 
Cambodia. Yet, I decided to focus on a specific world region particularly dominated 
by this type of regime: sub-Saharan Africa. In 2014, the Polity IV index classified 25 
of 44 sub-Saharan African states as anocracies, defined as mixed or incoherent 
authority regimes, and thus as hybrid regimes (see also Bogaards & Elischer 2016). 
The spread of multipartyism across the continent from the early 1990s led to the 
emergence of many hybrid regimes that display an uneven playing field and enable 
old autocrats to hold onto power. In all the open presidential elections that occurred 
between 1990 and 1994, 15 incumbents were re-elected, while 14 were replaced 
(Bratton & Van de Walle 1997: 8). More recent data shows that between 1990 and 
2015, 29 countries have not experienced an electoral alternation at all, and in only 21 
cases was an incumbent actually defeated at the ballot box (Bleck & Van de Walle 
2018: 56)5.  
The scope of my research is therefore limited to sub-Saharan Africa, a region which, 
despite its heterogeneity, has been characterised by common experiences such as 
colonialism, independence, authoritarianism and the third wave of democratisation. 
Still, in order to take into account a wide range of factors and to look at hybrid regimes 
in their diversity, I decided to select two countries as different from each other as 
possible among the African cases available, loosely drawing from the Most Different 
 
5 In another 16 cases, an opposition party won in an open election, where the incumbent was not 
standing. Bleck and Van de Walle’s dataset includes a total of 184 elections overall.  
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Systems Design or Method of Agreement (Mill 1843; Przeworksi & Teune 1970). This 
consists in selecting cases exhibiting different characteristics – or independent 
variables – but similar outcomes. The Method of Agreement is sometimes considered 
as ‘inferior’ to the Most Similar System Design due to its ‘tendency to lead to faulty 
empirical generalizations’ (Moses & Knutsen 2010: 102). However, it is better suited 
to my enquiry, which is to understand what role opposition parties can play in a hybrid 
regime in an inductive manner, rather than to ‘test’ causal mechanisms between set 
‘variables’. This approach therefore allows me to unpack the dynamics behind 
opposition parties’ simultaneous weakness and endurance within African hybrid 
regimes. 
The case selection cuts across colonial legacies and linguistic lines, as it includes a 
Francophone former French colony and an English-speaking country that was 
formerly part of the British Empire (an approach also used by Osei 2012). To confront 
and contrast bodies of literature and local dynamics, I also decided to go beyond a sub-
regional cluster, and to select my cases from two different regional blocs (Western and 
Eastern). This approach also enabled me to avoid the ‘Galton problem’ inherent to 
studying inter-connected states with high degrees of diffusion between them (Naroll 
1965; Ross & Homer 1976): similar patterns may be explained by borrowing and value 
diffusion across cases, a risk increased by geographical proximity and interacting 
within regional organisations in the present case. I avoided countries with an ongoing 
conflict, as it might affect the dynamics under study and the data collection process, 
as well as those whose multiparty system were set up or restored too recently to have 
a significant timeframe to explore.  
I also favoured countries which had received relatively less attention than most, so 
that the empirical data collected in itself would be a worthy contribution. Based upon 
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these considerations, among the 25 African countries classified as hybrid regimes in 
the Polity IV index in 2014, I selected Burkina Faso (under Compaoré) and Uganda 
(under Museveni) as case studies. Burkina Faso was selected first, motivated by my 
personal connections and pre-established knowledge of this country (where I had 
previously lived and worked), as well as the realisation that it was a particularly under-
studied case, especially in the Anglophone literature. Uganda was selected through a 
logical process of elimination based upon the considerations outlined above. As 
detailed hereafter, these two countries have different colonial legacies, are located on 
opposite sides of the continent, have had different historical trajectories leaving 
disparate legacies, and display different levels and kinds of ethnic, religious, and 
regional cleavages. Yet both regimes can be considered hybrid and one-party 
dominant.  
Burkina Faso, a former French colony, landlocked in the heart of West Africa, 
achieved independence in 1960. After the 1966 coup that removed its first President, 
Maurice Yaméogo, Upper Volta (as it was then called) was ruled by a succession of 
military regimes, though limited multipartyism subsisted under Sangoulé Lamizana’s 
Third Republic in the 1970s. In 1987, Compaoré came to power through the sixth 
successful coup in the country’s history, putting an end to the revolutionary regime of 
Captain Thomas Sankara (1983-1987). In 1991, Compaoré restored a constitutional 
order with the set-up of the Fourth Republic, which is the regime under study in this 
dissertation. Scholars who have worked extensively on Burkina Faso have 
unanimously described Compaoré’s regime as hybrid, and often also favoured 
Ottaway’s more specific concept of semi-authoritarianism (Englebert 1996; Hilgers 
and Mazzocchetti (eds) 2010; Loada 2010). Compaoré was toppled by a popular 
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insurrection in October 2014, shortly after the start of my research project, giving way 
to a political transition and turnover beyond the scope of this thesis.  
On the other hand, Uganda is located in East Africa and formerly part of the British 
Empire. After independence in 1962, the first executive leader, Milton Obote, banned 
political parties in 1966, and was toppled by Idi Amin Dada in 1971 who installed a 
famously cruel regime. Following Amin’s removal by an alliance of Tanzanian troops 
and an Obote rebellion, elections were organised in 1980. The polls, widely 
acknowledged as fraudulent (Willis et al. 2017), re-instated Milton Obote as President 
and kickstarted a six-year Bush War led by Museveni, which brought him to power in 
1986. Museveni first installed a ‘no-party democracy’ in which all political activities 
were held under an encompassing National Resistance Movement (NRM), the civilian 
outcome of the National Resistance Army. Political parties existed during that time 
but were seriously weakened, and it is only in 2005 that multipartyism was officially 
restored.  
Just like Burkina Faso, Uganda under Museveni has been described as a hybrid 
regime by country specialists (Tripp 2010; Perrot et al. (eds) 2014b; Makara 2016). 
But important differences exist between the two countries, aside from colonial history 
and geographical location. Ethnic and religious cleavages appear more salient in 
Uganda than in Burkina Faso, illustrated by the Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups 
scores employed by Posner (2004: 856) and by the historical ties between Ugandan 
parties and Christian churches (Ward 2005). Pre-electoral coalitions are a regular 
feature of Ugandan elections, despite their systematic collapse (Beardsworth 2018), 
but not in Burkina Faso. Uganda has experienced extensive civil conflicts in the past, 
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contrary to Burkina Faso;6 while civil society and trade unions appear stronger and 
more political in Burkina Faso than in Uganda (Oloka-Onyango & Barya 1997; Loada 
1999; Barya 2010). The selection of these two countries therefore enabled me to study 
hybrid regimes in their diversity and to observe a variety of dynamics affecting 
opposition parties’ formation and operations. A more detailed overview of each 
country’s political history is provided in Chapter 3.  
A common weakness of small-N studies is selection bias (Landman & Carvalho 
2017: 280), especially when the cases are selected based upon their outcome. Because 
my own research was inductive and did not have a clear set of variables at the start, 
this particular bias was avoided. While opposition parties in both Burkina Faso and 
Uganda can be considered to be weak, the two countries are characterised by different 
party and regime trajectories. The longevity of the DP in Uganda, for example, is 
unparalleled in Burkina Faso. More strikingly, the popular insurrection that took place 
in Burkina Faso in October 2014 – the outset of my PhD – denotes a regime change 
that remains elusive in Uganda. The occurrence of this insurrection created a distinct 
set of challenges, and made me consider a change in my case studies. However, I 
decided to retain Burkina Faso as a case, but took steps to avoid ‘rewriting history’ in 
a post-facto bias: I ensured a triangulation of sources using secondary literature and 
press reports in addition to interviews; I regularly reminded interviewees that the focus 
was on the Compaoré era and asked them to reflect on the similarities or differences 
between that period and the time of research; and finally, I considered my pre-existing 
knowledge about the political dynamics at hand, notably derived from conducting 
research for my Master’s thesis (Bertrand 2011) and informal observation of the 2012 
 
6 Since 2016, an armed insurgency with ties to Islamist groups in the Sahel has affected Burkina 
Faso, but this falls outside of the research focus.  
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electoral campaign in Ouagadougou. I address the methods used more thoroughly later 
in this chapter (see 2.2).  
 Selecting party-cases 
Analysing political parties requires some sort of typology; however, existing 
typologies, heavily influenced by the Western mass party model, were not very useful 
to observe African parties. The universal typology designed by Gunther and Diamond 
(2001) to allow international comparability is too wide to be applicable in my project 
with its 15 categories. A few other typologies or categorisations have been offered 
since the return of multiparty politics in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Van de 
Walle and Butler (1999: 19–21) identified three categories of parties: ‘ex-single 
parties’, ‘historic parties’, and ‘new parties’. This typology, while useful to analyse 
founding elections just after the fall of authoritarian regimes, has become less relevant 
with time, as the distinction between an ex-single party and a new party in power 
gaining access to state resources has become increasingly blurred (Erdmann 2004: 77). 
Gyimah-Boadi (2007: 24) divides African parties into two groups: ‘older parties that 
emerged victorious from the liberation and independence movement’ and ‘new parties 
cobbled together out of pro-democracy groups and opposition movements’; but this 
categorisation leaves out many parties across the continent that do not fit into one of 
those descriptions. Moreover, those existing typologies rarely enable us to distinguish 
various types of opposition parties, which is why I used a different approach in 
selecting the parties under focus in my research.  
When observing the party systems in place in my two country-cases, Uganda and 
Burkina Faso, a significant cleavage distinguishing different opposition parties 
appeared to be their links with the ruling elite. In both countries, we can distinguish 
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parties that have been in the opposition from the start, from parties that have been 
created following a split of the ruling party. This led me to ponder whether these parties 
could organise and operate in different manners. Historical opponents, meaning parties 
and political figures never associated with the ruling elite and who have always 
presented themselves as an alternative, may have a different way to organise and 
mobilise from political organisations who emerged from a split in the ruling party and 
joined the opposition after having been closely associated with the governing elite. 
This is not a dynamic found only in Uganda and Burkina Faso: Riedl (2014: 148–149) 
illustrates the same trend in the case of Senegal:  
‘The PS dictated the legal existence of a “party of contribution” rather than 
“opposition” at the outset. The ruling party, facing domestic and international 
incentives to liberalize, conjured up a strategy to allow a young PS militant who 
was dissatisfied with his own rise within the party – blocked by the dominating 
presence of party elders – to spin off from the ruling party to form the PDS with 
the stringent agreement that the incumbents would decide what an appropriate 
contribution to the national political discourse. Those who became early 
members of the PDS opposition leadership were already members of the political 
elite who possessed a certain access to the state but sought new routes for their 
own participation – they did not seek a democratic opening for the sake of 
political liberalization, but rather a means of improving their personal 
trajectory.’ 
Opposition parties, depending on whether they have emerged from the ruling elite 
or, on the contrary, have never been associated with the regime, may position 
themselves differently towards it and frame their opposition in a different manner, 
because of characteristics that make them act or be perceived differently. Whereas 
historical opponents may be more trusted by a core group of members – though not 
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large enough to have ever raised them to power – due to their resistance to co-optation, 
ruling party spin-offs may be perceived as opportunistic defectors and therefore less 
trustworthy. On the other hand, the latter may be seen as more capable of governing, 
as their leaders have often held high executive or legislative positions giving them a 
comparative valence advantage, whereas long-standing opponents may lack actual 
experience, except at the local level (see Bleck & Van de Walle 2018).  
For this reason, I selected two opposition parties in each country: one considered a 
historical opponent – meaning that the leadership did not come from the ruling party 
– and one originating from a split with the ruling party. To be selected, the parties had 
to be clearly in the opposition. This means that they were not, during the period under 
study, part of an electoral or ruling coalition or alliance with the ruling party, either 
formal or informal. In Burkina Faso, that excluded the ADF-RDA, a long-standing 
moderate opposition party which joined the cabinet in 2000 and supported Compaoré’s 
re-election bid in 2005 and 2010. It also excluded the Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC) 7, founded by former president Milton Obote, because a wing of the party, led 
by Obote’s son Jimmy Akena, allied with the NRM and joined the government in 2016. 
Parties selected also had to be politically relevant at the national level: for this criterion 
I used parliamentary representation as an indicator. A party could still be relevant 
without representation, and some authors have provided great analyses of minor 
parties, too often overlooked (Bob-Milliar 2019; Kelly 2020). Still, the ability to get 
at least a handful of Members of Parliament (MPs) elected is a good indicator of a 
party’s territorial penetration and mobilisation capacity, and its ability to influence 
 
7 The reader should note the potential for confusion between the Burkinabè Union pour le Progrès 
et le Changement (one of the case studies) and the Ugandan People’s Congress (not a case study, but a 
relevant party in Uganda), as both share the same acronym, UPC. The context should normally inform 
the reader about the country referred to.  
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public debates if not policies, and this criterion allows me to observe a broader range 
of party activities. Selected parties had to be represented in parliament during the most 
recent legislature, and their support base had to come from more than one region.  
Based upon these considerations, I selected the following parties: in Burkina Faso, 
the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (UPC) founded by former Minister of the 
Economy Zéphirin Diabré in 2010, and the Union pour la Renaissance–Parti 
Sankariste (UNIR-PS), a historical opposition party built around the legacy of Thomas 
Sankara. UNIR-PS is the product of a series of splits and fusions among a longer line 
of organisations claiming to further Sankara’s heritage. Because of this complex 
history, my research is interested in the broader web of inter-related Sankarist 
organisations succeeding each other throughout the 1990s and 2000s rather than 
focusing solely on the post-2009 party. Leaders of both UNIR-PS and UPC held, in 
turn, the title of Chef de File de l’Opposition Politique (Leader of the Political 
Opposition, CFOP), a status created in 2009 (see Chapter 7 for more details). As 
mentioned earlier, ADF-RDA was left aside because of its alliance with Compaoré 
after 2000. The Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP), founded in January 
2014 by former figures of Compaoré’s party and which went on to win the post-
transition elections in November 2015, was also discarded as too recent to provide 
much insight into opposition dynamics throughout Compaoré’s regime.  
In Uganda, I have studied the Democratic Party (DP), the country’s oldest party, 
which was founded in 1954, prior to Uganda’s independence. Despite taking part in 
Museveni’s broad-based government in the early years of the Movement era, the DP 
left the coalition in 1996 after the no-party provision was inscribed in the 1995 
Constitution and has been in opposition ever since. The second party under study is 
the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), which was founded in 2004 by disgruntled 
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members of Museveni’s NRM and led by Besigye, who has repeatedly and 
unsuccessfully stood against Museveni in presidential elections since then. In addition 
to the UPC, I left aside the Justice Forum (JEEMA) and the Conservative Party (CP) 
because they have failed to obtain more than one parliamentary seat over the years. 
Prior to the 2016 presidential elections, the NRM suffered a new defection, with 
former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi running against Museveni. However, 
Mbabazi did not officially leave the NRM and instead ran as an independent, with the 
support of a movement known as ‘Go Forward’ rather than an established party.  
Table 1 Key information on party-cases 
UNIR-PS (Burkina Faso) UPC (Burkina Faso) 
Union pour la Renaissance – Parti 
Sankariste 
 
▪ Founded in 2009 after multiple 
fusions and splits involving the 
UNIR-MS (created in 2000), the CPS 
(2000), the FFS (1996), the BSB 
(1990), and other parties. 
▪ Presided by Bénéwendé Sankara. 
▪ Won 4 seats in the 2012 legislative 
elections. 
 
Union pour le Progrès et le 
Changement 
▪ Founded in 2010. 
▪ Presided by Zéphirin Diabré. 
▪ Won 19 seats in the 2012 legislative 
elections. 
DP (Uganda) FDC (Uganda) 
Democratic Party 
▪ Founded in 1954 (pre-independence). 
▪ Presided by Norbert Mao since 2010. 
Previously Ssebaana Kizito (2005-
2010); Paul Ssemogerere (1980-
2005); Benedicto Kiwanuka (1956-
1972). 
▪ Has 15 seats in the 10th parliament 
(2016-2021) 
 
Forum for Democratic Change 
▪ Founded in 2004 
▪ President by Patrick Oboi Amuriat 
since 2017. Previously Mugisha 
Muntu (2012-2017) and Kizza 
Besigye (2004-2012). 
▪ Has 37 seats in the 10th parliament 
(2016-2021) 
 




The selection of these four parties as case studies allowed me to draw a broad 
picture of opposition party dynamics in hybrid regimes, taking into consideration their 
diversity – in size, origins, organisation, and success – and their shared constraints.  
2.2 Empirical methods: data collection and analysis 
My research has involved primary data collection in Uganda and Burkina Faso over 
the course of three years (2016-2018). During this period, I built a network of 
informants, observed political dynamics on a day-to-day basis through news and press 
reports and informal conversations, and conducted interviews. This embedded and 
long-term approach allowed me to observe political events more informally and gave 
me time to uncover and understand historical and cultural aspects underpinning 
political dynamics. The length of my fieldwork was influenced by my part-time mode 
of study. In parallel to my doctoral research, I worked as a consultant and undertook a 
series of assessments and evaluations in Burkina Faso and the broader Sahel region on 
behalf of international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).8 These activities 
were clearly distinct from my PhD research to avoid potential confusions, as I explain 
later in this chapter (see 2.4). However, these experiences allowed me to have a more 
in-depth understanding of political dynamics in Burkina Faso and the region, and 
sharpened my research skills such as conducting interviews and focus group 
discussions. 
 
8 This included a study on youth employability and drivers of migration in Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Niger for Plan International; an evaluation of a development programme on women’s engagement in 
agricultural policy making in Burkina Faso for Oxfam; an assessment of governmental policies against 




Data collection consisted mainly of semi-structured interviews with opposition 
party officials and activists, MPs, local councillors, civil society representatives, 
journalists, and other political observers. In total, interviews were held with 146 
stakeholders across the two countries, including 89 in Uganda, and 57 in Burkina Faso 
(see Appendix 1). I used semi-structured interviews with selected party leaders and 
activists from each of the four opposition parties under focus in order to gain an in-
depth understanding of their party’s history, aims, organisation, mobilisation strategies 
and internal dynamics, as well as their perception of the political environment that they 
operate in. The interviews explored the motivations of the party, the internal decision-
making processes, the conception of opposition, and the positioning of the 
interviewee’s party. I developed a semi-structured interview guide which allowed 
enough uniformity and preparation to ensure consistent and relevant data collection, 
whilst also encouraging in-depth and fluid discussions on key issues arising during the 
interview. This guide was a living document and was updated during the fieldwork 
process to reflect my evolving analysis and refine the focus of the research when 
needed.  
By interviewing both party officials and activists, I wanted to avoid an elite bias 
and take into consideration the perceptions of lower-level actors of the party. I talk 
about ‘activists’ rather than ‘members’ or ‘supporters’ because I believe it is the most 
relevant category. Membership – as a more formal than behavioural category (Heidar 
2006) – does not properly reflect participation, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Erdmann (2004: 65) argues that membership data is unreliable ‘because there is either 
no formal membership or in many cases multi-memberships’. Supporters or voters of 
the selected parties would be difficult to identify due to ballot secrecy. Party officials 
were selected among the executive members of each party’s organs and elected 
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figures, while activists were identified through the officials’ assistance among the 
unelected, non-executive supporters having actively taken part in party events.  
In order to have a more complete picture of the opposition dynamics in each country 
as well as avoiding the potential biases and tendencies to rewrite history by the 
interviewed party figures, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with other key 
informants including politicians from other parties, academics, journalists, and civil 
society activists. Interviews covered topics around the perception of opposition 
parties’ role, activities and constraints, as well as on relations between opposition 
parties and other stakeholders such as the media or civil society organisations. In 
Uganda, I met a few representatives of the ruling party, with mixed results. The two 
NRM interviewees from Kasese proved interesting, one because she was a historical 
figure with a deep knowledge of local politics since the early years of the Movement 
system, the other because he was the only NRM agent holding an important seat in this 
opposition-controlled area. Other NRM interviews were less useful, except to assess 
NRM figures’ lack of consideration of the opposition’s role and constraints in Uganda. 
For example, an NRM legislator stated that there was no reason for opposition parties 
to face a financial barrier, saying ‘There is no need for funding really, all parties are 
funded to campaign. Here in Parliament the money is distributed equally’ (int. UG33, 
Kampala, 08/12/2016). In reality, as we will see in Chapter 3, the NRM monopolises 
the limited public funding available to political parties, distributed proportionally 
based upon legislative representation. In Burkina Faso, I was not able to arrange 
interviews with CDP officials or with former dignitaries of the Compaoré regime now 
in government under the MPP banner.  
Interviewees were identified and contacted during the preparatory phase at the 
outset of the field research and during its course, using targeted and chain sampling 
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methods. For each country, an initial list of contacts was established drawing from my 
own and fellow researchers’ networks. Over the course of the research, respondents 
suggested additional people within their networks. I was careful to ensure my sample 
was balanced as to the parties under focus in each country, and to have a broad range 
of other stakeholders too. Within each party, I targeted various categories of people, 
from party officials at the national level to local activists, through members of 
parliament and local councillors. This enabled me to include the views and perceptions 
of a broad sample in terms of age, social class, and level of responsibility within the 
party. I also made sure to interview people from the different factions making up each 
party to ensure a fair and balanced coverage of internal dynamics. In both countries, 
women represented a small minority of interviewees (15 percent on average), as was 
expected based upon the low rate of women’s representation in political parties. I was 
able to interview a slightly larger proportion of women in Uganda (17%) than in 
Burkina Faso (13%), partly explained by the existence of reserved parliamentary seats 
for women at the district level in Uganda.  
Interviews were predominantly conducted individually, but on rare occasions two 
or three individuals were interviewed jointly. In these occasions, interviewees had 
agreed (or requested) to proceed in that fashion, and efforts were made to ensure they 
all felt comfortable responding to questions in this setting. In addition to the 
interviews, four focus group discussions were conducted in Burkina Faso with party 
activists. Interviews were all recorded – except for one interview in Uganda, because 
the interviewee declined it. Most interviews were conducted in English (in Uganda) or 
French (in Burkina Faso). One interview in Uganda was conducted in Luganda with 
the help of a fixer/translator; group discussions and one interview in Burkina Faso 
were at least partly conducted in Mooré with the help of a fixer/translator. Because the 
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fixers were not necessarily unbiased – usually belonging to the same party as the 
interviewee – transcription into French or English was then carried out independently 
by a research assistant not affiliated with any party. The two research assistants also 
contributed to the transcription of other interviews (see section 2.3). In this 
dissertation, quotes from interviews and discussions conducted in Burkina Faso, as 
well as francophone newspaper articles and other sources are provided in their English 
translation, done by me. 
The extended time spent in both Uganda and Burkina Faso also allowed for more 
informal conversations and daily observations, hard to quantify or codify, but 
nonetheless pivotal in my understanding of each country’s underlying political 
dynamics. Fieldwork also consisted in a regular review of press coverage of opposition 
parties’ activities, during which I collected press articles from online archives dealing 
with opposition party activities and organisation from a sample of news outlets, 
ensuring a balance between state-owned and private media. It also gave me the 
opportunity to conduct participatory observation of a couple of party events in Uganda.  
Erdmann, Basedau and Mehler (2007: 11) have argued that ‘[p]roper party 
research requires field work in Africa, and it should not be confined to the party 
headquarters in the capital’. Following their recommendation, I have undertaken 
research in various locations. In addition to the capital cities – Kampala and 
Ouagadougou – and their surroundings (Wakiso and Namasuba, districts bordering 
Kampala in Uganda), I have also gone to secondary towns in both countries, and a 
couple of rural locations in Burkina Faso. This allowed me to speak with local officials 
and activists in various opposition strongholds and to assess local dynamics beyond a 
capital-centric approach.  
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In Uganda, I targeted five towns which display a certain support for opposition 
parties: Soroti, Gulu, Kasese, Masaka, and Mukono.  
Soroti is a town of about 50,000 people (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2016: 63) 
located in Teso, in the Eastern Region. Teso was previously dominated by Milton 
Obote’s UPC. It was an armed opposition area until the mid-1990s and was later 
affected by incursions by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This insecurity has 
fuelled anti-government sentiments and led to the FDC’s success. While the NRM has 
regained ground in the Teso sub-region since 2011, partly through defections from the 
opposition studied by Perrot (2016), Soroti has remained an FDC stronghold, 
illustrated by the fact that in 2016, Besigye obtained 56.9% of the vote in the district.  
Kasese is a town of over 100,000 inhabitants located at the foot of the Rwenzori 
mountains in the Western region. Like Soroti, it is dominated by the FDC. It is 
perceived as a long-standing opposition stronghold: Museveni was popular there when 
he opposed Milton Obote, but the government’s refusal to recognise the Rwenzururu 
kingdom when it restored others (including the neighbouring Tooro kingdom) in 1993 
fuelled resentment. Despite the government’s finally changing its mind in 2005, 
Besigye still came ahead of Museveni in the 2006 presidential polls. As a local civil 
society figure argued, ‘It was too late, people had already defined their relationship 
with the government and opposition’ (int. UG62, Kasese, 15/05/2018). The area has 
also been affected by violence, notably due to spill-overs from the civil conflict in the 
neighbouring DRC involving the Allied Democratic Forces (see Scorgie 2011), but 
also ethnic clashes fuelled by a broad range of political, historical and socio-economic 
drivers (Reuss & Titeca 2017). Today, all MPs from the district belong to the FDC, 
and the local Woman MP, Winnie Kiiza, was the Leader of the Opposition in 
Parliament (LOP) between May 2016 and August 2018.  
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Gulu is the largest town in the Northern region, with around 150,000 inhabitants. 
This area was heavily impacted by civil war from the 1990s with the LRA’s violence 
fuelling internal displacement. Once a small provincial town, Gulu was transformed 
into the largest displacement camp in the region after the government’s forced 
displacement of the whole rural Acholi population in 1996 (Branch 2013: 3153). Gulu 
is the cradle of the DP: in the 1950s, a group of Catholic civil servants working in 
Northern Uganda, feeling marginalised, came together to form a political force. In the 
words of an elder from the DP, ‘the idea started in Gulu’, and was then conveyed by 
one of these civil servants originally from Central Uganda who was asked ‘to come 
and sell the idea down south in Kampala’ (int. UG03, Kampala, 20/04/2016), which 
led to the official formation of the DP in 1954. While the DP has long been – and 
remains – grounded in the Buganda kingdom9, Gulu is one of the few places where the 
party has retained a pocket of support. This is partly explained by the fact that it is the 
home of Norbert Mao, the current party president. In 2011, when Mao contested the 
presidential elections, most of his support came from Gulu and Pakwash districts in 
the Acholi sub-region – though he obtained less than 2 percent of the vote nationally 
(Beardsworth 2018: 99–101). The two members of parliaments currently representing 
constituencies in Gulu belong to the DP, while the local administration is headed by 
an FDC District Chairman and dominated by the opposition.  
Masaka is a town of over 100,000 people at the heart of the Buganda kingdom. It is 
a long-standing DP stronghold, where DP values and membership are passed on from 
 
9 Buganda is a subnational kingdom comprising Uganda’s central region, including the capital city 
Kampala, which gave its name to the country. A semi-autonomous kingdom at independence, it was 
abolished in 1966 by Obote and restored in 1993 by Museveni, and currently retains a degree of 
autonomy and an important influence on Ugandan politics. The reader should note that inhabitants of 
Buganda are the Baganda (singular Muganda).  
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generation to generation. Currently, two of the three directly elected MPs in the district 
as well as the local Woman MP were elected on a DP ticket.  
Finally, Mukono is a town of around 160,000 inhabitants only 27 kilometres away 
from the capital city, Kampala. Like Masaka, it is in the Central region and historically 
a DP stronghold. In 2010, Betty Nambooze was elected as MP for the municipality, 
defeating the NRM incumbent.  
Figure 3 Fieldwork locations in Uganda 
 




In Burkina Faso, I conducted research in three areas in addition to the capital: the 
Passoré province, the Boulgou province, and the town of Koudougou. The first two 
are the home regions of the UNIR-PS and UPC party leaders respectively, which 
contributes to each party’s strength locally, both in terms of electoral results and of 
organisational grounding (see Stroh 2010). Koudougou has historically been 
considered a rebellious town (Hilgers 2006).  
In the Passoré province (North region), I conducted research in the main urban 
centre, Yako, and in two rural villages, Bokin and Minissia. In 2012, the UNIR-PS 
obtained one of the three legislative seats in the province, as well as 126 municipal 
seats out of 472. While losing limited ground in 2015, the party still obtained 26.2% 
of the vote at the legislative polls in the province, its highest score nationally. This 
province is a Sankarist stronghold for two reasons. First, it is where former president 
Thomas Sankara originates from: his father’s village is Bokin. Therefore, resentment 
towards Compaoré is high, and Sankarist messages receive a particular echo in the 
area. In addition, several figures of the UNIR-PS are also local figures, including the 
party president Bénéwendé Sankara10. The Mayor of Bokin is the former leader of the 
Convention Panafricaine Sankariste (CPS), which fused with the Union pour la 
Renaissance – Mouvement Sankariste (UNIR-MS) to form the UNIR-PS in 2009. This 
allowed me to consider the internal divisions within the UNIR-PS and the broader 
historical network of Sankarist organisations.  
I also went to the Boulgou province (Centre-East region), specifically to the town 
of Tenkodogo and the rural locality of Garango. Tenkodogo was the first capital of the 
 
10 No family relation with Thomas Sankara. To avoid confusion, both Bénéwendé Sankara and 
Thomas Sankara are referred to by their full name throughout this dissertation, contrary to other 
politicians who are referred to by their last name only after the first occurrence.  
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Mossi Kingdom, dating back to the 12th century and to the Legend of Princess 
Yennenga, but the Bissa lived in the area earlier. Contrary to the highly hierarchical 
Mossi society, the Bissa are an acephalous society. Historically, tensions have existed 
between the two groups due to the Mossi practice of capturing Bissa as slaves during 
the Empire’s expansion, and land issues which have persisted to this day (Faure 2002). 
While Diabré was born in Ouagadougou, he is a Bissa, which has been seen by some 
observers as a political handicap (Sahelien.com 11/12/2015; int. BF26 05/04/2018). In 
the first elections the UPC took part in, in 2012, the party obtained 148 of 699 
municipal seats in the province and one of four legislative seats. In the 2015 legislative 
elections, it had become the first political force in the province where it got its highest 
score – 53.1% (Bemahoun et al. 2016).  
Finally, I conducted interviews in Koudougou, the third largest city in Burkina Faso 
and long considered a rebellious town and an opposition stronghold. When Thomas 
Sankara was killed in the coup that brought Compaoré to power on 15 October 1987, 
a group of soldiers led by Boukary Kaboré organised an armed resistance in the 
Koudougou camp. In 1998, when the journalist Norbert Zongo was assassinated, 
protests were particularly virulent in Koudougou, the hometown of the slain reporter 
(Hilgers 2010). The wave of protests that shook Compaoré’s rule in 2011 also started 
there after a student named Justin Zongo (no relation) died whilst in police custody. 
The town is also the birthplace of Maurice Yaméogo, the country’s first president 
(1960-1966), and of his son Hermann Yaméogo, leader of the opposition party ADF-
RDA until 2003.11 However, despite this reputation, opposition parties such as the 
UNIR-PS and the UPC, have failed to obtain legislative or municipal seats in the 
 
11 After 2005, the ADF-RDA, under the leadership of Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo, was co-opted by 
Compaoré and joined the government. 
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constituency, with Yaméogo’s parties – first the ADF-RDA, then the National Union 
for Development and Democracy (UNDD) – being the real challengers to the ruling 
CDP there. In Koudougou, I only interviewed three people from UNIR-PS (jointly) 
and one representative of the UPC due to limited time. 
Figure 4 Fieldwork locations in Burkina Faso 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using Google Maps 
I used my own coding system adapted to my specific project, using QSR’s NVivo 
software to centralise and code all sources. I used 130 units grouped into theme-nodes 
to sort the information collected during interviews, for example information related to 
each political party, respondents’ reasons to join their party (e.g. inspired by leaders, 
attracted by the party’s actions or manifesto, family heritage, etc.), or the different 
aspects of internal party organisation (candidate selection, local structures, leadership, 
internal divisions etc). I started the codification with a shorter list of nodes developed 
based upon the interview guides’ main themes and expected categories derived from 
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the literature, and I expanded the coding system in line with the actual data collected. 
This system allowed me to compare responses from different respondents addressing 
similar themes to identify patterns. The final codebook is included as Appendix 2.  
2.3 Conducting fieldwork: logistics, safety, and local collaboration 
As stated earlier on, my research involved an extended period of fieldwork in both 
Burkina Faso and Uganda. Understanding the conditions in which data was collected 
is important to contextualise and appreciate the findings contained in this dissertation. 
I therefore address hereafter how my research was conducted logistically. I highlight 
in particular the safety concerns and related measures taken, and how I collaborated 
with local stakeholders. The following section looks at other ethical considerations.  
Data collection in Uganda was conducted in two phases. I lived in Kampala, 
Uganda, for ten months starting just after the February 2016 elections, which enabled 
me to obtain the necessary research permit, familiarise myself with the political 
environment, and identify and interview respondents. While research was mostly 
concentrated in the capital, Kampala, I also had a two-day research trip to Mukono, 
and observed a training of DP local councillors in Masaka. I returned to Uganda for a 
shorter, more intensive follow-up trip in May 2018. Then, I spent three weeks 
conducting additional interviews in Kampala and surrounding districts (Wakiso, 
Namasuba), and two weeks visiting four peripherical towns: Soroti, Gulu, Kasese, and 
Masaka (see 2.2). 
The research in Burkina Faso, on the other hand was spread between January 2017 
and December 2018. Contrary to Uganda where my research was contemporary – 
focusing on opposition parties in the current regime headed by Museveni – in Burkina 
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Faso, my research dealt with the pre-2014 regime of Compaoré. The occurrence of the 
insurrection, a critical juncture, meant that interviewees could potentially be tempted 
to ‘rewrite history’ in the light of what happened in 2014, or be influenced by their 
own position shift, such as the UNIR-PS who had been a long-time opposition party 
throughout the Compaoré regime, but is now part of the ruling coalition. At the same 
time, despite the regime change of 2014, there was also continuity at some level, 
especially regarding internal processes and dynamics. This meant that interviewees 
sometimes had to be steered back to the past when they tended to discuss current 
events, and were asked about what changes and continuities existed before and after 
the insurrection. Most of the research in Burkina Faso was conducted in the capital, 
Ouagadougou. In addition, I conducted three short research trips to areas where 
opposition parties are relatively strong: the Passoré province for UNIR-PS (urban site 
Yako, rural sites Bokin and Minissia), the Boulgou for UPC (urban site Tenkodogo 
and rural site Garango), and the town of Koudougou.  
During my fieldwork, I had to contend with security considerations. While the 
protection of participants was of the utmost importance (see 2.4), protecting myself as 
an individual and as a researcher was also a crucial issue. This aspect was given 
particular consideration, both by myself and my supervisors, due to events that had 
highlighted the risks, sometimes under-estimated, faced by researchers and other 
professionals in doing this kind of work. In particular, the death of Cambridge DPhil 
candidate Giulio Regeni during his fieldwork in Egypt had a great echo in British 
academia and forced universities to re-assess the security of their staff and students 
(Times Higher Education 12/02/2016). Another, less grim but still meaningful, event 
that influenced my own behaviour was the arrest of two European journalists in 
Burundi while they were interviewing an opposition leader in January 2016, only a 
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couple of weeks before the start of my fieldwork in Uganda (Le Monde 29/01/2016). 
While they were released after 24 hours, their equipment (mobile phones, cameras) 
were seized and kept by the police. These events informed my strategy and attitude to 
ensure my own safety and that of my research participants. The security concerns 
during my research were of a different nature in each country: in Uganda, it had to do 
with conducting research of a political nature in the context of a hybrid regime; in 
Burkina Faso, it concerned the progressive deterioration of security across the country 
during the period of fieldwork resulting from the increasing activity of Islamist armed 
groups.  
I arrived in Kampala in February 2016, just after the elections had taken place. The 
capital city was characterised by a heavy military presence, illustrated by the army 
camp set up on Kololo Airstrip – a large public square in the middle of a posh 
neighbourhood. The main opposition candidate, Besigye, had been put under house 
arrest the day after the election, so as to prevent him from contesting the results – either 
in court or in the streets. This context may have appeared less than favourable to 
conducting research on opposition politics.  
Yet, Kampala also hosted universities and research centres which have been doing 
political and critical research, and a relatively outspoken private press. Other 
researchers, including fellow PhD students and one of my supervisors, had been 
conducting research about political parties and the elections in the country the previous 
year without any particular problem. These two realities standing side-by-side are, in 
my view, very reflective of the hybrid environment my research is focused on. As 
Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 60) have noted, hybrid regimes feature ‘fluid political 
characteristics’ and ‘ever-changing rules of the political game’. Contrary to a 
democratic setting, where clear rules and functioning institutions provide researchers 
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with certainty about what they can, should, and must (not) do, and differently from a 
closed-up authoritarian regime which may be inaccessible, conducting research on 
opposition politics in Uganda has been an ambiguous experience. A level of 
uncertainty fuelled by relatively open, but potentially fast-changing, circumstances 
regarding my own and my interviewees’ safety and the reception of my enquiries and 
findings meant that I had to adapt and adjust my research practices, whilst always 
retaining a focus on what might happen in the short to medium term.  
Upon my arrival in Kampala, I obtained an affiliation with the Centre for Basic 
Research (CBR), a reputable Ugandan research institute, and applied for a research 
permit from the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST). This 
application included my research proposal, which clearly laid out that I was 
researching the role of opposition parties, and that my data collection would include 
interviews with opposition figures. However, I toned done the description of Uganda 
as a ‘hybrid regime’ to avoid hurting sensibilities. As a French citizen, I also registered 
with the French embassy as a resident in Kampala to obtain consular protection if need 
be.  
Other steps I took included using an encryption software to protect interview 
recordings and transcripts – in case my laptop was either hacked or seized. I also 
decided not to try and interview the most high-profile opposition figures early on, in 
case it would draw attention to the project, and could make it more difficult for me to 
continue my research later on. Finally, I also elected not to attend campaign events 
because of their volatility. Indeed, during my second trip to Uganda in May 2018, a 
by-election was taking place in Rukungiri – the home district of FDC’s Besigye. While 
attending and observing the campaign rallies would have certainly be informative and 
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fascinating, the high prevalence of police repression around these campaigns led me 
to stay away.  
In Burkina Faso, risks related to my research topic were a lot lower than in Uganda, 
due to a different political context. Following the 2014 insurrection and the political 
transition, the environment was more open, and it was easier for people to talk about 
the past and for a researcher to ask open questions. My personal knowledge of the 
country and my past experience of living in Ouagadougou also contributed to making 
me feel at ease and safe throughout my fieldwork. However, unfortunately, the period 
of my fieldwork in Burkina Faso coincided with a steady deterioration of the security 
situation in the country, with a growing threat of terrorist attacks in the Northern and 
Eastern parts and, to a lesser extent, the capital city where I resided.  
In this context, I monitored security recommendations made by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly. I 
was registered with the French Embassy and received regular updates from the 
Consulate. I also discussed security risks and advisable precautions with Burkinabè 
and international contacts in the security sector in Ouagadougou, especially ahead of 
trips outside of the capital. I conducted my fieldwork in the Passoré and Boulgou 
provinces at a time when it was advisable to do so – and would have cancelled if it had 
been considered a risk.  
In both Uganda and Burkina Faso, I made efforts to ensure local collaboration, both 
formal and informal. In both countries, I obtained an official affiliation with a research 
institute: the CBR in Kampala, and the Tiemoko Marc Garango Institute for 
Governance and Development (IGD) in Ouagadougou. In Uganda, the local affiliation 
was necessary to apply for and obtain a research permit from the UNCST, and had a 
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USD150 fee. In Burkina Faso, there is no similar requirement, and the affiliation was 
provided freely. Less official but more significant relationships were built with 
individual researchers in both countries, who shared useful contacts, perspectives and 
opinions on local political dynamics and played an important role in shaping my 
research (see Jenkins 2018). In Burkina Faso, such relationships allowed me to present 
some of my findings during a seminar organised by the National Institute of Social 
Sciences (INSS). In most locations outside of the capital, a local fixer helped me 
identify respondents and setting up appointments, and provided valuable insights on 
internal dynamics and local issues. These fixers were civil society or party activists 
from the local area where I conducted my research. One of them, in Burkina Faso, was 
a local councillor that I had previously interviewed in the capital. I was introduced to 
the others by fellow researchers, and I interviewed them later on. One research 
assistant in each country also helped with the transcription of interview recordings and, 
when necessary, their translation. These two individuals were non-partisan 
postgraduate students. They were briefed on the confidentiality of the data they 
handled and their duty not to share any file with anyone or divulge information 
contained within the interviews to a third-party. In the case of interviews and 
discussions held in a local language and interpreted by the fixer, they were asked to 
pay particular attention to the interpretation of questions and answers and highlight 
discrepancies and reformulations by the fixer, which could have an impact on the data 
collected.  
Through these relationships, and in line with the long-term, embedded approach to 
fieldwork described previously, I was able to build a research community around 
myself, instead of doing research in isolation, going straight in and out of the country. 
The research assistants I collaborated with were adequately compensated for their 
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work, but beyond this our relationship was built and maintained based upon a mutual 
acquaintance and, at times, friendship.  
2.4 Ethical considerations: protection and positionality 
As for any research project, ethical considerations must be taken into account 
before, during, and after the research is conducted. In that regard, I followed the 
departmental procedures in place at the University of Warwick. As part of the 
department’s first-year review and upgrade process, I was required to submit an Ethics 
Form, which listed the measures I was foreseeing in the conduct of my research. I 
updated this Ethics Form prior to starting my fieldwork.  
The protection of the many people who have generously agreed to give their time 
for my research and to share their experiences and insights was of paramount 
importance. This issue was especially crucial considering the political environment I 
was doing my research in – that of hybrid regimes with limited liberties – and the topic 
of my research – opposition politics. Due to these concerns, participants were facing 
possible risks – in the immediate and/or more distant future – regarding their safety. 
Consequently, I gave particular attention to respondents’ confidentiality and 
anonymity for data protection purposes. Interviews were conducted in a location 
chosen by the interviewee – and where I felt comfortable too – to ensure a feeling of 
safety. Most often, this location was their office or a public café; other times, we would 
meet at party headquarters or, on rare occasions, the interviewee’s home.  
Anonymity was standardly guaranteed, following a decision taken ahead of the 
fieldwork phase. While anonymisation may contribute to erasing the contribution and 
agency of research participants (Moore 2012: 332), I have deemed it preferable to 
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ensure this anonymity, even when participants did not request it. The main reason 
behind this decision was the length of time that would elapse between the actual 
interviews and any publication of research finding – as the present dissertation, journal 
articles, or other outputs – and the volatility of the political environment in both 
countries. While a respondent may feel comfortable stating some things on the record 
one day, it is difficult to foresee the consequences and possible (mis)interpretations of 
these statements several years later. Moreover, for such a research project, the precise 
identity of each respondent I quote in my work – beside their general position and 
location – would not add, in my view, credibility or positionality that would justify 
taking any risks. Therefore, data has been systematically anonymised, and I have used 
only categories and party affiliation to identify interviews quoted in this dissertation. 
It should be noted that most interviewees did not request to be anonymous, particularly 
individuals with a known status such as local and national party officials, members of 
parliament, and journalists.  
However, anonymity appeared reassuring for some participants, especially some 
party activists in Uganda who appeared more concerned than their equivalents in 
Burkina Faso. Consequently, quotes throughout this thesis are attributed to anonymous 
interviewees referred to by a unique code, with their positionality indicated so that the 
reader can place the information provided. The positionality includes the respondent’s 
party affiliation if applicable, and their status (e.g. party official or activist, MP, civil 
society representative, etc.). I also provide the date and place of the interview, except 
in one case where it would make the respondent identifiable. A full, anonymised list 
of interviews conducted is included as Appendix 1.  
For each interview, I asked the respondent’s permission to record our discussion so 
as to allow for a more informal conversation and ensure accurate transcription and 
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quotes. On one occasion, the interviewee declined being recorded, and on a few others, 
respondents made additional comments at the end of the interview after I had switched 
off the recorder. Either I or, on some occasions, a research assistant, later transcribed 
the recording and/or notes into individual interview reports. As stated earlier, the 
research assistants tasked with transcription were postgraduate students with an 
understanding of ethical concerns, and were briefed on the confidential nature of this 
work and their related responsibly.  
A written statement of consent (in French or English) was signed by participants, 
explaining the purpose of the research, how the data would be used, and confidentiality 
measures. For group discussions, consent was provided orally after the participants 
were given the same explanations, with help from the fixer/interpreter. Interview 
recording and transcripts were anonymised and stored electronically on an encrypted 
drive to avoid breach of confidentiality. 
A researcher must question their own positionality vis-à-vis their research topic and 
the participants they interview, and consider how this may affect the responses 
gathered and potential biases in the analysis. This starts with a comprehensive self-
reflexion. Mine leads me to paint the following picture: I am a young white woman, a 
French citizen, and affiliated with a British university. I have grown up in Burkina 
Faso, lived in the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the DRC prior to starting my 
fieldwork. I have worked for peacebuilding and development NGOs before starting 
my PhD and conducted consultancy work for similar organisations during my 
fieldwork. Politically, I am left-wing, but I am not a member of any party or other 
organisation. This multi-faceted identity was translated into various positionalities 
over the course of my research.  
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During interviews, my white and Western status sometimes created certain attitudes 
or expectations. Some stakeholders would ask that I conveyed to ‘my’ government – 
either French or British depending on the occasion – the necessity to help their 
organisation or to stop supporting the government. In those occurrences, I would re-
iterate the purview of my research and my lack of influence or access to convey such 
messages. On other occasions, and especially in rural settings, I would sometimes be 
perceived as someone able to support service-delivery for the community. I would 
again explain my status as a researcher and the fact I was not affiliated with any charity 
or donor. My work for NGOs, unrelated to my PhD, was not disclosed in these settings 
where this could create confusion and set unrealistic expectations. My consultancy 
activities were clearly distinct and separated from my doctoral research, with no 
overlap in terms of research sites and interviewees.  
My positionality in Burkina Faso can be analysed through the concept of ‘hybrid 
insider-outsider’ researcher explored by Van Hooft (2019). I grew up in Ouagadougou 
and have spent ten years in the country in total. Moreover, my parents lived and worked 
in the country – my father as a technical adviser at the Ministry of Transports and at 
the Ouagadougou City Hall – and were there during the Sankarist revolution. Finally, 
I have travelled around the country and have some notions of the Mooré language. 
When discovering some of these facts – which I often disclosed as part of my 
introduction or later in the discussion – interviewees would tend to shift their 
behaviour and become more informal, treating me as an ‘insider’, a quasi-Burkinabè.  
While this could present risks – for example interviewees wrongly assuming 
previous knowledge on my part, which I addressed by asking for details when relevant 
– this position was advantageous for several reasons. People often appeared more at 
ease after I had established myself as a quasi-insider, illustrated by the fact that they 
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would sometimes shift from addressing me with the formal ‘vous’ to the informal ‘tu’. 
They would also be less wary of revealing informal practices and internal dynamics 
than to a clear outsider.  
In Uganda, while I lived in Kampala for ten months, I was rightly perceived as an 
outsider researcher. This position can come with some challenges, such as a difficulty 
in gaining access or build trust, and a lack of pre-existing knowledge (van Hooft 2019: 
38). I addressed these obstacles by spending enough time in Uganda to build networks 
that helped me to access interviewees, including with MPs and stakeholders outside of 
the capital, in ways that were more likely to encourage trust.  
Finally, a reader might raise the issue of a potential bias towards a party due to my 
own political beliefs. Despite living for an extended period of time in both countries, 
and despite my partial sense of belonging in Burkina Faso due to my personal history 
in the country, I have never been associated with or felt close to a political party there. 
In Uganda, the FDC and DP are ideologically and financially associated with 
conservative parties in Europe, in contrast to my own political leanings. Similarly, 
Burkina Faso’s UPC defends liberal economic policies promoting a strong role for the 
private sector, which I am critical of. Even in the case of UNIR-PS, whose Sankarist 
values I am partly sympathetic to, I have never felt any kind of political closeness or 
preference.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out the methodological framework used to conduct my 
research project. This dissertation is based upon a comparative, qualitative, and 
inductive approach. I compare four opposition parties across two countries: the UNIR-
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PS and the UPC in Burkina Faso, and the FDC and the DP in Uganda. The country-
case selection cuts across regional, linguistic, and colonial cleavages and allows me to 
observe hybrid regimes in their diversity. Meanwhile, the party-case selection reflects 
a relevant dimension of opposition party formation in these two countries, by including 
a historical opponent and a newer organisation that emerged from the ruling party in 
each country.  
My empirical methods have involved semi-structured interviews with 146 people, 
including party officials and activists, MPs, local officials, civil society and NGO 
representatives, journalists and other informants (see Appendix 1). I have also 
conducted four focus group discussions with party activists in Burkina Faso. My 
research was done in each country’s capital city (Ouagadougou and Kampala), and in 
areas considered opposition strongholds across the country (see figures 3 and 4). My 
fieldwork was conducted over an extensive period between 2016 and 2018 – due to 
my part-time status and independent activities as a consultant. During data collection, 
I gave the utmost consideration to the safety of interviewees and local collaborators 
(five fixers/translators and two research assistants who helped with transcription), as 
well as to my own safety in sometimes challenging circumstances. I have addressed 
above issues of positionality and potential biases, and have been as transparent as 
possible during every step of this PhD, from the design, via the data collection and 
analysis, to the writing of this dissertation.  
The inductive approach outlined in this chapter has enabled me to understand and 
analyse how the four parties under study were formed, the constraints they face in the 
environment of hybrid regimes, how they are organised, and how they operate. As 
such, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of opposition parties in a 
broad manner, beyond their reductive qualification as universally weak. The next 
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chapter addresses the challenging environment provided by hybrid regimes, rooted in 
a quasi-fusion of the ruling party, the state administration, and the incumbent. It 
provides the reader with an important overview of the regimes at hand (Burkina Faso 
under Compaoré, 1987 to 2014, and Uganda under Museveni, 1986 to date), in order 




‘C’est pas facile!’: State-incumbent fusion and the 
unlevel playing field 12 
In order to understand how opposition parties operate in the context of a hybrid 
regime, it is necessary to first observe these regimes and the manner in which they 
hamper the formation and activities of opposition parties. In this chapter, I start by 
placing the hybrid regimes in focus – Uganda under Museveni and Burkina Faso under 
Compaoré – and the specific parties at hand in their historical context. To this end, I 
provide a brief overview of each country’s political history since independence, before 
turning to the specific ways in which these regimes constrain opposition parties’ 
operations. I argue that these constraints stem from the hybrid or quasi-fused nature of 
the state, the incumbent, and the ruling party, a key aspect of hybrid regimes too often 
perceived as an individual historical attribute rather than a comparative feature.  
This state-incumbent fusion creates an unlevel playing field, to use the expression 
popularised by Levitsky and Way (2010a, b), which creates particular challenges for 
opposition parties, both directly and indirectly. While Levitsky and Way focus on the 
strength of the governing party and state institutions, they fail to consider the other 
side of the coin: what this entails for the opposition’s organising and mobilising 
 
12 ‘C’est pas facile’ is a common interjection in Burkina Faso that can be translated as ‘It ain’t easy’. 
It is used in everyday discourse, and was employed by a large number of interviewees. For example, a 
UNIR-PS local councillor exclaimed at the start of our interview ‘At the time of Blaise [Compaoré], we 
were in the opposition. It wasn’t easy at all!’ (int. BF27, Bokin, 06/04/2018).  
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capacities, and how the two are related. This is why I analyse how this state-incumbent 
fusion creates or increases a set of challenges for opposition parties. These difficulties 
are heightened by the uncertainty and constant shifting of the rules typical of a hybrid 
regime. Indeed, incumbents can shift between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ powers (Golooba-
Mutebi & Hickey 2016), and feature ‘quite fluid mixtures of authoritarian and 
democratic politics’ (Bunce & Wolchik 2010: 59). These circumstances mean that 
‘While an opposition victory is not impossible in a hybrid regime, it requires a level of 
opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be 
required for victory in a democracy’ (Diamond 2002: 24).  
This chapter places the two regimes under study in historical perspective and 
analyses how the state-incumbent fusion at play in both cases creates a specific set of 
difficulties for opposition parties. It is structured in three sections. In the first two, I 
discuss each country case – first Burkina Faso, then Uganda – and provide the reader 
with an analytical overview of key events and dynamics relevant for the empirical 
discussions found in this thesis. This allows me to describe and analyse the hybrid 
nature of Compaoré’s and Museveni’s regimes since the return to multipartyism, but 
also to provide a brief overview of each country’s political history since independence, 
introducing important actors, events, and concepts that are necessary to understand the 
regime’s political context. Along the way, I also address how the four parties under 
focus in this dissertation came to life and how they have fared over the years, to ensure 
the reader is familiar with these organisations before going into more details about 
their formation processes and operations in the following chapters. In the third part of 
this chapter, I bring out various ways that state-incumbent fusion in both countries can 
restrict opposition parties’ operation. I focus on four dynamics particularly important 
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in both countries: repression and violence; the monetisation of politics; electoral fraud 
and malpractices; and divisionary tactics.  
3.1 Compaoré’s Burkina Faso in context 
 Burkina Faso, a Sahelian country located in the middle of West Africa, has had a 
tumultuous political history since its independence from France on 4 August 1960. 
Compaoré’s 27-year long regime was in sharp contrast to the tumultuous decades of 
instability that preceded it, but his regime ended abruptly in October 2014 when 
Compaoré was toppled by a popular insurrection. This section reviews the country’s 
political history, drawing mainly from the monographs by Englebert (1996) and 
Harsch (2017), the collective volume edited by Hilgers and Mazzocchetti (2010), and 
the work of Augustin Loada (1998, 1999, 2020) and others.  
Burkina Faso was known as Upper Volta until 1984.13 At its independence in 1960, 
the multiparty system inspired by the French model originally set up was quickly 
turned into a de facto single party regime by President Maurice Yaméogo. Indeed, the 
only sizable party that could have presented an opposition to Yaméogo’s 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), the Parti pour le Regroupement 
Africain (PRA), joined the government that same year (Englebert 1996: 44). In the 
absence of a political opposition emanating from political parties, trade unions were 
the strongest counterweight to the government. A massive general strike on 3 January 
 
13 The country was renamed in 1984 on the first anniversary of the Sankarist revolution drawing 
from the three main vernacular languages spoken in the country. ‘Burkina’ means ‘upright people’ or 
‘people with dignity’ in Mooré, the language of the Mossi who make up about half of the population; 
‘Faso’ means ‘land’, ‘country’ in Dioula, widely spoken in the West of the country. The country’s name 
can therefore be translated as ‘the land of upright people’. The suffix –bè added to ‘Burkina’ to designate 
the country’s citizens comes from the Fulani word for ‘inhabitants’. ‘Burkinabè’ is therefore invariable 
and used for both genders.  
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1966 eventually led to Maurice Yaméogo’s resignation and invited the military to step 
into the political arena for the first time.  
Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana took the lead in the country’s first military regime and 
remained as the head of state for 14 years. This period was marked by the 
experimentation of various political models authorising diverse levels of competition, 
but always maintaining a military oversight. Political parties’ bickering led Sangoulé 
Lamizana to conclude that they could not be trusted, and trade unions continued to be 
the main source of opposition to the regime. Their activism weakened Lamizana’s 
third republic which was finally toppled by segments of the army led by Colonel Saye 
Zerbo on 25 November 1980. This was the start of a tumultuous decade marked by no 
less than three further successful coups in 1981, 1983 and 1987, and three alleged 
unsuccessful ones in 1984, 1985 and 1989. These coups were mainly driven by 
generational and ideological factionalism within the army (Englebert 1996: 53).  
The most memorable of the soldiers who ruled over Burkina in that decade was 
Captain Thomas Sankara, who presided the Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR). 
Briefly Minister of Information under Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo’s regime after Saye 
Zerbo’s dismissal (1981), he became head of state and launched a revolution in 1983 
following a coup engineered by his friend Captain Compaoré. The revolutionary 
regime borrowed ideological credentials from Marxism-Leninism, though its 
communist nature has been questioned (Kongo & Zeilig 2017: 204). Committees for 
the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) mushroomed at all levels of society, from public 
administrations to rural villages, to organise and mobilise people into the revolutionary 
process (Harsch 2017: 81). Despite the short nature of the revolution – four years – 
and some political shortcomings, Sankara’s idealism, his anti-imperialist rhetoric, 
charisma and simplicity have appealed to many young people across the continent who 
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still see him as an African Che Guevara (Murrey 2018: 75). He was assassinated on 
15 October 1987 in a coup which brought Compaoré, then his second-in-command, to 
power. Compaoré launched the ‘Front Populaire’, allegedly a ‘rectification’ of the 
revolution that took over the CDR structure. The remaining core leaders of the 
Sankarist revolution, Captain Henri Zongo and Major Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani, 
were accused of plotting a coup in 1989 and executed. Compaoré finally initiated a 
liberalisation process that culminated in the return to a constitutional republic in 1991. 
After the tumultuous 1980s came a contrasting stability under Compaoré. Indeed, 
he was able to fortify a hybrid regime and remain in power for 27 years. This stability 
was first achieved through a return to constitutional order and civilian rule – even 
though Compaoré himself never officially resigned from the army and the military did 
not completely step away from politics (Sampana 2013). The constitution of the Fourth 
Republic, devoid of any remaining reference to socialism or revolution, was adopted 
through a national referendum in 1991 despite widespread abstention. World Bank-
backed structural adjustment plans were also launched, while Compaoré tried to 
appease society through concessions towards customary authorities, economic 
operators, unions, and political figures such as Maurice Yaméogo (Otayek 1992). 
Compaoré also renounced the demonstrative austerity promoted by Thomas Sankara, 
leading to unprecedented levels of corruption (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 8).  
However, Compaoré’s refusal to follow the example set by neighbouring Benin and 
to organise a national conference (see Banégas 1995), so as to keep a tight control over 
the liberalisation process, led the opposition to boycott the first presidential elections 
held in 1991. Compaoré, unopposed, won with 86.19% of the vote despite a record 
abstention rate: only one registered voter in four went to the polls, amounting to less 
than 10% of the total population at the time. Compaoré was re-elected in 1998 with 
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87% of the vote. Throughout this period, the National Assembly was dominated by 
Compaoré’s party, first the Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire-Mouvement 
du Travail (ODP-MT) founded in 1989, then the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le 
Progrès (CDP) that emerged in 1996 from the fusion of the ODP-MT and nine smaller 
organisations. During the first legislature (1992-1997), the ODP-MT controlled 78 of 
107 seats, and in the second (1997-2002), the CDP had 101 seats, with only ten seats 
held by other parties. This domination was known as ‘tuk guili’ (Loada 2006: 23), 
literally ‘take everything’ in Mooré, the national language most spoken in 
Ouagadougou, the capital city. The ruling party’s electoral results were so high that 
they became embarrassing for the regime and more suited to monopolistic parties than 
to an apparent democracy (Loada 1998: 69).  
Shortly after the 1998 elections Compaoré faced an unprecedented crisis caused by 
the death of an investigative journalist, Norbert Zongo. First described as an accident, 
his death quickly appeared to be a political assassination orchestrated by the 
Presidential Guard and which implicated Compaoré’s own brother and economic 
advisor, François (Harsch 2017: 129). This sparked an unprecedented movement 
uniting opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society organisations into a coalition 
known as the Collectif.14 Compaoré appeased tensions through a mixture of 
compromise and co-optation: he agreed to various reforms that strengthened the 
opposition’s political chances – in particular reforming the electoral code and adding 
term limits to the constitution – while co-opting some moderate organisations by 
 
14 Officially known as the Collective of Mass Organisations and Political Parties (CODMPP), but 
often referred to simply as ‘le Collectif’.  
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bringing key politicians and parties into a national-unity government, and fracturing a 
union among opposition parties known as the G14 (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 9).  
The 2002 legislative elections saw opposition parties benefit from the reformed 
proportional system, and the ruling CDP nearly lost its majority. Opposition parties 
secured 49% of the seats (Santiso & Loada 2003: 405), but Compaoré quickly 
manoeuvred to re-secure a tight control of the parliament, by co-opting the largest 
opposition party, the moderate ADF-RDA, which had previously agreed to take part 
in a union government. As soon as he was back in control, Compaoré reversed the 
electoral reform in 2004. He was then re-elected twice more in 2005 and 2010 – with 
recently-adopted term limits brushed aside after the Constitutional Court stated that 
the amendment was not retroactive in October 200515 (Loada 2006: 21).  
One of the parties under focus in this thesis, the Union pour la Renaissance-Parti 
Sankariste (UNIR-PS), emerged in 2009 following a series of splits and fusions among 
the many parties claiming the legacy of Thomas Sankara. The first to come to light 
had been the Bloc Socialiste Burkinabè (BSB), founded in 1990 by Ernest Nongma 
Ouédraogo, who had been a minister in Sankara’s cabinet. At that time, the word 
‘Sankarist’ was not used by the party as it would not have been accepted by the 
authorities. In mid-1999, the BSB fused with a faction of the Front des Forces Sociales 
(FFS), another Sankarist party founded in 1996 by Fidèle Kientega, and other smaller 
groups to form the Convention Panafricaine Sankariste (CPS). Meanwhile, a young 
lawyer named Bénéwendé Sankara – with no family connection with Thomas Sankara, 
but who had been involved in the CDRs – was approached to join the party. He had 
 




worked on high-profile cases involving opponents (including Ernest Nongma 
Ouédraogo), journalists (such as Norbert Zongo, a friend of his before he was 
assassinated), and workers (notably employees of a former public textile company, 
Faso Fani, which was the largest employer in the town of Koudougou and was shut 
down in 2001). Bénéwendé Sankara was also involved in the Collectif formed after 
Nobert Zongo’s death as a lawyer and a member of civil society. In 1999, Bénéwendé 
Sankara joined the CPS, but broke away the following year when the party’s leadership 
decided to join the unity government suggested by Compaoré as a way out of the 
Zongo political crisis. He founded the Union pour la Renaissance – Mouvement 
Sankariste (UNIR-MS) in November 2000. At the 2002 legislative elections, UNIR-
MS obtained 3 seats, and so did the CPS. In the 2005 presidential elections, 
Bénéwendé Sankara came second with a score of 4.88%, while incumbent Compaoré 
hoarded over 80% of the vote. In 2009, what had remained of the CPS reconciled with 
UNIR-MS, which became UNIR-PS following a slight name change. A faction of the 
FFS, led by Nestor Bassière, also joined UNIR-PS. In the 2010 presidential election, 
Compaoré was once again re-elected with over 80% of the vote. Bénéwendé Sankara 
came in third position (6.34%), just behind another opposition figure, Hama Arba 
Diallo, Mayor of Dori and candidate of the Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme 
(PDS) (8.21%).  
The late 2000s were marked by a series of union-led protests against rising living 
costs (see Engels 2015b), but the second real test for Compaoré’s regime was the wave 
of protests and mutinies that broke out in 2011 (see Chouli 2012; Dwyer 2017). The 
death of a high-school student, Justin Zongo, in February 2011 in the town of 
Koudougou triggered a series of disparate protests affecting various sectors. Students 
in Koudougou marched first, to demand justice about Justin Zongo’s death, and were 
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later followed by their peers across the country coming out in solidarity, soon turning 
into full-blown riots. Meanwhile, in the capital, the condemnation of five soldiers in 
an unrelated case and their dishonourable discharge from the army in March 2011 
sparked a mutiny that spread through the capital’s barracks.  
The government’s reactions – freeing the jailed soldiers and smoothing over the 
damages occasioned by the mutinies – respectively angered the justice personnel and 
business operators, leading to strikes and marches, while trade unions reignited their 
protests against inflation (Chouli 2012: 133). New mutinies broke out across the 
country, including in the barracks of Fada N’Gourma (East), Gaoua (South-West), and 
Bobo-Dioulasso (West), spreading to the presidential guard on 14 April 2011. This 
unit, known as Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle (RSP) and described as ‘an army 
within the army’ (Sampana 2015: 37), was the best trained and equipped but also the 
most loyal to Compaoré. This mutiny pushed the regime to its limit, with Compaoré 
fleeing to his hometown of Ziniaré for a few hours. Ultimately, Compaoré restored his 
grasp on power through his usual mix of coercion and co-optation, illustrated by the 
payment of promised indemnities to the RSP, which then went on to quash the mutinies 
persisting in Bobo Dioulasso in June 2011 (Chouli 2012: 256).  
In the midst of this multipronged social movement, the political opposition made 
an unsuccessful attempt to pull the disparate grievances into a coherent revolutionary 
action, inspired by the Arab Spring at play across the Sahara. Opposition parties had 
managed to obtain an institutional status known as Chef-de-File de l’Opposition 
Politique (CFOP) in 2009, which provided them with a cooperation framework, a 
strengthened platform, and some public resources (Bertrand 2018). The CFOP 
designates both an institution including all registered political parties (with and 
without parliamentary representation) who decide to be affiliated with the opposition, 
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and an individual – the leader of the opposition party with the most seats in the 
National Assembly – who acts as the opposition’s spokesperson. In April 2011, the 
CFOP, in the figure of Bénéwendé Sankara, leader of the UNIR-PS, called for a rally 
in the capital to demand Compaoré’s resignation: a complete failure which barely 
mobilised a few hundred people and was scoffed by unions, civil society, and some 
opposition parties (Chouli 2012: 153).  
While the 2011 crisis failed to bring down the government, the seeds of turnover 
were already planted. This was illustrated by the quick implantation of a new 
opposition party founded in 2010, the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (UPC). 
It was formed by Diabré, a former member of the CDP who had been a Minister in 
Compaoré’s government between 1992 and 1996. Diabré had been elected to 
Parliament in the first legislative elections of the Fourth Republic, in 1992, on an ODP-
MT ticket and was soon appointed to the government, first as Minister of Industry 
(1992-1994), then Minister of Economy and Finances (1994-1996). He was then 
nominated as Head of the Economic and Social Council (CES), a consultative 
assembly advising the government. Despite being re-elected in the 1997 legislative 
elections, Diabré then distanced himself from national politics and started an 
international career leading him to Harvard University, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the French company AREVA.  
Diabré returned to Burkina Faso in 2009 and started organising in favour of a 
political renewal, positioning himself as an alternative to Compaoré, first within civil 
society with the holding of a civic forum on alternance – political turnover – then with 
the creation of the UPC. The party decided not to take part in the 2010 presidential 
elections, as they were not yet properly established throughout the country, nor did 
they back any other candidate (int. BF49, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018). In the 
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legislative and local elections held in 2012, the party fielded candidates in 41 provinces 
out of 45, illustrating an impressive groundwork to establish party branches across the 
country. They obtained a record of 19 seats, becoming the largest opposition party, 
and Diabré took over the position of CFOP from the UNIR-PS which had only 
obtained four seats. 
Soon afterwards, anti-regime mobilisation flared up again over Compaoré’s 
attempts to remove term limits from the constitution. Protests erupted first when 
Compaoré’s tried to create a partly appointed Senate in 2013, which was perceived as 
a ploy to ensure a two-third majority to pass a constitutional amendment. The 
mobilisation continued in 2014 when the government announced plans for a 
referendum on the constitution’s Article 37 setting term-limits. In January 2014, key 
figures from the CDP defected and founded a new party, the Mouvement du Peuple 
pour le Progrès (MPP). These included Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, former President 
of the National Assembly and head of the CDP, Salif Diallo, a key political strategist 
and former minister, and Simon Compaoré, the ex-Mayor of Ouagadougou. These 
defections reinvigorated the opposition protests led by the CFOP and largely supported 
by a vibrant civil society (Chouli 2015; Engels 2015a; Wienkoop 2019). This finally 
culminated in the seizure and arson of the National Assembly building by protestors 
and the resignation of Compaoré on 31 October 2014. Compaoré fled to Côte d’Ivoire 
with help from France, giving way to a one-year political transition. Despite a bumpy 
road and a coup attempt perpetrated by the Presidential Guard – who remained loyal 
to Compaoré – in September 2015, elections were finally held in November of that 
year, returning the country to constitutional order.  
In the 2015 elections, the UPC’s Diabré obtained 29.65% of the vote and lost to the 
MPP’s Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in the first round, while his party obtained 33 
92 
 
seats in the legislature, therefore remaining at the head of the CFOP. Meanwhile, 
despite the resurgence of Thomas Sankara’s ideas and figures during the 2014 protests, 
the UNIR-PS failed to reap the fruits of the insurrection after the transition. In the 2015 
elections, Bénéwendé Sankara, branded as the ‘candidate of the insurgents’, came in 
fourth position with a meagre 2.77% of the vote, and the UNIR-PS got only five 
parliamentary seats. With the winning MPP short of a majority, having obtained only 
55 out of 127 seats, and the runner-up UPC (33) and ex-ruling CDP (18) in the 
opposition, the UNIR-PS found itself in an awkward position. They decided to join the 
MPP-led presidential majority alliance, arguing that they could not sit in the opposition 
with the CDP, but also acknowledging they could not risk losing their few seats in a 
fresh election if the newly-elected president Kaboré failed to obtain a majority and 
decided to dissolve the National Assembly (int. BF20, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018). 
They obtained two cabinet positions and an ambassadorship in exchange for their 
support, and Bénéwendé Sankara became Vice-President of the National Assembly. 
To summarise, scholars who have worked extensively on Burkina Faso have 
unanimously described Compaoré’s regime as hybrid or semi-authoritarian (Englebert 
1996; Hilgers and Mazzocchetti (eds) 2010; Loada 2010; Hilgers & Loada 2013). The 
apparent liberalisation process of the early 1990s, like in many other countries across 
the continent, failed to produce a meaningful democracy in Burkina Faso. The Fourth 
Republic did provide for a formally democratic normative framework featuring a 
Constitution, an electoral code and other pieces of legislation (CGD 2008). 
Presidential, legislative, and local elections have occurred regularly since 1991. 
Opposition parties were allowed to form, take part in elections and pursue their 
activities; independent media outlets existed and voiced criticism and satire of the 
government; and civil society organisations such as trade unions and human rights 
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movements were prolific and well organised. From the outside, Compaoré’s regime 
appeared like a democracy being consolidated, and the fact that it had come about 
through a coup and was maintained with some level of repression was often 
overlooked (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 12).  
Yet, the level playing field deemed necessary by Levitsky and Way (2010b) for a 
regime to constitute a democracy, was very much lacking in Burkina Faso. The CDP’s 
ultra-dominance is a case in point: as a Burkinabè think tank reported, 
‘As a general rule, there is no suspense, the only question being that of the scale 
of [the winning party’s] victory. This is why the political regime of the fourth 
republic is based not so much upon a multiparty system but rather on an ultra-
dominant party system’ (CGD 2008: 3).  
Compaoré’s CDP has been built upon the Front Populaire’s legacy and the CDR 
structure from the revolution, and is therefore better implanted in rural areas than any 
other party. It also used state resources during and outside electoral campaigns 
meaning that it had a massive financial, logistical and visibility advantage on the 
opposition. Each campaign illustrated the resource gap between the CDP and its 
opponents (Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006: 15).  
The apparent freedom of the press was curtailed by self-censorship and a 
‘journalistic resignation’ in some newsrooms, explained by the precarious nature of 
the media job market and the decrease of militancy among media professionals (Frère 
2010: 241). It was particularly true for state-owned media such as the Sidwaya 
newspaper or the RTB radio and television stations: in 2013, in the midst of popular 
protests against the creation of a Senate, many journalists took part in a protest against 
the Ministry of Communication’s interference in the treatment of information by 
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public media. Even if the time for assassinating journalists seemed past, the lack of 
justice in the Zongo affair contributed to the pressure felt by the media (Loada 2010: 
287).  
Finally, the apparent democracy was distorted by the neopatrimonial nature of the 
Burkinabè state under Compaoré, illustrated by widespread clientelism and entrenched 
patronage from the highest spheres of the government to local elites. In this context, 
elections were not a means for democratisation, but rather a tool to maintain the elite’s 
hegemony through the distribution of seats and position to the friends of the regime, 
while the country’s economy was controlled by friends and relatives of Compaoré’s 
himself (Loada 2010: 291; Bertrand 2011). Compaoré’s regime therefore fluctuated 
between co-optation, compromise and repression over the years, responding 
differently to various threats and crises in order to maintain the status quo, in a typical 
fashion for a hybrid regime.  
3.2 Museveni’s Uganda in context 
Uganda, a similarly landlocked country in the Eastern part of the continent, has also 
had its fair share of military regimes and instability, but also of violent conflicts. 
Museveni, who secured power a year before Compaoré in Burkina Faso, resisted the 
liberalisation process much longer, and it is only in 2005 that multipartyism was 
officially restored in Uganda. This section draws from a rich secondary literature, 
including – but not limited to – historical monographs (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015; 
Mutibwa 2016), books on Museveni’s regime (Rubongoya 2007; Carbone 2008; Tripp 
2010), and collective volumes centred on elections (Kiiza et al. (eds) 2008; Perrot et 
al. (eds) 2014a; Oloka-Onyango and Ahikire (eds) 2016). 
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Uganda became an independent state on 9 October 1962. The year before, a 
government had been formed by the DP. The DP was founded in 195416 and, under 
the leadership of Benedicto Kiwanuka, won the elections held in March 1961. The 
founders of the DP were civil servants whose goal was to fight for independence and 
to defend the interests of Catholics, a relative majority in the country under-
represented in public offices (Mutibwa 1992: 15). However, fresh elections were held 
in April 1962, in which representatives from the Buganda region were appointed by 
the King instead of being elected. With the aim of keeping the Catholic-leaning DP 
out of power (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015: 77), this allowed an alliance between Milton 
Obote’s UPC – at the time perceived as a Protestant party – and the Buganda-appointed 
MPs gathered in ‘Kabaka Yekka’ (‘The King only’). The Buganda King, Edward 
Mutesa II, became the country’s first (non-executive) President, while Obote was 
appointed as the Prime Minister, effectively holding power.  
While the immediate post-independence period has been described as a prosperous 
time characterised by thriving multipartyism, economic well-being, and government 
accountability (Makara 2009: 60), it should be noted that following the DP’s defeat, 
most of its 24 MPs crossed to the ruling UPC. Only six of them remained in the party 
by the time Milton Obote banned political parties in 1969 (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015: 
103). Obote had previously staged a coup in 1966, putting an end to the UPC’s 
coalition with Kabaka Yekka, and abrogated the Constitution. He declared himself 
President, suspended elections, dismantled the traditional kingdoms including 
Buganda, and turned the country into a one-party state.  
 
16 Some accounts place the DP’s formation in 1956, after Kiwanuka returned to Uganda from his 
studies in the UK (see Karugire 2010: 158–162). 
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In 1971, Idi Amin Dada overthrew Milton Obote in a military coup. Amin’s regime 
would prove to be one of the most violent dictatorships across the continent, 
characterised by mass murders, political disappearances and violent repression 
(Mutibwa 1992: 120). Benedicto Kiwanuka, the DP’s leader, disappeared in 1972 and 
the party was severely weakened during that time. In 1979, Amin was himself deposed 
by a rebel army, the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), supported by 
neighbouring Tanzania. Subsequent elections in December 1980 returned Milton 
Obote to power. The official results attributed 47.18% of the vote and 74 seats to the 
UPC, and 47.04% of the vote and 51 seats to the DP. However, the 1980 elections have 
been widely acknowledged as fraudulent (Makara 2009: 61; Willis et al. 2017) and the 
official narrative of the DP heavily lingers on the fact that they have been cheated out 
of power twice – first in 1962, then in 1980.  
The contestation of these results sparked political instability as well as a five-year 
civil war (1981-1986) between the State and the newly founded National Resistance 
Army (NRA). This rebel group was led by Museveni, who had run in the 1980 
elections under the banner of the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). The Bush War 
led to the death of several thousand people and crippled the economy, and ended with 
Museveni’s accession to power in January 1986 (Carbone 2008: 1).17 Museveni’s 
regime quickly expressed a deep mistrust towards political parties, which were 
considered as the source of factionalism and instability affecting Uganda since 
independence (idem: 3). On the model of Resistance Councils (RCs) established in 
NRA-controlled villages during the war, Museveni wanted to set up a system based 
upon ‘individual merit’. This meant that though political parties were not exactly 
 
17 Obote had been deposed in a coup in July 1985, and a short-lived regime was headed by General 
Tito Okello until Museveni’s accession to power (Mutibwa 1992: 167). 
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banned, they were severely limited in what they could do: they could not have local 
branches, organise delegates’ conference, or sponsor candidates for elections (Carbone 
2003).  
The NRM, the political offspring of the NRA, was therefore the only organisation 
allowed to mobilise for popular support and all political activities were officially 
conducted under the Movement umbrella. The DP initially joined Museveni’s unity 
government, and the party’s president, Paul Ssemogerere, was appointed to the 
cabinet. But when the ‘no-party’ arrangement, originally envisioned as a temporary 
feature, was inscribed in the new Constitution in 1995, the DP left the government. 
Ssemogerere challenged Museveni in the 1996 elections – officially as an independent 
as parties were still barred from fielding candidates, but backed by the DP and the UPC 
– and obtained 23.7% of the vote. The party also called for a boycott of the subsequent 
1996 legislative elections, still officially held under individual merit, though some 
candidates decided to run anyway (Carbone 2008: 143; Beardsworth 2018: 79).  
The Movement system has been described by Carbone (2003: 487) as follows:  
‘something closer to a hegemonic party-state system… neither a fully-fledged 
one-party state (or a situation of political monopoly) nor a three-party system (a 
pluralist political context), but a situation of political supremacy exercised by a 
single organization, with smaller opposition groups not able, so far, to put up any 
significant challenge’.  
Furthermore, the NRM was not distinguished from the State by the 1995 constitution 
or the 1997 Movement Act (Makara 2009: 63). Rubongoya (2007: 139–141) described 
this period as a ‘return to presidentialism’, with parliamentary oversight being crushed 
by the executive, illustrated by the passing of the Movement Act (1997) and the 
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Referendum Act (1999) without the required two-third quorum. Meanwhile, the NRM 
itself appeared increasingly fractured, with a growing call to return to multipartyism 
and to put a stop to the regime’s corruption emanating from movement veterans such 
as MP Winnie Byanyima18 (Rubongoya 2007: 137). The Movement system was 
upheld in a referendum in 2000 that was boycotted by pro-multipartyists (Bratton & 
Lambright 2001). 
In that context, old parties such as the DP were severely constrained. This has had 
consequences on their formalisation until today (Carbone 2003: 490–491). Even 
though the DP’s leadership is well-known and it has thousands of supporters in the 
capital, its membership base in rural areas is largely inactive and scantily informed, 
despite efforts known as Kakuyege (‘small termites’ in Luganda) which consisted in 
sustaining an underground network through everyday practices to connect the 
leadership and the grassroots (Carbone 2008: 117–118). The party’s weak organisation 
has been supported both by its youth organisation, the Ugandan Young Democrats 
(UYD), and by the Foundation for African Development (FAD), a formally 
independent NGO created by DP leaders in 1980 whose budget is partly used for 
activities benefitting the DP such as training workshops and policy-making seminars. 
Yet, despite its long history, the DP has become weak within the Ugandan political 
spectrum. Whereas the DP was the main opposition force during the 1980s, its power 
base has decreased during Museveni’s regime and it has lost ground to new opposition 
forces (Beardsworth 2018).  
 
18 Winnie Byanyima is a daughter of Boniface Byanyima, a former figure of the DP. She joined the 
NRA rebellion and after 1986 served in the Constituent Assembly and as an MP until 2004. She became 
a vocal dissenter of the Movement system’s corruption and broken promises and is a founding member 
of the FDC, created around the figure of her husband, Kizza Besigye. Since 2004, she has distanced 
herself from domestic politics and been working for international institutions (African Union, UNDP) 
and organisations (Oxfam). She is currently the Executive Director of UNAIDS.  
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Indeed, with the old parties – the DP and the UPC – weakened, it was an NRM 
insider who presented a challenge to Museveni in 2001. A new figure, Besigye – who 
had been part of the NRA and served as Museveni’s personal doctor during the Bush 
War – retired from the army and contested the 2001 presidential elections as an 
independent, criticising Museveni for breaking the promises made in the NRM’s ten-
point plan. The DP rallied behind Besigye at that time – though Francis Bwengye, the 
former secretary general, decided to run anyway. This decision had the unintended 
consequence of leading many of their supporters to defect to the FDC at its creation 
several years later.  
In 2003, in an apparent U-turn, the NRM’s National Executive Committee (NEC) 
recommended a return to multiparty politics and a transformation of the NRM into a 
political party (Rubongoya 2007: 171; Makara et al. 2009). This recommendation was 
based on two main arguments: the first was to rid the NRM of internal opponents, in 
order to address the weakening ideology and discipline within the movement; the 
second was that Uganda had to follow the historical trend of political liberalism 
affecting the rest of the region since the early 1990s. Museveni manoeuvred to tag the 
removal of term limits to the return to multiparty politics, which led Makara (2009: 
66) to argue that the move towards political pluralism was ‘more of a self-service 
measure than a genuine conviction on the NRM administration to work towards 
greater democratisation of the state’. Keating (2011) further argued that the return to 
multipartyism allowed Museveni to undermine the weight of the legislature and 
impose party discipline over MPs.  
Despite the formal abandonment of the Movement system and the official 
recognition of political parties’ right to fully participate in Ugandan politics, 
Museveni’s NRM has maintained a strong grip on power. The new Constitution 
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actually increased executive dominance just as multipartyism was reintroduced. 
Indeed, since 2006, the parliament can be dissolved by the president, and it no longer 
has the power to vet the president’s ministerial appointments or to censure ministers 
for corruption or incompetence. The legislature has been weakened through bribery, 
the judiciary has been intimidated by force, and the press has suffered harsh repression, 
with independent media outlets such as KFM and the Daily Monitor being temporarily 
shut down (Mwenda 2007: 25). As will be shown, the NRM has also used incumbency 
to ensure that no other political party can represent a viable threat to its rule.  
The 2006 elections were the first to be organised under the new multiparty 
framework, but they gave very little time to the opposition to organise. An opposition 
coalition attempt, known as the Group of Six (G6), quickly collapsed (see Beardsworth 
2018: 82–87). Besigye came back from self-imposed exile in South Africa in October 
2005 to run under the banner of the newly created FDC. The FDC had been officially 
formed in December 2004, bringing together the Reform Agenda, the pressure group 
which had backed Besigye’s 2001 candidacy, and the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum 
(PAFO) – a group of legislators founded in 2001 to push for reform from within 
Parliament. It was therefore made up of a mix of disenchanted NRM historical figures 
– including Besigye and Mugisha Muntu – and ex-members of older parties such as 
the DP.  
The 2006 campaign was disrupted by Besigye’s trial for treason and rape, for which 
he was arrested and charged in November 2005 in an attempt to bar him from running 
(Kalinaki 2014). In December, despite government pressure, the Electoral 
Commission (EC) agreed to nominate Besigye in absentia, and he was released on bail 
in early January. However, the campaign period was still marked by regular court 
hearings and a smear media campaign portraying him ‘as an HIV-positive rapist and 
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adulterer, as a traitor and terrorist, and as a forger of school certificates’ (Gloppen 
et al. 2006: 17). In the end, Museveni was credited with 59.28% of the vote, and 
Besigye 37.36%.  
Historical parties such as the DP and the UPC received insignificant support in the 
presidential polls (DP’s candidate Ssebaana Kizito, a Protestant and the Mayor of 
Kampala who had taken over as head of the party in 2005, got 1.59% of the vote, and 
Milton Obote’s widow, standing for the UPC, came last with 0.82%). However, they 
managed to get a few parliamentary seats. The DP got eight MPs elected in the Central 
Region, while the UPC got as many in the Northern region and another in the East. 
The FDC as a party fared less better than Besigye as an individual, harnessing 37 MP 
positions (12% of the share of seats).  
In 2010, the DP’s leadership experienced a drastic shift with the election of the 43-
year-old Chairman of Gulu district in the North to the party’s presidency. Mao became 
the first non-Baganda to lead the DP – taking over from Ssebaana Kizito, who had 
been the first non-Catholic in this position. Mao’s election triggered factionalism 
within the party, with some Baganda figures such as Kampala Lord Mayor Erias 
Lukwago and Mukono Municipality MP Betty Nambooze joining the Suubi pressure 
group – an electoral lobby formed to defend the Buganda Kingdom’s interests – which 
backed Besigye in the 2011 presidential race and stirred divisions in the old DP 
stronghold (Brisset-Foucault 2013: 514). In the 2011 elections, which the opposition 
again contested divided following the collapse of the Inter-Party Coalition (IPC), 
Museveni was re-elected with 68% of the vote. Besigye’s presidential score declined 
to 26% – dashing expectations that Museveni’s support was fading and that the 
opposition could deny him an absolute majority and force a run-off (Beardsworth 
2018: 98). Meanwhile, the DP’s Mao received a meagre 1.86% of the vote.  
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Contrary to their two previous encounters, this time Besigye did not challenge the 
results in court. Instead, the opposition attempted to take to the streets, but protests 
called by the opposition to denounce the elections had little traction (Branch & 
Mampilly 2015: 128). However, in early April, the opposition formed a pressure group 
called Activist for Change (A4C) and launched a new movement with broader 
demands regarding living costs and poverty, in a context of soaring inflation partly 
resulting from the monetisation of the elections. This focus on very real issues – such 
as the cost of transport and food – instead of abstract concerns regarding election 
rigging, and the fronting of an independent activist group, rather than polarising parties 
and politicians, had a resounding appeal that was branded by Branch and Mampilly 
(2015: 128) as a ‘stroke of genius’. Opposition figures and activists took to the streets 
to denounce the high inflation affecting the cost of transport, and started to ‘walk to 
work’ in solidarity with poorer Ugandans. This led to massive arrests and beatings of 
protestors, which themselves resulted in further mobilisation and unrest (Perrot 2014: 
426). The movement petered out after Besigye was shot in the arm and evacuated to 
Kenya on 29 April 2012. 
Following the Walk-to-Work protests, Besigye became increasingly disenchanted 
with party politics, shifting his interest towards direct action and civil disobedience. 
He stepped down as party president in November 2012 in an apparent attempt to move 
the FDC away from personality politics (Beardsworth 2018: 108). An internal contest 
to replace him pitted Retired Major General Muntu, another NRA historical and a 
rather austere figure running on the necessity to build party structures, against Nathan 
Nandala Mafaabi, then the Leader of Opposition in Parliament (LOP) who hailed from 
the Eastern region. Muntu was elected, but his presidency was marked by increasing 
division over his leadership style – apparently focused on building the party behind 
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the scene rather than promoting the party through high-profile actions. More 
specifically, a growing schism appeared between ‘organisers’ who defended Muntu 
and ‘activists’ who supported Besigye and promoted the defiance strategy (Mutyaba 
2018). Meanwhile, the DP has continued losing electoral ground to the FDC and 
suffered from internal infighting – for example, Erias Lukwago created a splinter 
group known as the Truth and Justice Platform in 2015, though others like Betty 
Nambooze appeared to have come back into the DP’s fold – despite persisting tensions 
(The Observer 30/05/2018). Still, the party retains a sizable group of vocal legislators 
in Parliament and a relative stronghold in the Central region. 
The 2016 elections saw yet again an attempt to form an opposition coalition, known 
as The Democratic Alliance (TDA) and again that attempt failed (Beardsworth 2016; 
Kayunga 2016). Like in 2001, a regime insider decided to challenge Museveni: former 
Prime Minister Mbabazi announced that he would run in the upcoming elections in 
June 2015 (Oloka-Onyango 2016). A few months later, he was selected as the TDA 
candidate after fraught negotiations (Beardsworth 2016). Even though Besigye had 
proclaimed in 2013 that he would not contest the next elections, he still stood to be the 
FDC’s flagbearer (winning against Muntu), then refused to back Mbabazi and the FDC 
left the coalition. This left Mbabazi to run with the support of smaller parties – 
including the DP, which was itself divided over the issue, as many of the party’s 
supporters on the ground backed Besigye (int. UG05, Kampala, 14/06/2016). The 
campaign was once again characterised by violent repression of opposition activities, 
with Besigye and Mbabazi both being routinely arrested, and their supporters scattered 
by security forces (Nkuubi 2016).  
Museveni officially won with 60% of the vote – a result heavily distrusted by the 
opposition (Daily Monitor 22/05/2016). Besigye was placed under house arrest prior 
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to the results’ announcement and remained so for six weeks. Mbabazi challenged the 
results in court but the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Besigye 
was sworn in as ‘the People’s President’ in a mock ceremony, launching a civil 
disobedience campaign called ‘Defiance’ – an extension of the election campaign to 
maintain mobilisation levels (Daily Monitor 22/05/2016).  
This activist approach to politics has also been embraced by a new political figure, 
slum musician-turned-MP Robert Kyagulanyi, known by his stage name Bobi Wine. 
He was elected to parliament in 2017 in a by-election for the Kyaddondo East 
constituency, a popular neighbourhood on the outskirts of Kampala. Since then, he has 
built a movement known as ‘People Power’ and has regularly been arrested and beaten 
up for holding political rallies (The Observer 24/07/2019).  
Meanwhile, the FDC has continued to suffer from internal divisions. In November 
2017, Muntu failed to be re-elected as party president, losing to Patrick Oboi Amuriat, 
the pro-defiance candidate backed by Besigye. In August 2018, Amuriat dismissed 
figures close to Muntu from parliamentary positions, including the LOP Winnie Kiiza 
who was replaced by Betty Aol Ochan. The following month, Muntu quit the party 
and formed a new party known as the Alliance for National Transformation (ANT) in 
March 2019, but has so far failed to attract durable support (The East African 
06/05/2019). In contrast, the DP attempted to launch a reunification process under the 
banner of the UYD in 2018, with the creation of a DP Bloc uniting the DP, the Social-
Democratic Party (SDP) – founded in 2005 by DP defector Michael Mabiike – and the 
People’s Development Party (PDP) of Abed Bwanika (Daily Monitor 13/07/2019). 
Museveni is set to contest for another term in 2021 – having removed the age-limit 
contained in the Constitution in December 2017 – and both Bobi Wine and Besigye 
are likely to challenge him. 
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Museveni’s regime, characterised by repression, patronage, and a blurred 
distinction between the NRM and the State’s institutions, can therefore be described 
as hybrid – a label attributed to the regime by many researchers (Tripp 2010; Perrot et 
al. (eds) 2014a; Makara 2016). Contrary to Burkina Faso, where Compaoré developed 
more subtle strategies over-time and where violent repression generally decreased 
from the 2000s onward, Museveni has continued to resort to violence against 
opponents. This led Freedom House to change Uganda’s status in 2019 from ‘Partly 
Free’ to ‘Not Free’, citing the government’s attempts to restrict free expression. The 
unlevel playing field in Uganda has been conceived as a legacy of the ‘no-party era’ 
and of the Movement Act (Wild & Golooba-Mutebi 2010). As I argue in the next 
section, this kind of state-incumbent fusion is a common feature of hybrid regimes 
designed by the incumbent and creates a particular set of constraints for opposition 
parties. 
3.3 State-incumbent fusion and opposition constraints 
As we have already seen in Chapter 1, African opposition parties are generally 
branded as weak. In a large number of countries, they have been blamed for their 
internal divisions, lack of internal democracy, low resources and disparate presence on 
the ground (e.g. Olukoshi 1998b; Lotshwao 2011; Katundu 2018; Kelly 2020). 
Opposition weakness has been considered a chief obstacle to democratisation 
(Olukoshi 1998b; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Erdmann et al. 2007; Rakner & Van de 
Walle 2009). Yet, it is difficult to understand these weaknesses without considering 
the political environment these opposition parties operate in, and the lack of a level 
playing field described in the previous section. Authors such as Levitsky and Way 
(2010a) have described this unlevel playing field whilst focusing on what it means for 
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incumbents and their capacity to resist opposition challenges, while others have 
analysed opposition’s constraints in specific countries and linked these to specific 
historical legacies – such as the Movement system in Uganda (Wild & Golooba-
Mutebi 2010).  
I argue here that the challenges faced by opposition parties in hybrid regimes must 
be understood as consequences of the fusion of the incumbent and state institutions. 
These are often intertwined in a way that prevents the emergence of a ‘loyal’ 
opposition and instead consider opposition parties as enemies of the state rather than 
adversaries of the incumbent. In this section, I start by explaining this concept of state-
incumbent fusion, before discussing in turn various ways in which it constrains 
opposition parties’ activities. I review the violence and repression they face, the 
monetisation of politics that affects their capacity and citizens’ expectations, subtle 
and not-so-subtle electoral malpractices, and the divisionary tactics used by the 
regimes in both countries.  
Opposition parties in Burkina Faso and Uganda, like in other hybrid regimes, face 
a range of obstacles that prevent them from fulfilling their objectives. Some of these 
difficulties are directly imputable to the actions of non-democratic incumbents. For 
example, electoral fraud prevents opposition parties from winning elections even if 
they have support, while violence and repression prevent them from organising and 
mobilising. Others appear to be internal weaknesses, such as opposition parties’ lack 
of resources and local structures and their own divisions and leadership squabbles 
(Randall & Svåsand 2002c). Yet, even these internal issues cannot be disassociated 
from the environment in which opposition parties exist and operate. This environment 
is characterised by a lack of clarity regarding where the ruling party ends and where 
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the state begins, and both of these realms are closely connected with the incumbent’s 
figure and personal circle.  
In Uganda, this fusion of the NRM and the state has been considered as a legacy of 
the Movement system. The NRM and the state were effectively one and the same at 
that time, and the ruling party has never disentangled itself from the state’s institutions 
(Wild & Golooba-Mutebi 2010: 5). This fusion concerns every layer of the state, from 
Parliament and local councils to security forces and parastatal companies, effectively 
meaning that ‘institutions have been turned into defenders of the regime’ (int. UG05, 
Kampala, 14/06/2016). It also allows Museveni and the NRM to ‘grab’ elections by 
abusing state resources, blurring the line between their own pockets and the public 
coffers (Helle & Rakner 2013). This fusion creates a situation in which opposition 
parties ‘are competing against the state and all its machinery’, as a DP MP puts it, ‘in 
that one thing lie all [the] other obstacles’ that they face (int. UG89, Constituency, 
2016). The NRM itself is intrinsically linked to the persona of Museveni. As Vokes 
and Wilkins (2016: 586) argue: ‘The idea of the NRM is inseparable from the 
personality of the president, who truly owns its history and values in a way that no 
other national NRM elite comes close to matching’. Within the parliamentary arena, 
Museveni attempts to control NRM MPs through the NRM caucus, and regularly 
resorts to buying the support of recalcitrant legislators through executive patronage 
(Muhumuza 2009; Collord 2016).  
In Burkina Faso, we find the same dynamics, with the ruling party intertwined with 
the institutions at all levels, and blurry boundaries between personal, partisan, and 
institutional spheres. This can be seen though the politicisation of the administration, 
illustrated by the top positions being reserved for ruling party members: as a civil 
society leader explained: ‘You needed the [CDP] party card, otherwise you could not 
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build a career, even if you were competent’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). A 
UPC activist further complained that ‘the administration was politicised, appointments 
were political even among technicians, who shouldn’t have a political agenda. It 
means the administration is not efficient’ (int. BF31, Koudougou, 17/04/2018). 
Cabinet positions were also used to provide patronage to one’s constituency, for 
example in the form of development projects.  
Like in Uganda, Compaoré and the CDP had the distinct upper-hand in election 
campaigns due to their abuse of state resources (Loada 2010; Bertrand 2011). The 
party-state-person fusion was also demonstrated by the dominance of Compaoré’s 
close personal circle over the economy, in particular his wife, Chantal, and his 
brother’s mother-in-law, Alizéta Ouédraogo (Harsch 2017: 148–153). Various deals 
with economic operators also contributed to blurring the line between the party and 
the state: ‘Economic operators would rather put their money into the CDP and 
expected kickbacks such as public contracts or concessions in return’ (int. BF09, 
Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). By the end of the 1990s, this situation had created, 
according to critics, a ‘virtual party-state […] with the ruling party machine using 
public power and resources to co-opt potential challengers and reduce the 
parliamentary opposition to just a token 10 (out of 111) seats in the legislature’ 
(Harsch 1998: 627).  
While Compaoré’s CDP also benefitted from a historical legacy – much like 
Museveni’s NRM – in regard to its implantation across the country, the short-lived 
Front Populaire (or the previous Sankarist Revolution) fails to provide a satisfactory 
justification to this quasi-fusion at every level. More convincingly, the hybrid nature 
of their respective regime has enabled both Museveni and Compaoré to manipulate 
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state institutions, aggregate political and social forces into a mega-party through a mix 
of coercion and co-optation, and pose as the ultimate referee on the political field.  
As I describe in the following sections, the hybridity of the regime translates into a 
particularly volatile environment, as the government may repeatedly shift their stance 
between appearing more open in order to release pressure and increasing repression to 
contain threats to preserve their grasp on power, therefore denying the kind of 
predictability that democratic rule of law would entail. This kind of shift in tactics can 
be explained by both domestic and international pressures. Museveni has faced less 
pressure than Compaoré to appear more democratic due to the relative strategic interest 
his regime represented for international partners, for example due to Uganda’s pivotal 
role in the War on Terror and its heavy contribution to the AMISOM mission in 
Somalia (Fisher 2012).  
I now review a series of ways this state-incumbent fusion plays out and affects 
opposition parties’ activities. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but presents four 
key aspects that have emerged from my research as being particularly constraining for 
the opposition, both in Burkina Faso and Uganda. I focus on aspects that restricts the 
opposition’s capacity, rather than those that give the incumbent an advantage, such as 
the support received from international donors (e.g. through aid or muted criticism) 
(Fisher 2013) or the control and credit of development projects (Muhwezi-Mpanga 
2016). I address the following four key dynamics: repression and harassment; the 





 The fear factor 
The most straight-forward constraint that opposition parties face in a hybrid regime 
is the threat of violence. Opposition parties and actors in hybrid regimes suffer from 
repression and harassment by the regime, even though the intensity of repression and 
the kind of threat they face can evolve over time.  
The Front Populaire instituted by Compaoré when he first came to power in 1987 
was a military regime, with the associated threat of violence that such a regime entails. 
While Compaoré took conciliatory measures to obtain support from certain segments 
of the population – especially those that had been side-lined or frustrated by Thomas 
Sankara, such as traditional chiefs, economic operators, and civil servants – the Front 
Populaire was still characterised by violent repression. In particular, this period was 
marked by the violent quelling of a military rebellion in Koudougou in 1987 and the 
execution of potential challengers, such as Henri Zongo and Jean-Baptiste Lingani, in 
198919 (Englebert 1996: 62–64; Harsch 2017: 113–114). On 9 December 1991, several 
opposition figures were attacked by unidentified individuals, killing Oumarou 
Clément Ouédraogo, former general secretary of the ODP-MT, Compaoré’s party, and 
injuring Moctal Tall, leader of a small opposition party (Harsch 2017: 120). Another 
prominent death in that period was that of student union leader Dabo Boukary in 1990 
(Mazzocchetti 2006: 98).  
While the 1991 Constitution did allow for a return to civilian rule and the official 
liberalisation of the political environment, the following decade was still characterised 
by high levels of repression. Indeed, a UNIR-PS leader argued that ‘the democratic 
 
19 As stated earlier, Zongo and Lingani were, with Blaise Compaoré, the most prominent figures of 
the Revolution’s National Council (CNR) headed by Thomas Sankara (1983-1987).  
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opening did not fundamentally change the repression in itself. It became more 
insidious, more sneaky’ (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). Describing that 
period, a civil society activist explained: ‘it was very difficult for the opposition… 
There was no space for opposition during the first ten years’ (int. BF06, Ouagadougou, 
28/03/2017). A journalist similarly recalled the authoritarian roots of Compaoré’s 
power and argued that, despite the adoption of a liberal constitution in 1991, ‘people 
were still tense, there was no real opposition until 1998’ (int. BF02, Ouagadougou, 
17/03/2017) An activist from the PDS-Metba, a small opposition party at the time, 
further argued that ‘everything was done to smother the opposition’ (int. BF11, 
Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017). A UNIR-PS official described security measures taken 
within the party to protect the party headquarters and its officials’ homes from reprisals 
(int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). Several interviewees have described receiving 
death threats during that period.  
Political repression culminated on 13 December 1998 with the assassination of 
journalist Norbert Zongo. His death was significant because of what he and his 
newspaper represented. According to a Burkinabè journalist, at that time, ‘the action 
of political parties was marginal. A newspaper served as a counter-power: Nobert 
Zongo’s L’Indépendant’ (int. BF02, Ouagadougou, 17/03/2017). As I previously 
described, his death marked a turning-point for Compaoré’s regime and for his 
opponents, as it triggered an unprecedented wave of protests bringing together 
opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society organisations to demand that the truth 
be uncovered and justice be served on the ‘Zongo affair’. Norbert Zongo’s death also 
shed light on the authoritarian nature of Compaoré’s regime internationally, in 
particular through the advocacy work of Reporters Without Borders (RSF 1998).  
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To respond to this crisis, Compaoré shifted gears and adopted a more subtle 
approach to deal with dissent, co-opting certain opposition parties to break the 
coalition of opposition parties known as ‘G14’, and agreeing to limited democratic 
reforms, such as a change to the electoral code and a re-introduction of constitutional 
term-limits (Santiso & Loada 2003; Hilgers & Mazzocchetti 2006; Loada 2010). The 
relative opening of the political space was particularly well illustrated by the growing 
public interest in Thomas Sankara’s legacy. As mentioned previously, in the early 
years of Compaoré’s regime, the first Sankarist party, the BSB, used ‘socialist’ in its 
name rather than ‘Sankarist’ because Sankara’s name was very taboo. Over the next 
decade, the authorities eased up and even attempted to appropriate this heritage, as 
described by Harsch (1998: 625):  
‘Initially small and subject to police harassment, the annual pilgrimages to 
Sankara's gravesite gradually began to attract thousands. By the tenth 
anniversary, it was a major national event. The Burkinabè press gave pages to 
assessments of Sankara's life, achievements, and political legacy; even the 
government-owned daily ran a commentary acknowledging Sankara as a 
'national hero.’ 
Yet, the harassment of opponents continued, even if in more subtle ways. For 
example, private operators known to be in or to support the political opposition were 
passed over for contracts, in a context where a large majority of opportunities came 
from the public sector (int. BF10, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017). For civil servants, 
including teachers and administrators, career progression was dependent on political 
affiliation, as being a CDP card-carrying member was an informal but real pre-
requisite to access top-level positions in the administration. As Loada (2010: 271) 
explained at the time, ‘the quasi-totality of administrative and economic elites are, or 
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believe to be, forced to join the ruling party to exist or subsist. In electoral periods, 
high-ranking civil servants are asked to demonstrate their loyalty toward the party’.  
A UNIR-PS activist from Yako reported that he was once laid off from a project he 
was working for, and instructed to go and see the CDP’s regional coordinator in 
Ouahigouya when he asked for an explanation: ‘I was told to choose between my work 
and the UNIR, that if I wanted to keep my job I had to leave the UNIR and join the 
CDP’ (int. BF24, Yako, 04/04/2018). In the end, he was able to remain a member of 
UNIR but had to give up his regional responsibilities within the party in order to keep 
working. Teachers active in opposition parties have described how they were 
frequently transferred to inconvenient postings (for example far away from their 
family) as a result of their political affiliation. As a UNIR-PS leader argued, ‘If you 
wanted to evolve in your career, you had to not belong to a Sankarist party’ (int. BF39, 
Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). These career impediments hurt individuals in an attempt 
to demobilise or co-opt them personally, but it also impacted opposition parties as 
organisations and increased their financial difficulties by making their leaders and 
activists financially insecure and limiting the support they could receive from private 
operators.  
After 2009, it appears that operating as an opposition party in Burkina Faso became 
easier. The UPC, founded in 2010, benefitted from a much more favourable 
environment than the UNIR-PS and other parties created in earlier years. This has been 
acknowledged by UPC activists themselves: ‘UPC activists were rather protected, 
compared to other opposition parties. People knew that hurting a UPC member was 
dangerous’ (int. BF15, Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018). The fact that the regime tolerated 
better the UPC than previous opposition parties has been interpreted by some as 
evidence that the regime had supported its creation for its own motives. According to 
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one UNIR-PS leader: ‘It seems that the creation of the UPC was supported by the 
power in place, with money, so that radical parties such as UNIR-PS could not get in 
power’ (int. BF43, Ouagadougou, 24/07/2018). But once again, repression did not 
completely disappear. For example, UNIR-PS activists I interviewed still reported 
being beaten up by CDP supporters during this period (int. BF16, Ouagadougou, 
17/01/2018), while the government violently repressed a military mutiny in Bobo 
Dioulasso amidst a national wave of protests in 2011 (Chouli 2012: 70; Dwyer 2017: 
160). In 2014, a judge sitting in the Constitutional Court, Salifou Nébié, was found 
dead in suspicious circumstances – an enquiry is still open. Nébié was considered close 
to the MPP, and was known to oppose the modification of term-limits (le faso.net 
30/05/2014) . The anti-government protests in October 2014 were also characterised 
by violent repression (Amnesty International 2015). 
Overall, we can therefore see that Compaoré’s regime progressively turned away 
from blatant violence to more subtle harassment and repression, accompanied by a rise 
of co-optation techniques detailed in the next section. This echoes a more global trend, 
as Cheeseman and Klaas (2019: 25) have argued: ‘authoritarian governments have a 
strong incentive where possible to swap violent forms of rigging for other, less blatant 
strategies’. Still, throughout the period, journalists have practiced self-censorship, 
especially those working for state-controlled media. Those investigating corruption 
and abuses faced unfavourable libel laws placing the burden of proof on the defendant, 
as stated in Freedom House’s (e.g. 2010) Freedom of the Press annual reports.  
While the political space progressively became more open for opposition parties – 
illustrated by the affirmation of Sankarist parties owning the once-tabooed name and 
the UPC’s comparatively higher freedom of operation after 2010 – epitomised 
violence was still used when Compaoré started to lose control. This was the case in 
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1998 when Norbert Zongo threw unwanted light on the authorities’ murky actions and 
encouraged opposition unity within the G14; or when the army – upon which 
Compaoré’s power was highly reliant – rebelled in 2011 as hands-out appeared 
insufficient to calm the mutinies (Chouli 2012); and finally in the last hours of 
Compaoré’s tenure in October 2014 (Engels 2015a). 
In contrast, in Uganda, repression has generally been less subtle than in Burkina 
Faso, with Museveni regularly resorting to arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and 
violent suppression of protests until today. The army is visibly involved in politics in 
various ways, leading to a ‘militarization of politics’ (Muhumuza 2009: 7; see also 
Kagoro 2016). For example, ten parliamentary seats are reserved for army members 
who ‘are strictly supposed to toe the NRM line’ (Muhumuza 2009: 7), and the army is 
regularly deployed around election time in a threatening fashion (Nkuubi 2016: 418). 
Army officials have also made worrying statements on various occasions, such as 
when the Chief of Defence Forces, Aronda Nyakairima, reportedly claimed that the 
army ‘[would] not allow bad characters coming back to power’ in August 2008 
(Tangri & Mwenda 2010: 44) and threatened to stage a palace coup in 2013 at a time 
when parliament was pushing back against the executive on corruption: ‘The message 
was well taken for those to who it was intended. Stand warned. Stand advised. Should 
you not change course, other things will be brought into play. Let no one return to the 
past’ (Daily Monitor 24/01/2013). 
Despite the return to multipartyism in 2005, new legislation was passed to 
effectively maintain restrictions on opposition activities. In particular, the Public Order 
Management Act (POMA), passed in 2013, was used and abused to curtail the 
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opposition’s mobilisation capacities (Nkuubi 2016: 427).20 POMA required political 
parties to obtain authorisation from the police chief before organising and holding any 
rally or meeting. POMA was used by the police as a justification to systematically ban 
or disrupt opposition meetings, including during the 2016 electoral campaign, leading 
the Ugandan press to claim that ‘across the country, police have waved the law like a 
conventional flag in a war zone signalling ‘cease-fire’ to, especially (sic) Opposition 
activities’ (Daily Monitor 14/07/2015). Security forces and civilian militias more or 
less controlled by the government have been used against the opposition to maintain 
an environment of fear (Kagoro 2015; Nkuubi 2016; Tapscott 2016). Museveni 
himself has regularly made veiled (and at times not so subtle) threats about the 
opposition, such as stating that his opponents would end up ‘six feet underground’ 
(Kalinaki 2014: 168).  
Repression has been particularly harsh on opposition flagbearer and FDC founder 
Besigye since he decided to challenge Museveni in 2001. These elections were marred 
by violence – leading to 12 deaths and 742 cases reported to the police – which 
prompted investigations by international organisations (e.g. HRW 2001) as well as the 
Ugandan Parliament (Kalinaki 2014: 168–171). The 2006 campaign was notably 
marked by Besigye being charged for rape and treason, which meant that he spent over 
half the time of the campaign in jail or in court (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016). The 
2011 elections went more smoothly, with ‘cases of actual violence during the 
campaign and the elections remain[ing] localised’, but armed forces were widely 
deployed, especially in Kampala (Golaz & Médard 2014: 54). The Walk-to-Work 
 
20 It should be noted that POMA was struck as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on 26 March 
2020 following a petition filed in December 2013 by opposition MPs, human rights organisations, and 
a retired Bishop (Chapter Four 29/03/2020; The Guardian 28/03/2020). 
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protests, organised by Besigye and other opposition activists to denounce rising food 
prices and poverty on the back of the 2011 elections, were met with brutal violence 
(HRW 2011; Branch & Mampilly 2015: 130–132).  
In a similar pattern, the 2016 elections demonstrated lower levels of recorded 
violence than previous polls, despite an ‘omnipresent threat of violence’ (Oloka-
Onyango & Ahikire 2016: 3). Yet events held as part of the Defiance campaign 
launched by Besigye after the elections were violently repressed, and Besigye himself 
was once again charged with treason after he had sworn himself in as the ‘People’s 
President’ (The East African 11/05/2016). Recently, Bobi Wine has become another 
target of violent repression, notably during the by-election in Arua Municipality in 
August 2018 where his driver was shot dead as Bobi Wine was arrested and allegedly 
tortured (Daily Monitor 03/09/2018). Overall, the repression is sometimes so high that 
an FDC activist argued that Ugandan opponents ‘have to prepare for battle instead of 
preparing for elections’ (int. UG29, Kampala, 05/12/2016). 
We therefore notice a different trend in the two countries, with violent repression 
giving way to more subtle co-optation and less apparent militarisation of politics in 
Burkina Faso overtime, while Museveni has continued to rely of security forces up 
until today. Yet, a common trait shared by both the Burkinabè and the Ugandan 
oppositions is that they have been considered and treated as an enemy by the ruling 
elite. A young opposition activist in Burkina Faso explained that ‘the opposition was 
seen as an enemy that had to be taken out’ (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017), 
while a DP leader argued that ‘in Uganda, the opposition is not seen as a competitor, 
it is seen and regarded [as] – and it has been explicitly stated so that it is – an enemy 
force’ (int. UG03, Kampala, 20/04/2016). This is reinforced by the past occurrence or 
mere threats of electoral violence by incumbents who portray the opposition as 
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troublemakers and present themselves as the guarantors of peace and security (Lynch 
et al. 2019; Jenkins 2020). 
This should also be related to the fact that both these regimes find their own roots 
in violence: they both obtained power by force – through a coup in Compaoré’s case 
and after a civil war in Museveni’s – and have therefore been unwilling to step down 
through democratic means. The 2014 insurrection in Burkina Faso illustrated this: 
while the regular Army refused to shoot down the peaceful protestors marching on the 
National Assembly building, the presidential guard did otherwise. Nineteen protestors 
were killed, and another 500 injured, mainly near the Presidential Palace of Kosyam 
housing Compaoré, and the residence of his brother François.21 Tripp (2010: 1), in the 
opening of her book on Museveni’s Uganda, highlighted how hybrid regimes’ 
perversion of democracy and reliance on patronage and violence to remain in power 
creates a vicious circle:  
‘Because leaders have sought power through violence and patronage, they 
cannot leave power; the personal consequences would be too great. Because 
there is no easy exit, they must continue using violence and patronage to remain 
in power.’ 
This description fits Compaoré’s regime equally well, as its last attempt to quell the 
insurrection shows. Yet repression and violence are not the only obstacles that 
 
21 As mentioned earlier, François Compaoré was implicated in the assassination of the journalist 
Norbert Zongo in 1998. He was later positioned as a potential successor by Blaise Compaoré, leading 
to the defection of key CDP figures in January 2014. François Compaoré and his mother-in-law, Alizéta 
Ouédraogo, were particularly unpopular among the Burkinabè population. François Compaoré was 
arrested in France in October 2017 and Burkina Faso has requested his extradition to prosecute him in 
the Zongo murder case.  
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opposition parties face. As Tripp (idem) point out, another way these regimes use to 
remain in power is ‘patronage and largesse’, a dynamic I discuss next.  
 The monetisation of politics 
During interviews in Burkina Faso and Uganda, the lack of resources was 
systematically cited as the chief constraint faced by opposition parties. This difficulty 
must be analysed on the backdrop of the high monetisation of politics in both Burkina 
Faso (Kibora 2019) and Uganda (Muhumuza 1997; Conroy-Krutz & Logan 2012; 
Wilkins 2016), as well as across the rest of the continent (e.g. Kramon 2017; Okunloye 
2018). While it is not the sole factor, money does play a major role in politics. As a 
Burkinabè civil society activist and researcher argued:  
‘When we look at political parties’ electoral results, what we see is that there is 
a correlation between their score and their financial means. The richer parties 
always have the highest scores. It is true money is not everything, but it is the 
most decisive variable’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017). 
Vote-buying or electoral corruption is considered a normal part of politics and is a 
clear expectation from voters. In Uganda, a survey found that 74% of young people 
were vulnerable to electoral bribery; 39% further stated they would only vote for a 
candidate who bribed them (Awiti 2016: 2). In Burkina Faso, any politician going to a 
village to campaign has to stop by the village chief to pay their respects, and to leave 
an ‘envelop’ (Kibora 2019: 81). A young UNIR-PS leader and local councillor 
explained: ‘When I was a candidate for local elections, village chiefs told me outright 
that if I wanted to get the votes in their village, I had to put my money where my mouth 
was’ (int. BF16, Ouagadougou, 17/01/2018). At meetings people expect water, food, 
and gadgets, sometimes a gas refill for their motorcycle or transportation costs. As a 
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UPC MP argued, ‘When you have a meeting, you lay out the political programme, it 
is completely useless; the conclusion people are waiting for is how much you are going 
to give them’ (int. BF38, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018).  
This means that the costs of running for elections are ever increasing, as ruling 
parties mobilise increasing war chests (Koter 2017). In Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s re-
election campaign in 2005 officially cost around one billion CFA Francs (FCFA)22 – 
a figure greatly under-estimated according to political observers (Loada 2006: 26). In 
Uganda, a study estimated that legislative candidates spent between 150 and 500 
million Ugandan shillings (USh)23 on electioneering in the 2016 campaign (Golooba-
Mutebi 2017: 8) – while the average monthly cash income that year was USh416,00024 
according to the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (The Observer 04/10/2017). Campaign 
costs are inflated by the NRM’s ability to use the public budget – through the use of 
government facilities by Museveni and other NRM figures, the spending of a 
discretionary ‘presidential donations’ budget (amounting to USD10.2 million in 
201125), and the wide patronage networks of the NRM (Helle & Rakner 2013: 164). 
As an example, a study on campaign financing released in January 2016 found that 
President Museveni had spent USh27 billion in just two months of campaigning ahead 
of the February 2016 election, compared with the USh1.3 billion spent by independent 
candidate Mbabazi, and Ush976 million by FDC’s Besigye (New Vision 
22/01/2016)26.  
 
22 Around £1 million at the time (November 2005). All historical exchange rates were retrieved on 
OANDA [https://www1.oanda.com/currency/converter/]. 
23 Around £30,000-100,000 (February 2016). 
24 Around £84 (February 2016). 
25 Around £6.4 million (February 2011). 




As Helle and Rakner (2013: 166) have argued, this massive spending by the ruling 
party can fuel skyrocketing inflation, as in 2011 when the Consumer Price Index 
reached a 18.7% annual increase – which in turn triggered the Walk-to-Work protests. 
This does not necessarily mean that incumbents simply ‘bought’ their re-election: 
based upon opinion surveys, Conroy-Krutz and Logan (2012) have argued that 
Museveni’s re-election in 2011 was due to widespread public satisfaction with a 
growing economy and peaceful dividends in the Northern region, and that ultimately 
the money spent by Museveni in vote-buying did not make a decisive difference in the 
election’s outcome. Yet, the lavish spending by incumbents increases the cost of entry 
into politics and forces candidates to raise funds and take on massive debts (Wilkins 
2016; Golooba-Mutebi 2017; Koter 2017) 
In this context, the low financial capacity of opposition parties is a real issue. Their 
meagre resources make the development of party structures particularly challenging, 
as money is necessary to organise rallies and meetings, maintain party headquarters 
and full-time staff, and conduct activities. As a Burkinabè researcher and activist 
explained: 
‘People are attracted to a political party based upon realism. They are not 
looking at the quality of ideas, but at the mobilisation capacity, the financial 
means. If a small party has good ideas and clean, honest people, but people 
believe it does not have the means to campaign, they will prefer to be with a party, 
maybe a little less clean, but which realistically is more likely to obtain a few 
parliamentary seats’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017). 
In both Uganda and Burkina Faso, resource mobilisation is hampered by the 
absence of a political culture of paying membership fees. In Burkina Faso, 
‘cotisations’ – or the regular financial contributions party members are expected to 
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make to the organisation – are rarely paid, except by those aspiring to be candidates, 
or those with political or elected responsibilities. As one UPC MP argued: ‘no party 
has activists who pay membership dues because Blaise Compaoré used to give them 
money. If you go and ask them for money, even as an opposition party, they won’t 
understand it’ (int. BF38, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018). Similarly in Uganda, a civil 
society representative described how ‘we have created a tradition in this country in 
the last fifteen years where party supporters expect to get from the party, instead of 
them giving to the party’ (int. UG01, Kampala, 06/04/2016).  
One notable exception is the display of financial contribution by individual 
supporters to Besigye and the FDC in Uganda during rallies in the run up to the 2016 
election. According to the Ugandan newspaper The Observer (03/02/2016), individual 
supporters may have contributed up to USh112 million27 during the campaign, not 
counting additional contributions in nature, including chickens, rabbits, fish, and 
vegetables. However, this kind of contribution remains ad-hoc and falls short of the 
real costs involved in campaigning. There is also a lack of transparency and 
accountability in terms of how much money the party actually gets in this manner, and 
how those funds are spent.  
Public funding for political parties is inscribed in the law, but greatly limited and 
often monopolised by the ruling party. In Uganda, the Political Parties and 
Organisations (Amendment) Act of 2010 includes a provision for public resources to 
be awarded to political parties or organisations represented in Parliament for elections 
and the conduct of their normal day to day activities. While campaign financing is 
officially distributed on an equal basis, regular funding is calculated based upon 
 
27 Around £22,600 (February 2016). 
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numerical representation in parliament. It is therefore largely monopolised by the 
ruling party considering its ultra-dominance in number of seats. The large number of 
independent MPs (who are more numerous than MPs affiliated to opposition parties) 
also affects the division of available resources. The actual disbursement of funds is 
irregular, as illustrated by the Electoral Commission’s announcement that there would 
not be funding for political parties for the 2018-2019 financial year due to a budget 
shortfall (The Observer 20/01/2018). In 2016, out of the USh10 billion envelope 
awarded, less than USh2 billion28 was split among the five opposition parties 
represented in the ninth parliament (Daily Monitor 03/05/2016).29 
Similarly in Burkina Faso, there are two streams of public funding but with different 
distribution rules: regular funding for day-to-day activities is allocated based upon the 
latest legislative election results (% of votes obtained), while funding for election 
campaigns is awarded based upon the number of candidates a party fields (Law n°12-
2001/AN of 28 June 2001).  
In Uganda, it is particularly difficult for opposition parties to raise money, due to 
obtrusive legislation. For example, the NGO Act (2016) has reduced the ability of 
political foundations to provide funding to political parties – except indirectly through 
the organisation of trainings and workshops. For example, the DP receives some 
financial and technical support from a German political foundation, the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), to organise training workshops (see Erdmann 2006). All 
parties also benefit from capacity-building through programmes such as the Inter-Party 
 
28 USh 10 billion = around £2 million; USh 2 billion = £408,000 (May 2016). 
29 While legislative elections had taken place in February 2016, the resulting tenth legislature only 
sat on 17 May for the first time. These funds were awarded at the beginning of May 2016, therefore 
based upon representation in the ninth parliament (2011-2016) which included the NRM (259 MPs), 
FDC (37), DP (15), UPC (10), Jeema (1), CP (1).  
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Youth Platform (IYOP), the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD), or the 
Democratic Governance Facility (DGF).30  
In addition, the Political Parties and Organisations Act (PPOA, 2005) places a 
ceiling of USh400 million31 on funds a party can get from foreign sources. This makes 
it very difficult to evaluate the diaspora’s contribution to opposition parties’ finances 
in either country. An FDC activist stated that the party had chapters abroad 
contributing financially to the party, notably in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and South Africa (int. UG86, Kampala, 26/05/2018). Meanwhile, a civil society 
activist in Soroti indicated that the FDC received discreet support from the diaspora – 
for example by distributing it to young people who then reversed the funds to the party 
as individual contributions (int. UG38, Soroti, 07/05/2018). Yet, assessing the actual 
amount of these contributions is impossible at this stage.  
It is the same in Burkina Faso, where party officials rarely acknowledged the 
diaspora as a source of funding. However, the Sankarist parties have in the past 
received financial contributions from Mariam Sankara, Thomas Sankara’s widow 
exiled in France (L’Observateur Paalga 15/10/2007a). Meanwhile, a researcher stated 
that parties did receive unofficial – and unaccounted for – contributions from abroad, 
for example through ideology-based international connexions with European parties 
or due to ethnic solidarity ties with politicians in the sub-region (int. BF07, 
Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017).  
 
30 This is acknowledged on these programmes’ websites or social media pages: 
https://www.facebook.com/Interparty-Youth-Platform-IYOP-215134021927161/; 
https://nimd.org/programmes/uganda/; https://www.facebook.com/DGFuganda 
31 Around £84,000 (April 2020). 
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Contributions from domestic and foreign supporters are however hampered because 
these supporters often have an interest in remaining anonymous. The Ugandan 
legislation requires the disclosure of sources of funding, therefore ‘violat[ing] the 
anonymity that businessmen, soldiers and other big funders would need to be safe 
when they give funds’ (Ssenkumba 2007: 18–19). A DP leader stated that the party has 
‘well-wishers who contribute to the party, [but] most of them have to do it 
anonymously because they fear reprisals, because the government thinks that 
supporting an opposition party amounts to treason’ (int. UG87, Kampala, 
28/05/2018). A particular risk for private operators is that their business can be targeted 
as a punishment for funding the opposition. In Burkina Faso, a UNIR-PS leader asked: 
‘Who will fund you if you are not friends with those who manage state power? They 
are the ones awarding public contracts, they are the ones sustaining private 
companies’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018). Similarly in Uganda, a DP 
member of parliament stated that ‘any businessman here who associates with us will 
be visited by URA [Uganda Revenue Authority] to remind him he owes taxes to the 
government’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).  
In this context, parties are heavily reliant on key individuals among the party’s 
leadership to use their own resources to fund the party’s activities, including 
conducting electoral campaigns and building and maintaining local structures. MPs 
tend to be the ones paying for the local party headquarters in their constituency and 
greatly contribute to party activities at the local level, and at the national level, the 
party’s leadership is responsible for financing a large part of the party’s activities. The 
party’s capacities are therefore closely connected to the personal means of its leaders.  
Politicians who have taken part in government have been able to extract resources 
from their political positions and have built economic foundations they can rely on to 
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create and sustain their party, but it is more difficult for opposition leaders with limited 
means to accumulate a financial base. For example, as a civil society representative 
explained, ‘a party like the UNIR-PS has not, since the time of Thomas Sankara, 
directly participated in state power and has not been able to constitute a large enough 
financial base’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017). The UPC’s founder, Diabré, 
had more resources than UNIR-PS officials, though it should be noted that he 
accumulated these resources through his international clout and network more than 
from his brief time in government. When the party is mainly funded by its leader, it 
can be a problem. Indeed, this inevitably creates a situation where the party ‘belongs’ 
to the leader rather than the members, and the dependence of parties on key 
contributors can prevent internal democracy and leadership renewal, something I will 
come back to when discussing party-building processes (5.2) and parties ability to 
endure (7.1). 
Financial difficulties are obviously a major hurdle for opposition parties: limited 
funding prevents them from setting up local structures and maintaining offices and 
staff, holding rallies and conducting activities, and responding to the population’s 
widespread expectations for handouts. While a lack of funding could be considered as 
an internal weakness, in the context of a hybrid regime it is mostly fuelled by the 
political environment: repressive legislation, threats towards opposition supporters, 
and the monopolisation of public funding by ultra-dominant ruling parties all 
contribute to opposition parties’ financial troubles. This must also be considered 
against the backdrop of the widespread use of public resources by incumbents in 
hybrid regimes such as Burkina Faso and Uganda, which widens the gap between the 
ruling party’s and the opposition’s financial capacities. This gap is particularly 
ostentatious during election campaigns – which I focus on next.  
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 Electoral malpractices 
True to their hybrid nature, the Ugandan and Burkinabè regime have failed to offer 
a level playing field to opposition parties, especially when election time came. As 
Cheeseman and Klaas (2019) neatly demonstrated, authoritarian incumbents have a 
large toolbox to choose from when they wish to rig an election, and can adapt their 
strategies over time, for example in the face of domestic pressure or international 
criticism. These tactics range from the gerrymandering of constituencies and efforts to 
influence the voter register to the use of threats and money, multiple voting, and vote-
buying, to ballot box stuffing and result manipulation.  
 In both Burkina Faso and Uganda, there is evidence of outright fraud affecting 
election results during the period under study. For example, in the 2016 general 
elections in Uganda, several NRM stronghold districts logged improbable turnouts 
nearing or reaching 100%, creating high suspicions of ballot-stuffing or vote count 
tampering (Beardsworth & Cheeseman 16/03/2016). Presidential results have 
systematically been described as fraudulent by the opposition, with evidence of voter 
bribery, multiple voting, pre-ticked ballot stuffing and alterations of results. These 
allegations were the subject of court challenges in 2001, 2006, and 2016. On these 
occasions, contradictory judgements acknowledged frauds, but upheld Museveni’s 
victories based on ‘substantiality’ arguments (Kabumba 2016).  
In Burkina Faso, the opposition alleged ‘massive frauds’ in the 1992 legislative and 
1995 municipal elections, but some observers have pondered whether these allegations 
were mere attempts at justifying their defeat (Loada & Otayek 1995: 138). Still, Harsch 
(2017: 131) lists a variety of irregularities reported throughout the 1990s:  
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‘faulty voter lists, issuing voting identification cards to underage youths, 
transporting voters from one polling station to another, withholding cards from 
entire villages suspected of opposition sympathies, using chiefs’ homes as voting 
places, and ‘indelible’ ink that could be easily washed off, allowing multiple 
voting’.  
During my research in Burkina Faso, several interviewees recalled instances of such 
methods being used (int. BF10, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017; int. BF54, Tenkodogo, 
18/12/2018).  
This kind of ostensible rigging diminished in the next decade, as the CDP’s efficient 
political machine, its use of public resources, and the opposition’s divisions it fostered 
(discussed later) were enough to guarantee Compaoré’s re-election. Yet, the CDP 
could still resort to these practices in selected constituencies as needed – like in Bokin 
during the 2012 local elections. Bokin is Thomas Sankara’s birthplace and 
consequently a Sankarist stronghold. It is a rural commune encompassing a chef-lieu 
(known alternatively as Bokin or Téma-Bokin) and sixty villages. A couple of local 
councillors are elected in each village and are brought together in the communal 
council of Bokin which counts a total of 81 councillors. A local councillor affiliated 
with the UNIR-PS recounted that his party was proclaimed as the winner in Téma-
Bokin on the evening of the election, but the results were inverted the next day to give 
the majority to the CDP: ‘We got the vote, but they confiscated our victory. It’s Blaise 
[Compaoré] who took this victory away from us’ (int. BF29, Bokin, 06/04/2018).  
The leader of the UNIR-PS, Bénéwendé Sankara, reported in the press that the 
definitive results proclaimed by the Conseil d’Etat on 29 December 2012 and 
published on its website – which gave two of the Téma-Bokin seats to UNIR-PS and 
the third to the CDP – were ‘corrected’ on 8 January 2013, reversing the results in 
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Téma-Bokin, after ‘a boss who belongs to the CDP came and asked to modify the 
results because there had been mistakes’ (le faso.net 11/01/2013). The government 
also cancelled the results in one of the villages where the UNIR-PS had obtained the 
two councillor seats, Guoera, and re-organised the election which returned one seat to 
the UNIR-PS and one to the CDP. Through these ploys, the CDP obtained a short 
majority in the Bokin communal council (41 councillors against 40 for the UNIR-PS), 
denying the Sankarist party control over one of their strongholds.  
Elections are also disrupted by more subtle malpractices, including delays in 
dispatching voting materials and opening polling stations in known opposition 
strongholds. For example, in 2016 the opening of some polling stations in Kampala 
and Wakiso was delayed by over six hours (EU EOM 2016). Ballot secrecy has 
regularly been undermined in both countries: Golaz and Médard (2014: 77) illustrate 
this in the case of the 2011 Ugandan elections with the issue of ballot design: 
‘Besigye’s name on the first line and Museveni on the last did not do much to provide 
confidentiality. Individual efforts to keep the vote secret could be viewed as attempts 
to conceal a vote in favour of the opposition’. More blatantly, in the 2018 local 
elections, voting was done by lining-up behind one’s preferred candidate (Mwesigye 
04/07/2018), with the NRM announcing in January 2020 that they would adopt this 
voting method for their next primary elections (New Vision 24/01/2020). In Burkina 
Faso, opposition activists have reported that in some villages, polling stations were 
sometimes set up in front the chief’s courtyard, or the chief himself would stand by 
the polling station’s entrance to influence voters – usually in favour of the CDP 
(Beucher 2010: 48).  
But frauds and malpractices are not happening solely on election days. In Burkina 
Faso, the voters’ roll has long been a source of contention. For the 1997 legislative 
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elections, it had been hastily put together based upon raw census data, leading to 
widespread fraud (Meunier 1998). Ahead of the 1998 presidential poll, two 
investigative journalists from L’Indépendant demonstrated the authorities’ 
manipulation of the voters’ roll by visiting registration offices across the capital and 
obtaining twenty official voting cards between them (Harsch 2017: 131). In 2007, the 
voters’ registry was itself falsified to allow under-aged voters to take part, or enable 
some people to vote multiple times (Loada 2010: 278). Because of these issues, the 
opposition made biometric registration one of their key demands, leading to the 
development of a cleaner roll based upon biometric registration ahead of the 2012 
elections. As a UNIR-PS leader argued: ‘In 2010, the electoral system had to be re-
set, we made as much noise as possible to switch to a biometric system, we succeeded 
[…]. This has enabled parties such as UPC to benefit from transparency to get a spot 
under the sun’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018).  
In Uganda, similar shortcomings of the voters’ roll affected elections. For example, 
the register used in the 2001 elections ‘was widely criticised as inflated with duplicate 
registrations, ghost voters, the underage and non-citizens, opening for possibilities of 
vote rigging’ (Gloppen et al. 2006: 10). Despite a review of the electoral roll prior to 
the 2006 elections, problems remained, especially as a number of voters were not 
issued a voter’s card.  
Discrepancies on the voters’ roll are also used to disqualify opposition candidates 
from standing, such as occurred when DP leader Mao attempted to stand for the MP 
seat in Gulu municipality (Namae 2016). Uganda introduced biometric voter 
registration and verification ahead of the 2016 elections, however this did not prevent 
the improbable 100% turnout figures in NRM strongholds mentioned earlier. 
Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis (2018) raise the important point that new technology 
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in itself cannot ensure election credibility, and that it tends to have a positive outcome 
in more democratic settings but can have damaging consequences in more 
authoritarian contexts. 
Another practice to manipulate elections used in Uganda has been gerrymandering. 
This has involved the incessant creation of new districts (electing a Woman MP) and 
constituencies (for directly elected MPs). As an example, a total of 33 by-elections 
have been held across the country between August 2016 and October 2018: nearly half 
of them (15) were organised to fill newly-created seats, while 10 followed a court 
challenge cancelling previous results and 7 after the seat became vacant due to the 
MP’s resignation, illness, or death. While the opposition has been able to pull resources 
and win half of the seats put in play after a court challenge (notably catching three 
seats previously held by the NRM, in Jinja East (FDC), Rukungiri (FDC), and Arua 
(Independent)), in the case of new districts, only two seats out of fifteen have been 
won by opposition parties – Kyotera District (DP) and Bugiri Municipality (JEEMA). 
This pattern had previously been highlighted as beneficial to the NRM in the 2011 
elections (Golaz & Médard 2014: 68).  
In Burkina Faso, Compaoré manipulated the electoral rules in a different way. As 
the country uses a party-list proportional representation system (PR) rather than first-
past-the-post, the government tweaked the size of electoral districts. Following the 
Zongo Affair, Compaoré made concessions to the opposition and the electoral district 
changed from the province to the region (a larger administrative unit), while the index 
of proportionality used was also modified. This led to unprecedented gains by 
opposition parties in the 2002 election (Loada & Santiso 2002). In 2004 – when 
Compaoré had regained control with the co-optation of the moderate ADF-RDA – 
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these provisions in the electoral code were reversed, in order to re-give the CDP its 
electoral advantage (CGD 2008: 41).  
The capacity and independence of key institutions, such as electoral commissions, 
has also been questioned in both countries, especially in Uganda. Indeed, in this 
country the Electoral Commission (EC) is not independent, not even by name. 
Commissioners are appointed by Museveni, without any input from the opposition, 
and are therefore answerable to Museveni himself who can dismiss them at any time 
(Fisher 2013). He has, for example, declared the EC to be ‘full of rotten people’ and 
that ‘they should get out’, following NRM losses in by-elections in 2018 (Daily 
Monitor 28/08/2018).  
In Burkina Faso, the opposition successfully fought to be better represented in the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). Legislative reforms were made 
to eliminate the problem of political nomadism – illustrated by the ADF-RDA’s 
representative at the CENI sitting among the five opposition commissioners when the 
party was part of the majority and officially backed Compaoré’s presidency. From 
2009, the CENI was recognised as truly independent: according to Afrobarometer data 
from 2012, 41% of the population trusted the CENI ‘a lot’ and another 20% 
‘somewhat’ (CGD 2012: 37). This positive perception was also illustrated by the fact 
that the CENI’s composition was not modified after the 2014 insurrection to organise 
the 2015 election (CENI 2016: 51).  
While opponents often claim elections are marred by frauds, and there is some 
evidence of it, it is still important to keep in mind that the government retained a large 
support base in rural constituencies (representing the vast majority of voters), where 
they are sometimes unchallenged and often are the only party with an effective 
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presence down to the village level. In Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s hold on rural votes 
was facilitated by the co-optation of influential customary chiefs. In both countries, as 
I have argued in the previous section, elections and the wider political field have been 
skewed by vote-buying, and more broadly by the monetisation of politics. Electoral 
dynamics must also be studied taking into account the repressive environment 
described earlier. A UNIR-PS leader argued that the way it was set up, ‘you wouldn’t 
in your right mind not vote for Blaise Compaoré, not vote for the CDP. There are 
entire villages which were punished because they did not give a majority to Blaise or 
the CDP’ (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018). This illustrates the unlevel playing 
field, as does the violent repression of the opposition’s electoral campaigns in Uganda. 
Incumbents also have an advantage when they face a divided opposition, which they 
often do, as I discuss next.  
 Divide and rule 
Opposition parties are further weakened by deep divisions within and between 
them. As a leader from the DP explained, speaking about Ugandan opposition parties: 
‘They fight each other, before they fight the regime. A lot of effort is spent on 
fighting first of all themselves internally within the parties, then fighting each 
other, and little effort is spent at collectively putting up a front as an alternative’ 
(int. UG03 20/04/2016). 
In Burkina Faso, electoral coalitions have not managed to take hold. Even among the 
Sankarist parties – supposedly sharing common values and manifestos, unity has never 
been able to take hold, as a UNIR-PS leader despaired: ‘There are over a dozen 
Sankarist parties. We, ourselves, neutralise each other on the ground’ (int. BF20 
09/02/2018). In Uganda, Beardsworth (2018: 60) has shown that ‘despite the 
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recognition that coalitions are necessary, they almost invariably collapse’, often due to 
inter-party competition over the same pool of voters, newly-elected party presidents 
willing to test their own electoral viability by standing on their own ticket, and intra-party 
factionalism that disrupts coalition negotiations (see Chapter 7 for further details).  
Factionalism and party splits have plagued opposition parties in both countries. In 
Burkina Faso, a UNIR-PS official despaired that among all opposition parties, ‘there 
wasn’t one month, two months without a split with the creation of a new party’ (int. 
BF40, Ouagadougou, 17/04/2018). The history of Sankarist parties illustrates this issue 
too well, with internal divisions and frequent splits harming their credibility (Harsch 
2013: 359). Party splits in Burkina Faso can usually be explained by one of two 
reasons: either a disagreement between two wings of the party over joining the 
government or not; or frustrated ambitions leading aspiring party leaders to create their 
own organisation due to lack of elite circulation within the party. An example of the 
first scenario was the break-up of the CPS and the creation of the UNIR-MS in 2000, 
because of the CPS leadership’s decision to join a ‘unity’ government of Compaoré 
(int. BF20, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018; int. BF25, Yako, 05/04/2018).  
An illustration of the second is the creation of the Convergence de l’Espoir by Jean-
Hubert Bazié and other UNIR-MS members in 2004. Frequent floor-crossing, or 
‘political nomadism’ (see Meunier 1998: 149), also affects Burkinabè opposition 
parties, with leaders and activists frequently co-opted by the ruling party (Loada 2010: 
280–282). Money can also play a role in triggering these splits. In Burkina Faso, a 
financial dispute over the use and distribution of a sum of money given to the party by 
Mariam Sankara, the widow of former president Thomas Sankara, led to the BSB’s 
division into three parties in 2000 (L’Observateur Paalga 15/10/2007b).  
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In Uganda, though splits have been less frequent, both the DP and FDC have 
suffered from entrenched factionalism and divisions. The DP, the country’s oldest 
party, suffered from massive floor-crossing during Milton Obote’s regime in the 
1960s. Its decision to join Museveni’s unity government in 1986 and, later, to back the 
presidential candidacy of Besigye in 2001, also led to the loss of some of its members 
to the NRM and FDC respectively. In 2005, the DP suffered a split when then MP 
Michael Mabiike created the SDP: a UYD leader explained that ‘even before the 
Besigye factor, there was already an uprising among the young people in DP around 
Ssemogerere’s leadership style. This had led Mabiike to go and create the SDP’ (int. 
UG08, Kampala, 30/06/2016). More recently, the DP was still characterised by 
factionalism, which could be interpreted in two ways. One is to see the opposition from 
a section of strong Baganda leaders to the party’s president Mao along ethnic lines. 
Mao, a northerner, was elected president of the party in 2010 thanks to the support of 
party representatives from Northern, Western, and Eastern Uganda, breaking the 
dominance of the Central region where the DP’s Baganda core constituency is found. 
However, the people involved have defended themselves from these claims: 
‘At one time, we pushed Mao because of the way he organised the elections, but 
people said it was about tribe, that we were against him because he wasn’t a 
Muganda. But it wasn’t the case. The issue was that he had rigged himself into 
power. But when we raised it, he said we were saying this because of his tribe. It 
was like the party went out hunting for a non-Muganda and they stole him into 
leadership just to satisfy the voices that were demanding for a non-Muganda 
leader’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).  
Another interpretation has more to do with the party’s strategy and objectives vis-
à-vis the regime and the rest of the opposition. Indeed, there have been frictions over 
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whether to form alliances with other parties and, more particularly, whether to support 
Besigye as the opposition’s flagbearer. This issue, particularly controversial within the 
DP, reflects wider divisions among the opposition, which build upon competition for 
the same constituencies and a fear by smaller parties that they will be swallowed by 
the FDC (Beardsworth 2016). This fear is particularly justified by past experience in 
the case of the DP, as Beardsworth (2016: 758) explained: ‘Mao has repeatedly stated 
that he holds the FDC and Besigye responsible for much of the instability within DP, 
particularly through the informal alliance forged between Besigye and Lukwago’s 
Suubi group in 2011’.  
While Lukwago held a parallel party conference in 2015 to launch the ‘Truth and 
Justice Platform’, and ran for re-election on an independent ticket in 2016 
(Beardsworth 2016: 758), others have re-entered the DP fold, such as MP Nambooze, 
despite continuous frictions – Nambooze was for example suspended from holding 
party activities, in spite of being a party Vice-President, for three months in 2017 
(Daily Monitor 20/04/2017).  
The FDC has also suffered from factionalism after Besigye stepped down from the 
party presidency and was succeeded by Muntu in 2012 in a contested election 
(Beardsworth 2016: 757), with growing disagreements over Muntu’s leadership and 
strategy, leading to Muntu’s defeat against Amuriat in the 2017 party leadership 
contest.  
Moreover, while Besigye’s decision to step down as party-president in 2012 was 
‘broadly commended as an attempt to move beyond the personalisation of the party’ 
(Beardsworth 2016: 757), he still stood as the FDC’s ‘flagbearer’ (presidential 
candidate) in 2016. This flagbearer status has undoubtedly been extended way beyond 
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the electoral period, especially in light of Besigye’s swearing-in as the ‘People’s 
President’ in May 2016 (Daily Monitor 17/02/2019). This led the party to be, in effect, 
double-headed and deeply affected by factionalism, with some voices within the party 
going as far as accusing Muntu of being an NRM mole – which in the end led Muntu 
to split from the FDC in September 2018 and form a new party (The Observer 
25/09/2018).  
Though opposition parties bear the responsibility for these divisions driven by 
personal interests, strategic disagreements, or financial disputes, the regime has also 
played a part in fuelling mistrust and enmities in both Uganda and Burkina Faso, 
abiding by the old divide and rule tactic. In Uganda, Museveni reportedly stated after 
his swearing-in ceremony in 2016 that he would ensure there would be no more 
opposition by 2021 (The Observer 05/04/2017). In Burkina Faso, a regime cadre, Salif 
Diallo32, then a Minister in Compaoré’s government, admitted to a journalist: ‘From 
time to time, if we can accelerate [the opposition’s] internal decomposition, we do it, 
it makes sense. Personally, I cannot say that I am as white as snow in that matter’ 
(L’Evènement 10/02/2008). These divisions have therefore been actively fuelled by 
the regime, through a broad range of tactics. In both Burkina Faso and Uganda, the 
government have co-opted individuals, factions, or whole parties, usually in exchange 
for a government seat. The ADF-RDA’s participation in the broad-based government 
from 2000 led to the ex-opposition party to officially support Compaoré’s re-election 
bid in subsequent presidential elections. In Uganda, the UPC’s faction led by Jimmy 
 
32 Salif Diallo later resigned from the CDP to form the MPP in January 2014, along with two other 
CDP heavy-weights, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and Simon Compaoré. Diallo became President of 
the National Assembly following the 2015 elections, until his death in August 2017.  
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Akena was similarly co-opted by Museveni in 2016 by including key members in the 
government.  
The authorities have also distributed financial gifts to opposition politicians to 
foster disputes and discredit them. For example, in 2005, Laurent Bado of the Parti 
pour la Renaissance (PAREN) admitted he had received FCFA30 million33 from 
Compaoré, and accused other opposition leaders, including Emile Paré of the 
Mouvement du Peuple pour le Socialisme/Parti Fédéral (MPS/PF), of having received 
a similar gift from the President. This scandal tarnished the image of the opposition 
ahead of the presidential elections. Moreover, perhaps not unrelatedly, the Burkinabè 
opposition’s attempt to build a unified front – the Opposition Burkinabè Unie (OBU) 
– collapsed after Laurent Bado and Emile Paré decided to run on their own (Loada 
2006: 29).  
In this political climate, rumours that some opposition parties or leaders are in 
collusion with the authorities spread easily. Muntu, at the time when he was the 
president of FDC, was branded as an NRM mole by people within his own party (Daily 
Monitor 08/12/2017). While it is difficult to assess whether the regime itself has a hand 
in fuelling these kinds of accusations, Museveni’s and Compaoré’s regular resort to 
co-optation and infiltration give credit to these rumours, even if they are baseless.  
Conclusion 
In summary, Compaoré’s regime in Burkina Faso and Museveni’s in Uganda are 
two examples of hybrid regimes, characterised by an unlevel playing field and a quasi-
 
33 £32,000 (November 2005). 
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fusion of the state, the ruling party, and the incumbent. This creates or worsens a set 
of constraints for the formation and operation of opposition parties. The incumbent, 
who has the state’s security forces at his disposal, can repress opposition parties’ 
activity violently – or credibly threaten to do so. Opposition activists and officials risk 
being harassed, beaten, and arrested due to their affiliation to an opposition party. The 
incumbent also has access to the state’s resources more broadly, and can use public 
coffers to fund his electoral campaigns and patronage networks. This fuels the 
monetisation of politics and drives up the costs of running for office. Meanwhile, 
opposition parties may find it difficult to raise money, due to curtailing legislation or 
the fear of business operators to offend the ruling elite and lose public contracts. 
Consequently, opposition parties tend to have limited resources and to be financially 
dependent on a few individuals, a problem I will come back to later on (see Chapter 
5).  
Incumbents in hybrid regimes also employ a range of tactics to rig elections – from 
outright fraud to meddling with the electoral code and controlling the electoral 
commission. This makes defeating them through the ballot an impossible task – yet 
opposition parties still take part in them, as I will further discuss later on (see Chapter 
6). Finally, opposition parties within these regimes are further weakened by their 
inability to unite, as illustrated by the failure of coalition-building attempts and the 
internal factionalism that plagues all the parties at hand. Yet these divisions are often 
fuelled by the regime itself. Defections and disputes are triggered by the co-optation 
of individual opponents, while the hybrid nature of the regime leads to disagreements 
over strategy, which fosters divisions. This echoes the observation by Bunce and 
Wolchik (2010: 60) that opposition parties in post-communist hybrid regimes are often 
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‘self-destructive’ because of the inherently divisive strategic choices they have to 
make:  
‘Because of their fluid political characteristics, given weak institutions, ever-
changing rules of the political game, and the extraordinary difficulties such 
regimes pose with respect to reading both popular sentiments and regime 
capacity, competitive authoritarian regimes present oppositions with unusually 
diverse, difficult, and, therefore, inherently divisive strategic choices’. 
Hybrid regimes therefore present a set of challenges to opposition parties, not 
exhaustively covered here, and it is necessary to understand and consider these 
constraints when talking about the ‘weakness’ of opposition parties. The quasi-fused 
incumbent, ruling party, and state institution they face make it extremely difficult not 
just to win an election, but to exist and operate as opposition parties on a daily basis. 
It is with these circumstances and the simultaneous survival of opposition parties in 
mind that I know turn my attention to what these parties are formed around, how they 





Party cores: what are opposition parties about? 
Opposition parties in hybrid regimes operate in a particularly difficult environment. 
In order to understand the role that they can play within these settings, it is necessary 
to analyse what makes these parties what they are: what do these parties exist for? Too 
often, the study of what parties are about is limited to a binary analysis of whether 
these parties can be considered as programmatic (a good thing), or not (a bad thing). 
Indeed, programmatic parties, structured around clear and ideological commitments, 
are thought to be ‘a crucial element of enabling adequate democratic representation’ 
(Luna et al. 2014: 1).  
Yet most African parties are seen as non-programmatic, as scholars have argued 
that ‘ideological and programmatic debates have been muted and rare’ across the 
continent (Van de Walle 2003). Instead, African parties are often considered either as 
catch-all parties mobilising around valence issues (Bleck & Van de Walle 2013), as 
particularistic parties formed around identity-based cleavages such as ethnicity 
(Horowitz 1985; Cheeseman & Ford 2007), or as mere clientelist vehicles (Chabal & 
Daloz 1999). However the programmatic nature of a party should be seen on a 
spectrum, rather than as a binary variable (International IDEA (ed.) 2014: xii), and 
parties can combine programmatic and non-programmatic mobilisation strategies 
(Cheeseman & Paget 2014). Such an approach therefore tells us little about the nature 
of political parties.  
142 
 
In order to understand these aspects better, my research set out to apprehend what 
constitutes the ‘core’ of the parties under study (noyau in French). Somewhat related, 
but not corresponding exactly, to the mainstream party goals (Strøm 1990) or social 
base, I define the core as the element a party is formed around, what it derives its 
identity and legitimacy from, and what glues it together despite constraints and 
factionalism. My use of the word ‘core’ differs from Manning’s (1998: 170) 
conception of a party’s core as its hierarchy, in her study of Renamo’s transformation 
into a political party in Mozambique. Here, it is close to the concept of party brand, 
defined by Lupu (2014, 2016: 18–19) as the image that voters have of the party and of 
who it stands for.  
This consumerist metaphor, centred around the prototypical voter or supporter of 
the party, is useful in analysing how parties attract voters and partisan attachments 
more broadly, but it does not necessarily capture what parties stand for and are built 
around. While such a brand is solely outward-focused, my interest is what is inside the 
party. Why do people found or join it, and around which ideas, concepts, and 
objectives? I consider that this core constitutes the party’s specific identity and 
provides it with a level of legitimacy, therefore fuelling its endurance as an 
organisation – something I will come back to at the end of this thesis (see Chapter 7). 
Rather than focusing on electoral mobilisation (why people vote for the party), this 
encompasses why people belong to it – either as leaders, officials, or activists – as a 
broader organisation.  
Existing classifications of parties in Africa and beyond (Gunther & Diamond 2001; 
Elischer 2013: 12–22) as well as discussions of African parties in the literature (e.g. 
Kitschelt (2000); Horowitz (1985)) often focus on three things that could be considered 
the core of a party: ideology and programmatic ideas, identity-based cleavages such as 
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ethnicity and religion, and personalistic attributes. Gunther and Diamond (2001: 9–
11), for example, explicitly list ‘ideologically-based’, ‘religious-based’, and 
‘ethnicity-based’ parties. They also include a ‘personalistic’ party-type aimed at 
retaining power for an individual, while the ‘elite party’ they describe also revolves 
around personal resources and relations. Souaré (2017: 66–76), in his own review of 
the literature on African parties, discusses in turn the issue of leadership and the 
consideration by some party leaders of the party ‘as their property’, ethnic and 
regionalist parties, and parties exhibiting (or not) an ideology and a ‘society project’.  
Most scholars agree that ideological cleavages tend not to be relevant in explaining 
party formation in Africa. Elischer’s (2012: 657) study of party manifestos across the 
continent confirmed this, while Manning (2005: 715–716) argued that the weakness 
of ideological bearings on party formation and competition in sub-Saharan Africa 
could also be explained by structural adjustment programmes and high aid dependency 
constraining policy options. This disdain for ideologies is sometimes embraced by 
parties themselves, which the Burkinabè UPC illustrates very well. Indeed, the 
manifesto drawn up at the party’s creation stated that ‘The particularity of our party is 
that it refuses to claim any ideology, as seems to be fashionable, but instead aims at 
solving our people’s problems through pragmatic solutions guided by solid values’ 
(UPC 2010). This has led to the over-bearing perception that African parties were 
generally either formed around an ethnic core (Horowitz 1985) or an individual 
(Chabal & Daloz 1999; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Manning 2005), as was already 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
However, my research in Burkina Faso and Uganda has shown that it is impossible 
to consider the parties at hand solely as either ‘ethnic-based’ or ‘programmatic’ or 
‘personalistic’ and to categorise them along these lines. Instead, all parties use a mix 
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of these cleavages to define themselves and to mobilise support. The DP in Uganda 
has been in turn called a Catholic and a Baganda party (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2015), and 
it is undeniable that the party has been influenced by and been popular amongst 
Catholics and Baganda throughout its history. Yet, defining the party as just that, a 
religious or ethnic-based party, neglects the fact that the party’s aims and strategies 
were never dictated by the Church (Kassimir 1998: 13), nor by the Kabaka – illustrated 
by the KY’s alliance with UPC in 1962, or the Suubi pressure group backing Besigye 
in 2011. These parties are still drawing from certain traditions and legacies – such as 
the Sankarist revolution in Burkina Faso – and mobilising around certain issues or 
values, such as impunity and corruption, alternance, or federalism. And while partisan 
politics across the continent is certainly highly personalised and leaders are important 
pull factors, none of the parties I observed can be reduced to their individual leader. 
Indeed, the appeal of party leaders go beyond personal ties, charisma, and clientelist 
networks, and is intertwined with broader values and promises these leaders come to 
embody, and which form the real core of these parties.  
In a nutshell, issues, identity, and personal ties are mobilisation tools linked to a 
broader party core that needs to be defined. Based upon my empirical research, I 
identified two kinds of cores and, therefore, types of parties: value-based parties, 
whose legitimacy derives from historical credentials and the perpetuation of loose but 
institutionalised values; and credible change-bearers, whose attractiveness is fuelled 
by a mix of partisan and personal qualities making them ‘credible’ leaders to deliver 
an ill-defined ‘change’. I address each model in turn, discussing how these cores are 




4.1 Truth, Justice, and Integrity: Historical values’ trustees 
Some opposition parties, often founded earlier or having roots in an older party 
lineage34, are built and do their mobilising around a core set of values and a sense of 
history. This is the case of the DP in Uganda, and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso, for 
example. Activists from both of these parties routinely state that they joined up because 
of the party’s values.  
As a DP MP argued, ‘this is the only party that believes in values, and it is brought 
forward by the most ordinary supporters: it is a party founded on values. People 
believe in justice, rule of law, and constitutionalism’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). 
As stated earlier, the DP is Uganda’s oldest party. It was founded in 1954, in a context 
marked by the struggle for Uganda’s independence and the political marginalisation 
of Catholics, and around the values of ‘Truth and Justice’ – the party’s motto. These 
values have contributed to the DP’s endurance as a party during the no-party eras of 
Idi Amin and the Movement System, and to be resilient up until today. Indeed, a former 
DP leader stated that: ‘The core values of DP are truth and justice, human rights, 
social justice, constitutionalism, non-violence. These values and principles have 
enabled the party to survive’ (int. UG32, Kampala, 07/12/2016).  
These values are grounded in the DP’s history, and, according to a Ugandan 
academic, ‘historical attachment has made the party survive, it is their social capital’ 
(int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). DP meetings and events usually include a speech 
 
34 A succession of fusions and splits can result in a party officially founded recently but drawing 
from the legacy of a broader party family tree, in terms of leaders and personnel, symbols, and/or 
political history. For example, the UNIR-PS, founded in 2009, cannot be studied without considering 
the broader lineage from the creation of the BSB in 1990 leading to a number of inter-related Sankarist 
parties until today.  
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that goes back to the party’s official history, marked by the independence struggle, the 
party’s marginalisation and the robbery of their election victories throughout the post-
colonial period (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016). The DP’s historical values and 
partisan identity are also transmitted across generations, which helps to explain why 
the DP retains support in some historical strongholds across Buganda.  
Many DP activists and officials I interviewed explained that their parents had been 
in the party and had transmitted those values, and that they were therefore born or had 
grown up within the party. For example, an MP stated: ‘I was born in a DP family and 
I chose to remain because of the party’s values: peaceful coexistence, truth and justice. 
Everything we do must fit into the values’ (int. UG18, Kampala, 12/10/2016). The 
party has allowed for a loose understanding of these broad values so that each 
candidate could adapt them to the local reality of their constituency, as the same DP 
MP suggested: ‘Values are interpreted similarly but adapted to the context based upon 
the needs of the people’ (int. UG18, Kampala, 12/10/2016). Overall, as Juma (2010: 
113) noted, the ‘Democratic Party (DP) has the least capacity to engage in muscular 
battles, but it has always stuck to its principle of truth and justice’. These values, 
around which the DP was founded over sixty years ago, are still the motto of the party 
and continue to resonate among the party’s leaders and activists, who systematically 
refer to them when talking about the party.  
 The lineage of Sankarist parties in Burkina Faso can be analysed using the same 
lens. Even though Burkinabè stakeholders sometimes designate Sankarism as an 
ideology, it is more accurate to describe it as a set of values. It is important to remember 
that ‘Thomas Sankara was a man of action, he wasn’t an ideologue’ (int. BF09, 
Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). He has not left any writing behind and Sankarism has 
been defined by his disciples on the basis of his most famous speeches, first and 
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foremost the Discours d’Orientation Populaire given on 2 October 1983, which 
outlined the revolution’s guiding principles (Sankara 2007). When asked to define 
Sankarism, respondents tend to provide a list of values: integrity, hard work, justice, 
fairness, patriotism, all embodied by the (mythicised) figure of former President 
Sankara.  
These values attract two categories of people into the party. On the one hand, an 
older generation which was directly involved in the revolution and knew Thomas 
Sankara, and therefore wish to further his legacy. On the other, a younger generation 
who have not known him or experienced the revolution directly, but are inspired by 
the values he embodies – often glossing over some aspects of the revolution’s history 
and magnifying Sankara as a hero. A young UNIR-PS leader explained:  
‘There are several generations of activists in UNIR. The first generation of 
activists is the outcome of the previous attempts at creating a Sankarist party, 
looking for leaders, notably some former members of Sankara’s cabinet… Other 
generations have come from love for the man, like us who are trying to see how 
to best revive Sankara’s legacy’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018).  
This interviewee belongs to the second group, as he further says: ‘I belong to a 
generation that have not known Thomas Sankara, but that carried him in our hearts 
in high school, through the movies and his speeches, anecdotes shared by our parents. 
We found it interesting and we had this Sankarist leaning’ (ibid.).  
While the Sankarist revolution suffered from both authoritarian excesses and 
revolutionary short-comings (Kongo & Zeilig 2017: 181-182. 205-206), its legacy 
remains important in Burkina Faso, particularly in how it shapes the Burkinabè 
national identity. As Harsch (2017: 80) argues, the revolution made unprecedented 
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efforts in terms of nation-building, resulting in the fact that ‘[y]ears after that 
government’s demise, significant sectors of the population, including leading critics 
of the CNR, seemed to readily accept their identification as citizens of Burkina Faso, 
as Burkinabè’. The values associated with Sankarism, most prominently ‘integrity’ but 
also hard-work and justice, are also values associated with the Burkinabè people more 
broadly, and Sankarist parties – and recently, other parties too, as we will see below – 
have attempted to tap into and claim to be the legitimate guardians of these values. 
Both DP and UNIR-PS therefore have appropriated a set of values to define themselves 
and to derive legitimacy.  
While the appropriation of these values by parties such as DP and UNIR-PS has 
played an important role in attracting supporters and making parties resilient, it has 
proved a weakness for some reasons. First, it is hard to have a monopoly on these 
broad values. The multiplication of Sankarist parties with their own interpretation of 
what being Sankarist means is a case in point. Pushing values to the fore is also 
dangerous because it sets a higher standard for these parties. This is once again well 
illustrated by Sankarist parties and leaders who are compared, not to the other parties 
and the government, but to (the mythicised version of) Thomas Sankara himself – an 
ascetic President notably remembered for driving a Renault 5 (the cheapest car 
available at the time), earning less than his civil servant spouse, and leading the fight 
against domestic corruption and the foreign debt. ‘People are extremely demanding 
toward us because they want to compare us with Sankara, so their expectations exceed 
what we can possibly do’ a UNIR-PS official lamented (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 
18/01/2018).  
Furthermore, it may not be enough to respond to voters’ aspirations and to convince 
people the party can be elected and effectively govern. A civil society activist leader, 
149 
 
talking about the UNIR-PS, argued that ‘When you are running for election, it is not 
enough to be named Sankara, or to have Sankara posters behind you. You also need 
to offer something responding to the population’s deep aspirations. Whereas now, 
Sankarism does not offer much. “Give the people their dignity back”, what does it 
mean? There is no clear substance. This weakness of the Sankarist offer beyond 
catchphrases deprives them of a real foothold’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017).  
Similarly for DP, while they have been resilient and have maintained some support 
in a few strongholds, it is unquestionable that they have lost a lot ground, both to the 
NRM and the FDC, as their historical legacy has faded. The DP is increasingly 
perceived as a party turned towards the past, failing to attract young people, who 
represent the largest share of eligible voters. Indeed, a DP MP acknowledged that the 
‘DP has been here for so long and it has baggage. […] People get excited with new 
ideas, new things’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).  
This analysis of those parties’ cores as rooted in historical values does not mean 
that leadership, ethno-religious identities, or programmatic cleavages are irrelevant, 
but rather that they are framed in a way that taps into the explicit values of the party. 
Party leaders’ character and charisma certainly play a role in attracting supporters and 
activists. However, the leadership dynamics and leaders’ popularity are connected to 
the values at hand.  
This is well illustrated by the case of Bénéwendé Sankara, who has built a 
reputation prior to joining politics as a lawyer who took on prominent cases nobody 
else would, such as the assassinations of Thomas Sankara and Norbert Zongo. An 
academic and civil society activist explained that ‘he was seen as someone 
courageous, who was bringing new ideas, who was taking risks to defend noble 
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causes’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017). Indeed, a UNIR-PS activist praised 
him saying, ‘before he created his party, he was on all fronts to defend widows and 
orphans’ (int. BF33, Koudougou, 17/04/2018). While he may not compare to the 
mythicised figure of Thomas Sankara himself, as previously discussed, he was still 
perceived as someone who embodied the values of justice, fairness, and integrity.  
In the case of the DP, its Catholic roots are still used to mobilise its base in relation 
to the values. A DP MP, for example, stated that the DP ‘embraces Christian values 
and has the backing of the Catholic Church’, and connected this to the party’s ‘track 
record of non-violence, of refusing to kill to get power’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 
04/10/2016). Religion continues to be an important tool of mobilisation in Uganda, 
with church services and prayer services commonly used by politicians, but this 
mobilisation is done in a way that reflects the original values defended by the DP.  
While both parties were able to endure despite a range of difficulties highlighted in 
Chapter 3, and DP in particular has certainly partly institutionalised – something we 
will discuss in Chapter 7 – these older, ‘historical’ opposition parties have lagged 
behind newer organisations that managed to present themselves as opposition 
frontmen, despite having their own roots within the system. 
4.2 Reform and alternance: Credible change bearers  
My empirical analysis led me to identify a second type of party core. Uganda’s FDC 
and Burkina Faso’s UPC can both be seen to have built their identity and their 
legitimacy on the ideas of ‘change’ and ‘credibility’.  
The UPC was founded by a group of people surrounding Diabré, a former member 
of Compaoré’s government who had distanced himself from domestic politics after 
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1997 and who went on to have an impressive career in international management. He 
came back to Burkina Faso in 2009 and, according to an international NGO 
representative, ‘felt that there was a vacant seat: room for an alternative, and to attract 
back people disappointed with compaorism’ (int. BF03, by phone, 23/03/2017). From 
the start, the UPC mobilised around the idea of alternance.  
Meaning ‘turnover’ or ‘rotation’, alternance is ‘a French term that has become 
associated with the transfer of power from one party to another in parts of francophone 
West Africa’ (Cheeseman et al. 2019). It has become an important political issue across 
the region within the context of entrenched, and seemingly immovable presidents such 
as Abdou Diouf in Senegal or Compaoré in Burkina Faso. After the 2002 legislative 
elections held in Burkina Faso – which saw unprecedented gains for the opposition 
following electoral reforms – Loada and Santiso (2002: 5) believed that political 
alternance had become ‘not only possible, but also feasible as a strategy for conducting 
opposition politics and, eventually, conquering power’. Yet in 2006, a year after 
Compaoré successfully ran for his third term, the French journal Politique Africaine 
published a special issue entitled ‘Burkina Faso: the impossible alternance’35. But it 
was in 2009 that the concept truly became a hot topic in Burkinabè political debates.  
In May 2009, Diabré organised a Citizens’ Forum for Alternance bringing together 
civil society activists and political actors. Diabré opened the ceremony with those 
words: ‘Any democracy remains incomplete as long as it has not produced a transfer 
of power. Our democracy belongs in that category’ (L’Observateur Paalga 
21/12/2009). Following this forum, and based upon the recommendations that 
emerged from its proceedings, a formal civil society organisation was created the same 
 
35
 ‘Burkina Faso : L’alternance impossible’. 
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year, bearing the same name: the Forum des Citoyens et Citoyennes pour l’Alternance 
(FOCAL). A political party was then founded in March 2010 to directly engage the 
fight for alternance and the conquest of power: the UPC. A women’s leader from the 
party explained: ‘the first time we talked about alternance, it was in 2009. People didn’t 
believe in it, they thought we were kidding, or that we were bought-off’ (int. BF49, 
Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018).  
The UPC’s core was therefore built upon the idea of ‘change’, a change in how the 
country was governed. A UPC MP indeed stated: ‘What federates people is the UPC’s 
discourse, built around change, real change – not a mere substitution’ (int. BF15, 
Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018). Yet, while the Sankarist parties such as the UNIR-PS 
were tapping into the legacy of the Revolution, the UPC clearly positioned itself as a 
reformist organisation. They denounced the ‘locked democracy’ and the ‘de facto 
monopartyism’ in their manifesto, but the party’s motto was the following: ‘Improve 
what is already done. Rectify what is done badly. Achieve what has not been done yet’ 
(UPC 2010). The party’s analysis was that a real democracy requires a transfer of 
power – a consideration reminiscing of Huntington’s (1993) two-turnover test – and 
that the Burkinabè people was ‘thirsty for progress and change’ (UPC 2010). 
The FDC also emerged around similar ideas of change and reform. Besigye was in 
the NRA between 1981 and 1986, and served as Museveni’s personal physician in the 
bush. When the NRM came into power, Besigye was appointed to the government as 
Minister of State for Internal Affairs. In 1999, still a Colonel in the army, Besigye 
wrote a missive entitled ‘An Insider's View of How the NRM Lost the Broad Base’, 
which criticised the nature of the Movement system. He wrote:  
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‘All in all, when I reflect on the Movement philosophy and governance, I can 
conclude that the Movement has been manipulated by those seeking to gain or 
retain political power, in the same way that political parties in Uganda were 
manipulated. Evidently, the results of this manipulation are also the same, to wit: 
factionalism, loss of faith in the system, corruption, insecurity and abuse of 
human rights, economic distortions and eventually decline. So, whether it’s 
political parties or Movement, the real problem is dishonest, opportunistic and 
undemocratic leadership operating in a weak institutional framework and a weak 
civil society which cannot control them’. (PML Daily 07/07/2017) 
In 2001, after having retired from the army, Besigye challenged Museveni in the 
presidential elections – still held under a no-party dispensation – and formed the 
Reform Agenda, a civil umbrella organisation which, along with a group of pro-
multiparty MPs gathered in the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO), would form 
the bedrock of the FDC in 2004. An FDC activist explained: ‘We try and advocate for 
change. There has been no turnover since I was young, all turnovers happened through 
the guns’ (int. UG86, Kampala, 26/05/2018). The FDC’s 2011 Manifesto was entitled 
Together for Change and three out of the five sections contained the word ‘change’ 
(‘Change the economy’, ‘Change society’, and ‘Change politics’). The most recent 
manifesto, ahead of the 2016 elections, contained the slogan ‘Power to the People – 
The Change we Deserve’. But beyond this ill-defined idea of change, the core of 
Burkina Faso’s UPC and Uganda’s FDC – and what has partly explained their quick 
positioning as opposition frontmen – is rooted in the party’s and leaders’ ‘credibility’. 
In Burkina Faso, according to the UPC’s manifesto, the transfer of power that was 
so necessary to achieve real democracy was prevented by Compaoré’s manipulation 
of the democratic institutions to remain in power, but also by the weakness and lack 
of organisation of the existing opposition parties. This enabled the party to position 
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itself as a more credible contestant. As a UPC official argued to explain his party’s 
quick popularity:  
‘There was a thirst for change that traditional parties were not able to embody. 
At that time, the main opposition party was the UNIR-PS. As they did not manage 
to somewhat embody this thirst, they were not able to mobilise people because, I 
believe, of a lack of credibility.’ (int. BF57, Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018).  
In both countries one dimension of credibility is one’s ability to mobilise enough 
support to obtain power (through the vote or otherwise). Considering the high 
monetisation of politics described in Chapter 3, the party’s founder or leader’s 
financial means is an important factor. Both Besigye and Diabré have been their 
party’s chief funder, especially at the beginning. Their financial means made their 
party more competitive than smaller, poorer organisations. But credibility goes beyond 
financial strength: it answers the deeper question of why they are perceived as more 
viable alternatives than the older parties such as the DP and UNIR-PS. An FDC activist 
described the FDC as ‘the only promising party that you see is capable of turning 
things around’ (int. UG24, Mukono, 17/11/2016). A local official elected on an FDC 
ticket further explained that when ‘Besigye arrived in 2001, he made people believe in 
him as a challenger’ (int. UG54, Gulu, 12/05/2018).  
Part of that was due to the FDC’s vigour in mobilising support, as opposed to older 
parties such as the DP and UPC: an FDC activist in Soroti argued that ‘at least FDC 
was very shrewd, very aggressive, and projected the agenda that the country is looking 
forward to’ (int. UG51, Soroti, 10/05/2018). But the FDC’s credibility has a lot to do 
with the figure of Besigye himself – first as a former NRM insider, then as a beacon 
of hope willing to suffer for the ‘Struggle’. A civil society representative explained 
that ‘Besigye is willing to go through torture and harassment, which leads to media 
155 
 
coverage and increases the popularity of FDC’ and that therefore ‘people see him as 
a leader’ (int. UG05, Kampala, 14/06/2016). In the case of Diabré, his stay in 
government – short and discreet enough to avoid a tarnished image – and, above all, 
his international career has been used to promote the image of a ‘very good manager’ 
(int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017) who would be able to manage the country’s 
resources better.  
The personal career of these officials, either within the NRA and the government 
in the case of Besigye, or within the administration and in international organisations 
for Diabré, is perceived as evidence that they have the necessary experience to be 
credible contenders for the executive, as opposed to opposition party candidates 
without this kind of experience. The fact that opposition leaders with roots in the ruling 
parties tend to appear as more credible echoes the ‘liability of newness’ described by 
Bleck and Van de Valle (2018: 11–12) as providing incumbents with a valence 
advantage of most policy issues and creating uncertainty around the opposition’s 
capacity to govern.  
In both cases, there is something to be said about the fact that people have come to 
associate ‘real change’ with leaders once associated with the regime. They have 
successfully built on both an anti-incumbent cleavage at a time of growing 
dissatisfaction with the regime and on the weariness with older parties seen as either 
inexperienced, or inefficient, corrupt, and part of the system. However, the 
sustainability of this cleavage and credibility is in question, with new actors – either 
parties or independents – able to rise and question the legitimacy of these parties and 
their ability to actually bring about the change they advocate. The rise of independent 
musician-MP Bobi Wine in Uganda since 2017, and the break-away of key CDP 




My research has led me to identify these two types of opposition parties, based upon 
what I define as their core. The DP in Uganda and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso can 
be seen as trustees of historical values around which they were founded, while the UPC 
in Burkina Faso and the FDC in Uganda are credible change bearers built upon the 
idea of reform and turnover, and credentials making them stronger contenders.  
This analysis contradicts the common perception of opposition parties as simply 
personalistic endeavours centred around an individual leader (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 
151; Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 42; Gunther & Diamond 2003: 187–188; Manning 
2005), even though personal traits are still important in the parties under study, and 
smaller personalistic parties do exist in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Burkina Faso’s 
political landscape does suffer from a proliferation of parties deeply affected by 
personalistic tendencies. This is illustrated by the fact that leadership transitions within 
political parties are extremely rare, and systematically controversial when they do 
occur. 
The lack of opportunities within parties and the emergence of a new generation 
fuels internal frustrations, which often end up in party splits – like those that the UNIR-
PS suffered from over the years. This is true for both the UPC and UNIR-PS, with 
Diabré and Bénéwendé Sankara respectively playing an important role in attracting 
support. The personalistic tendencies of Burkinabè parties is also illustrated by the fact 
that their strongholds tend to be located in the home region of the party leader, and 
other powerful figures. A researcher and civil society activist explained that ‘a party’s 
founder or president has always been supported by people from their region… 
Everyone has a stronghold at home’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017). And 
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indeed, UNIR-PS activists in Minissia, a village close to Yako (Nord region, Burkina 
Faso), exclaimed: ‘Maître Sankara36 is from Toéssin, he is one of us, he is a relative. 
We cannot push him aside and vote for someone coming from somewhere else’ (dis. 2, 
Minissia, 05/04/2018). Stroh (2010) described this as the ‘power of proximity’, and 
argued that party leaders in Burkina made rational strategic decisions on where to 
compete based upon the presence of high-ranking ‘fils du terroir’ (‘sons of the soil’) 
in the party’s leadership.  
Yet, contrary to small and ephemerous parties that completely revolve around their 
founder, both the UNIR-PS and UPC have a broader core than their respective leader. 
Even if Bénéwendé Sankara and Diabré are central figures in their respective parties, 
we cannot reduce their parties to them. The parties are able to compete and win seats 
in other regions than their own home bases, especially in urban areas, and activists and 
leaders who join the party have other objectives than access to patronage, such as 
competing for power, advancing values, or fighting for change.  
In Uganda, the DP has proven that it is more than a person’s vehicle, as can be seen 
from its longevity – since the 1950s – and the multiple leadership changes the party 
has experienced. A Ugandan researcher argued that the ‘strong man syndrome is not a 
factor for DP’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). The FDC has also experienced 
leadership changes, even though the party has had more difficulty in detaching itself 
from the figure of Besigye. As one FDC leader explained, Besigye is ‘an icon which 
FDC can rally around’ (int. UG28, Kampala, 24/11/2016), and remains ‘a unifying 
factor and people believe in him’ (int. UG19, Kampala, 07/11/2016). Yet, despite the 
 
36
 Maître is the French title used to address lawyers. 
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importance of Besigye’s figure in the party, the party’s core is more what Besigye 
represents, than just who he is. Besigye is a popular figure because he has come to 
embody the ‘Struggle’ for change described in this chapter.  
My research also dismisses the idea that ethnicity is necessarily the main cleavage 
around which parties are formed. As already pointed out in Chapter 1, authors such as 
Horowitz (1985), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), and Arriola (2013), for example, 
have considered African parties as inevitably ethnic in nature. Yet, Elischer’s (2013) 
comparative work demonstrated that ethnic parties are actually not as prevalent as 
often assumed, confirming previous findings by Basedau and Stroh (2012) on four 
francophone West African countries, including Burkina Faso (see also Stroh 2010; 
Posner 2004).  
Ethnicity does not constitute the core of party formation, even though it can be a 
political mobilisation tool and important ethnic-based social processes and 
conventions permeates the political sphere in both countries. In Burkina Faso, for 
example, the highly-hierarchical Mossi Empire sees politicians co-opt influential 
customary chiefs who play a pivotal role in mobilising votes in their locality, and 
increasingly run for office themselves (Hagberg 2007; Kibora 2019; Kouraogo 2019). 
Additionally, ‘joking kinships’ (parentés à plaisanterie) at play in Burkina Faso and 
neighbouring countries are mobilised in the course of electoral discourse.37 Ethnic 
prejudices are sometimes used to disqualify one’s opponent – the UPC’s Diabré has, 
for example, been affected with social prejudices depicting the Bissa (his ethnic group) 
as favouring their own extended family and community.  
 
37 This peculiar mechanism regulates conflicts between communities by turning co-existing ethnic 
groups into allies or even allegorical parents, and diffuses potential tensions through a performative – 
and regulated – use of insults and stereotypes between them (see Badini 1996; Hagberg 2006). 
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In Uganda, the weight of traditional kingdoms, their recognition and the issue of 
federalism have affected party politics since independence. A prominent example is 
that of Buganda royalism, which has continued to influence politics through the 
mobilisation of Baganda identity and loyalty to gather popular (and electoral) support 
(Brisset-Foucault 2013). The Suubi pressure group, created by Buganda royalists 
ahead of the 2011 elections, is a good illustration of this persistent influence.  
Kingdom issues have also been prominent outside of Buganda, for example in 
Western Uganda’s Rwenzururu Kingdom where the demand for recognition – ignored 
by the government until 2009 – became a ‘dividing line’ upon which people in Kasese 
have ‘defined their relationship with the government and opposition’ (int. UG62, 
Kasese, 15/05/2018), and fed the opposition’s popularity, in particular the FDC (Reuss 
& Titeca 2017: 134). The DP continues to be seen as a ‘selling card’ in certain areas 
in Buganda (int. UG08, Kampala, 30/06/2016), but its appeal has faltered in the face 
of growing multi-ethnic organisations such as the FDC and the ruling NRM, with 
regional and ethnic voting patterns decreasing over time (Beardsworth 2018: 65–66). 
Overall, ethnicity does have an influence on politics in Uganda and Burkina Faso, yet 
in both countries it does not have a direct causal relationship with party formation 
dynamics. 
In this chapter, I have identified two types of party core: historical values, and 
credible change prospects. This contributes to a broader understanding of the nature of 
opposition parties across sub-Saharan Africa. These cores add on to – rather than 
replace – existing arguments regarding opposition party formation in other countries, 
such as Riedl’s (2018) focus on anti-incumbent cleavages during the democratic 
transition, and LeBas’s (2013) work on opposition parties’ origins in protest 
movements. The core of opposition parties needs to be considered when explaining 
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why and how opposition parties endure and perform the way they do within the context 
of a hybrid regime – an important question I address in Chapter 7 of this thesis. But 
beforehand, we still need to understand how parties are built as organisations, which 





Opposition party-building in a hybrid regime 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that opposition parties in hybrid regimes 
face a range of constraints fuelled by the quasi-fusion of the state and the incumbent. 
I have also shown that historical values or credible ideas of change can form the core 
of an opposition and be the source of its identity and legitimacy. I now turn my 
attention of a different aspect of opposition party formation: how are these parties 
organised internally, and how they are built and spread on the ground. 
I have previously highlighted how African opposition parties are often perceived as 
weak, poorly institutionalised, and personalistic (Van de Walle & Butler 1999: 15). 
One of the weaknesses explaining their poor electoral results is said to be their poor 
‘territorial penetration’ (Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 37), meaning their lack of local 
structures able to organise and mobilise during and outside electoral periods. Indeed, 
Olukoshi (1998a: 32) argued that opposition parties were ‘extremely weak when it 
came to reaching out to people in the rural areas, where the bulk of the population – 
and of the voters – are concentrated’.  
This has led some parties to actively promote the building of a local presence across 
the country, such as Chadema in Tanzania (Paget 2019b), the UPND in Zambia 
(Beardsworth 2020), and the UPC in Burkina, as described later in this chapter. 
Importantly, Paget (2019b) argues that Chadema was forced to launch a massive and 
costly branch-building effort to disseminate its message and to present itself as a 
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credible rival to the ruling CCM in the absence of social actors able to act as proxies 
for the party. Meanwhile, Le Bas (2006: 432), in her study on the emergence of the 
MDC in Zimbabwe from the labour movement, argues that the violent state response 
forced the party to close branches and go partly underground, with party structures 
turning into ‘more amorphous, socially embedded networks’. This echoes the 
‘Kakuyege’ strategy of the DP during the no-party era, described by Carbone (2003: 
491) as:  
‘the secret politics of furtive individual contacts and the shrewd use of any social 
occasion – e.g. a funeral or a seminar – as an opportunity to meet members and 
followers. The aim is to keep active the party’s ‘silent’ membership by building a 
fragile and intermittent underground network to link the top leadership with the 
grassroots, Kampala with the countryside’.  
Another important contribution to a better understanding of internal party dynamics 
is the work of Osei (2016) in Ghana. She argues that formal and informal structures 
co-exist in both the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC), but highlights differences in these parties’ ability to control informal networks 
and argues that party hierarchies can sometimes be by-passed by informal and local 
centres of power. All these authors contribute to our collective understanding of the 
diversity of intra-party dynamics and organisation strategies across the continent. This 
chapter makes a further contribution, which – by adding a comparative element going 
beyond a single party or country – reveals the importance of internal dynamics of 
party-building and of understanding the relations between the party’s centre and local 
branches.  
This chapter is based upon an approach adopted by Hodgkin (1961). In his succinct 
yet rich overview of political parties at the time of independence across Africa, 
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Hodgkin (1961: 124) discusses the structure and organisation of parties and highlights 
the complexity of the internal political systems within African parties, and the 
necessity to understand ‘where, in any given party, does power lie?’. He also 
demonstrates the importance of local structures and the different ways power can be 
distributed between the party’s central leadership and its local branches. I argue that 
these considerations are still applicable to contemporary African parties. This raises a 
series of questions: how do opposition parties set up structures and branches, 
considering their lack of resources and the repression they face? What are the relations 
between the central party and local branches? How are decisions taken, and leverage 
distributed?  
My analysis of party-building processes is particularly focused on the dynamics 
between ‘the party in central office’ and ‘the party on the ground’ (Katz & Mair 1993), 
meaning between the national leadership and activists. I observe in turn three aspects 
of party organisation. First, I discuss how parties consider the building of local 
branches, and what their strategies are. Parties have had different approaches 
depending on the context, their capacity, and their political analysis. In some cases, 
such as that of the FDC in Uganda, the mere topic of building structures has been the 
subject of controversies that has fuelled internal factionalism. Second, I look at the 
financial sources of political parties. While the party’s founder and/or leader is often a 
major contributor to the party at the national level, candidates, MPs, and other local 
leaders are often instrumental in funding local branches, therefore creating a 
decentralised party elite. Finally, I observe how decisions are made within the party, 
and the level and direction of the consultations that exist. Decision-making is generally 
a top-down process, with few functioning mechanisms to ensure a meaningful 
consultation of the grassroots. However, leaders and activists at the local level can 
164 
 
sometimes push back on unpopular decisions, and are increasingly demanding to be 
listened to when it comes to nominating candidates for office.  
These dynamics are not the only dimensions of opposition party-building at play: 
rallies, youth wings and women’s groups, personal networks, community events and, 
increasingly, social media are also important aspects of how parties work. Yet, this 
chapter focuses on these three particular aspects (local branches, funding, and 
decision-making) because they emerged from the research as particularly significant 
factors for opposition parties’ cohesion or factionalism and, ultimately, for their 
capacity to endure and perform (see Chapter 7). Related issues such as mobilisation 
strategies and the use of election campaigns by candidates to organise beyond formal 
structures are addressed in the next chapter. 
5.1 Why and how build local branches?  
All opposition parties face constraints in establishing local structures across the 
country – as we have seen in Chapter 3. The combination of a repressive environment 
and meagre financial resources at the opposition’s disposal means that in large parts 
of the country, the ruling party is the only player with an active presence (Wahman 
2017). This is especially true in rural areas, where both the NRM and CDP benefitted 
from previous institutions – the Revolutionary Defence Committees (CDRs) in 
Burkina Faso and the Resistance Councils (RCs) in Uganda, that they could build upon 
when setting up a party presence. Ruling parties may also rely on existing local elite, 
such as traditional leaders or local councillors. In Burkina Faso, customary chiefs had 
been vilified by the Sankarist revolution, and were eager to support Compaoré when 
he made conciliatory gestures towards them (Otayek 1997; Bado 2015: 28).  
165 
 
In both countries, local councils are overwhelmingly controlled by the ruling party. 
In Uganda, in particular, the regime simply did not organise elections for the lowest 
levels of administration (village (LC1) and sub-county (LC3)) between 2001 and 2018, 
leaving movement-era administrators in post for seventeen years. Museveni also has a 
vast network of appointed Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) throughout the 
country (Tapscott 2017). Because opposition parties cannot rely on key local figures 
such as chiefs or local administrators to build a local presence, it makes it difficult for 
them organise and mobilise on the ground.  
This situation of monopoly obviously represented an advantage for the ruling party. 
As a Burkinabè civil society figure argued: ‘Only the CDP could, at the time, claim to 
be present in the 8,000 villages [Burkina Faso counts]. When you are the only ones to 
be there, you have a head start to get a large share of the vote in this village, you are 
the only political option they know of and can access’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 
27/03/2017). Similarly in Uganda, Wilkins (2018: 120) has described the NRM’s 
monopoly on political competition in lower level of politics, and argued that while it 
does not mean ‘that opposition activity does not exist at all in the rural south, […] for 
the vast majority of the population the forum culture of politics pioneered in the 
Movement System remains in place today’.  
When the ruling party is ultra-dominant in areas of the country, and opposition 
parties are unable to have a local presence, these opposition parties will not be able to 
field candidates in these constituencies and to conduct campaign activities on the 
ground. In the 2007 legislative elections in Burkina Faso – held under a PR system – 
only five out of 47 parties taking part actually ran in all 45 provinces. In Uganda, where 
parliamentary elections are held in single-seat constituencies, one in five seats in the 
2016 election were not contested by an opposition candidate (Beardsworth 2018: 115). 
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Local structures are also important because they are ‘a centre of vigilance’ that can 
raise people’s awareness during elections and protect the vote from rigging (int. UG14, 
Kampala, 20/09/2016).  
Social media is also increasingly used by political parties across the continent, 
shaping in yet unclear ways the organisation and mobilisation tactics of these parties. 
Researchers have started investigating these dynamics (Dwyer and Molony (eds) 
2019; Gadjanova et al. 2019; Hitchen et al. 2019), generally finding that social media 
complements rather than replaces traditional mechanisms. While these studies have 
often focused on political mobilisation (especially during electoral campaigns) rather 
than organisation, they point out the emergence of new roles within parties, such as 
that of social media entrepreneurs or communicators (Gadjanova et al. 2019: 11; 
Hitchen et al. 2019: 21). The role of social media in party activities in further discussed 
in Chapter 6.  
The main difficulty opposition parties have in setting a local presence is their lack 
of resources. Paget (2019b: 3) demonstrated this in the case of Tanzania, where 
Chadema was able to set up branches only after it had raised enough private finance. 
A leader from the FFS argued that ‘setting up a structure at the departmental level is 
very expensive, because the cell needs to be kept active, otherwise it is pointless, it dies 
out. But this requires means, and we don’t have them’ (int. BF35, Ouagadougou, 
02/07/2018). This is true for the broader Sankarist family, including the UNIR-PS, as 
a founding member explained:  
‘The strategy was to become established, so the UNIR’s leaders set up structures 
everywhere they could, in provinces as well as in some villages where the ideas 
of Thomas [Sankara] thrived. It was this strategy to occupy the field. This work 
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was conducted in successive phases due to the lack of means’ (int. BF39, 
Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018).  
Yet, those local structures have remained sparse and weak, as a young leader 
admitted: ‘we may have one or two representatives in a province, but it does not work. 
The leaders are not accessible, there are no structures’ (int. BF16, Ouagadougou, 
17/01/2018). The party also has difficulties maintaining local headquarters outside of 
the capital. For example, the local branch in Koudougou (115 kilometres from 
Ouagadougou) had been unable to cover the rent of their office for the past seven 
months at the time of my research, and their request for help to the national level had 
remained unanswered (int. BF33, Koudougou, 17/04/2018). 
The UPC has had a much more proactive approach to local party-building. As an 
MP explained, ‘at the party’s creation, our strategy was to communicate, to set up 
structures across the country in order to have respondents’ (int. BF41, Ouagadougou, 
11/07/2018). The founding members produced a memo laying out a process to set up 
local structures across the country, from the village up to the national level. Potential 
local leaders were identified and co-opted at the regional and provincial level to set up 
the party in their area. A national secretariat was in charge of supervising the process. 
A UPC founding member explained that ‘where we had committed and competent 
activists, we trusted them, they did their work, they set up the local bureau and sent us 
a report so that we could compile everything’ (int. BF49, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018). 
Local leaders were identified and selected based upon their foothold in the community, 
and the (financial) means they could contribute. An MP explained:  
‘Most of us, MPs, we were a sort of neutral elite who had previously worked in 
other fields in our respective regions, as the president of an association or 
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something like that, and so we had our own networks as well’ (int. BF46, 
Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018).  
Once co-opted, these leaders were entrusted to set up the party at their level. An 
MP explained that in his province, he went to each village, gathered people interested, 
and had them elect their local bureau. After doing this in all the villages, the village 
representatives elected the party bureau at the level above. In his province, this process 
took four months (int. BF47, Ouagadougou, 08/08/2018). In other areas, the provincial 
correspondent identified and co-opted local leaders at the municipality level to be the 
party’s respondent in their locality and to mobilise and organise support at the village 
level. As another MP argued:  
‘The grassroots committees were not yet set up because we did not have the time 
to do it. But considering the Burkinabè social fabric, where the person matters 
much more than the organisation, we thought that if you have focal points, good 
people, you have an 80% chance of success even where you don’t have any 
structures.’ (int. BF46, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018)  
This has enabled the UPC to expend its presence across the country very quickly – 
illustrated by its impressive results in the 2012 election: just two years after its 
foundation, the UPC obtained 19 seats in Parliament. Even more significantly, the 
party was able to compete in 68% of municipalities in the same election cycle – one 
of only 3 parties, among 67 competing, having fielded candidates in at least half of the 
municipalities – and obtained 1,615 local councillors (figures compiled by the CENI).  
In Uganda, the Movement era had devastating consequences on the organisation 
power of the two oldest parties, the DP and UPC. As a Ugandan researcher explained: 
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‘They spent twenty years in limbo; by the time they were allowed again [in 2006], 
most old parties had lost their supporters because they hadn’t been mobilised; 
because parties hadn’t been soliciting financial contributions from supporters; 
and because [local] leaders had died or joined ranks with the NRM’ (int. UG30, 
Kampala, 06/12/2016).  
This partly explains why the DP has an uneven organisation across the country. Before 
the return to multipartyism, Carbone (2003: 190–191) described the DP as having an 
‘extremely weak – at times and places […] hardly detectable – presence’ composed of 
a ‘well-known party-leadership and thousands of supporters in the capital’ and 
‘largely inactive up-country membership’.  
The DP has made efforts to remobilise support and build structures across the 
country, including outside Buganda. In Gulu or Mukono, for example, the party has a 
functional office – supported by the local MP – which is used to coordinate activities 
across the county, but this does not extend to lower administrative levels and failed to 
meet the expectations raised by Mao’s accession to the party presidency. According to 
a Ugandan civil society activist, ‘when Norbert Mao was elected, it created a belief 
that DP would be able to expend outside of the Central region and attract young 
people, but that hasn’t been the case’ (int. UG26, Kampala, 21/11/2016).  
In particular, the DP has lost ground in the capital, with figures like Besigye or Bobi 
Wine attracting the support of urban youths. This was well illustrated by the decision 
of Erias Lukwago, Kampala’s Lord Mayor, to distance himself from the DP – and 
instead campaign alongside Besigye – and stand on an independent ticket for re-
election in 2016. The factionalism prevailing in the DP after Mao’s election – with 
Baganda heavyweights such as Lukwago questioning his legitimacy and holding 
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parallel activities – distracted the party’s leadership from the necessary efforts to 
strengthen the party structures.  
In the FDC, the building of party structures has become the subject of an intense 
debate. In 2012, Muntu was elected president of the party on a platform focusing on 
building those structures. At that time, Besigye was stepping down as per the party’s 
term limits, but also because he was dispirited with party-building efforts and became 
increasingly interested in civil disobedience. Some FDC members and political 
observers saw progress under Muntu’s leadership, with a Ugandan civil society activist 
arguing that ‘Muntu is very strong on institutionalising the party, and for the last three 
or four years that’s what he has been doing. He has covered around 60% of the country 
in terms of having a structure in every district’ (int. UG01, Kampala, 06/04/2016). But 
these efforts have been conducted ‘very quietly’ and ‘without any leading speeches’ 
(int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016), and others have been frustrated about what they 
perceive as slow progress. As one activist wondered, the ‘FDC has structures, but the 
question of the day is how functional are they, are they operating?’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 
09/05/2018).  
At the same time, observers have noticed the lack of engagement of some FDC 
figures in those efforts. As an international NGO representative argued:  
‘Muntu won on a ticket promising to reorganise the party and he was hoping to 
do that, and the party MPs went “fair enough, you get on with that”, they didn’t 
see that they should be involved, [that] it was part of their larger responsibility’ 
(int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016).  
Some in the party have actually argued against building party-structures, seeing it 
as pointless or counter-productive. For example, one FDC activist in Soroti said that:  
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‘Organisation would be good, but in the way Uganda is running, under a dictator, 
even if you try and organise yourself he will come and disorganise you, if you try 
and create structures, [Museveni’s] emphasis will be to target structures, 
intimidate members, buy them off or even kill them’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 
09/05/2018).  
Perrot’s (2016) work has indeed shown that the hegemonic NRM regularly co-opts 
opposition structures.  
This is why the FDC – as part of the Defiance campaign – has started to create 
‘covert structures, which are not known, so even the government cannot target them 
because nobody knows about them’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 09/05/2018). These informal 
structures include the Power 10 initiative – which aims to set up a group of ten young 
people per village whose role is to mobilise support at the lowest level – and the 
regional ‘People’s Assemblies’ set up as parallel government structures following the 
national ‘People’s Government’ introduced by Besigye after the 2016 elections (Daily 
Monitor 17/02/2019). This echoes the MDC’s strategy in Zimbabwe to create parallel 
‘action committees’ to coordinate and mobilise faster in response to state repression 
(LeBas 2006: 434).  
This disagreement has fuelled factionalism throughout Muntu’s party presidency, 
with an internal polarisation between the ‘party-building’ approach defended by 
Muntu, and the ‘Defiance’ promoted by Besigye. This factionalism deeply hurt the 
party – with Muntu himself being branded as an ‘NRM mole’ by some FDC figures 
(Daily Monitor 08/12/2017), and later quitting the party a few months after failing to 
be re-elected at the head of the party in 2018 (The Observer 25/09/2018).  
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Overall, opposition parties face severe constraints when attempting to expand their 
presence across the country, and the two main ones are the lack of resources – 
discussed in the next section in more detail – and the repressive environment due to 
the hegemonic ruling party (see Chapter 3). When repression is high, opposition parties 
have to use informal, underground tactics. In Uganda, where repression has remained 
particularly intense, this has been illustrated by the DP’s Kakuyege approach during 
the no-party era, and more recently by the ‘covert structures’ mentioned by FDC 
activists. Similarly in Burkina Faso, the Sankarist organisations had to use informal 
tactics with a hidden agenda – such as playing tapes of Thomas Sankara’s speeches 
under cover – during the first decade of Compaoré’s regime, characterised by political 
repression. The UPC, which emerged in a much more favourable environment, was 
able to use a more open approach of co-opting local figures and setting up branches.  
Meanwhile, the push to create local branches tends to come from the top of the 
party. In Uganda, both Muntu and Mao were elected as party presidents on a platform 
of building and expanding party structures, with the expectation that they would then 
go on and do that themselves. In Burkina Faso, the initial group that founded the UPC 
laid out a road map and started the process of identifying local figures who could be 
co-opted and relied upon to set up a branch in their area. This approach, and especially 
its financial implications detailed in the next section, have led to the creation of a ‘party 
franchise’38 with local party leaders sharing ‘ownership’ of the party with the national 
leadership.  
 
38 This concept is the subject of a paper in preparation, in collaboration with Dr Nicole Beardsworth. 
The phrasing ‘franchise party’ emerged from discussions with Dr Dan Paget. 
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5.2 Follow the money 
Building party structures, and especially local branches around the country, requires 
financial resources. A local presence requires office space; while it can be staffed by 
volunteers, they still need resources to conduct their activities, ranging from phone 
credit to liaise with members to the costs associated with organising rallies or 
meetings. Campaign financing has received some attention in the literature (Lindberg 
2003; Arriola 2013; Ukase 2016; Kramon 2017), but the issue of party financing 
outside of electoral periods remains largely unexplored. This is why I focus here not 
on campaign spending, but on parties’ financial resources more broadly. Obtaining 
reliable information about parties’ resources and funding mechanisms is difficult, 
partly because they are at the discretion of a few individuals (Elischer 2013: 19). 
Sources of funding at a party’s disposal tend to be the following (in no particular 
order): membership dues and fees; personal resources of the party president and other 
officials; public funding allocated to political parties; donations from supporters 
(domestic or in the diaspora); and money raised or contributed by candidates. As 
already discussed in Chapter 3, public funding is very limited in both countries, and 
heavily monopolised by the hyper-dominant ruling party. Donations, either from 
domestic supporters or the diaspora, are impossible to properly assess and tend to be 
done under the cover of anonymity.  
Membership dues, prominent in the funding of mass parties, are rarely paid in all 
parties under study – except by high-profile figures and those wishing to run for office. 
In Burkina Faso, someone wishing to become a party member must pay a small 
registration fee, then membership dues on a regular basis (monthly or annually). These 
dues are sometimes adjusted to the financial situation of the member, as some parties 
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have discounted fees for students and the unemployed. In effect, even though regular 
members may pay the registration fee to obtain the party’s card, it is rare for people to 
pay their cotisations regularly, except when they wish to run for office – for which 
they must demonstrate they are up-to-date with their membership dues. An UPC MP 
explained:  
‘People tend to pay [the membership fees] when they need to be a candidate, 
because it requires to prove one’s membership to the party. Some activists are 
proud to show the document, the party’s card. But generally, it is not in the 
Burkinabè’s culture to pay membership fees’ (int. BF45, Ouagadougou, 
31/07/2018). 
In Uganda, the membership dues are even less institutionalised. In 2006, FDC 
reportedly launched party cards, sold for USh1,000 for ordinary members, USh1,500 
for a laminated card, and USh5 million39 for so-called corporate membership (New 
Vision 13/11/2006). A survey conducted in 2007 found that ‘DP reported to have sold 
500,000 party cards. FDC estimated its party strength at between four to five million 
people’ (Ssenkumba 2007: 20). Over the course of my research, no interviewee was 
able to provide a number of actual party members, even at the branch level.  
 Considering the small amount that membership dues represent in each party’s 
finances, it is usually the leadership that contributes the most. Parties are often 
financially carried by their founder, especially in their early years. A young UNIR-PS 
leader explained: ‘it is him [the party president] who supported the party for a dozen 
 
39 Around £0.30 for ordinary members; £0.45 for a laminated card; and £1,400 for the corporate 
membership (November 2006). 
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years before we started having MPs who contributed too’ (BF17, Ouagadougou, 
18/01/2018). Similarly, regarding the UPC, a party leader stated that:  
‘At the beginning, it was difficult to talk about funding, because the party didn’t 
have any external funding. It was the contributions of the board members between 
2010 and 2012, the personal contribution of founding members and “resource 
persons”, and above all the financial support of the party’s president.’ (BF49, 
Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018) 
Souaré (2017: 66), in his work on opposition parties in West Africa, argued that 
because a large majority of parties are created by a few wealthy individuals who 
become and remain their main ideologues, strategists, and donors, these people tend 
to consider the party as their property. As a Ugandan civil society activist put it: 
‘If your party is like FDC where Besigye has been one of the biggest individual 
funders, it creates a patronage system. People will then push him to run because 
he has the money, he can finance activities. A lot of people elect leaders that they 
think have money and they can support the party activities, and that is distorting 
the interpretation of what kind of leadership you get for the party.’ (int. UG01, 
Kampala, 06/04/2016) 
Yet, it is not only the party’s founder or individual leader who has to actively 
finance the party’s activities: other officials such as regional or local party executives 
and figures holding an elected position (MPs, councillors, etc.) have both formal and 
informal financial obligations towards the party and the membership. For a start, the 
membership dues of these individuals are much higher than the regular dues described 
earlier, and usually amount to a set percentage of the earnings associated with the 
position to be reversed to the party. A Burkinabè MP from the UNIR-PS explained 
that prior to being elected, he was a civil servant and a regular member, and therefore 
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used to pay a monthly membership fee of FCFA2,000; as an MP, he has to pay 
FCFA150,000 as per the party’s statutes, amounting to 10% of his parliamentary 
salary40 (int. BF44, Ouagadougou, 26/07/2018). Similarly in Uganda, DP MPs make 
monthly contributions worth USh250,000 to a pool for party activities41 (int. UG73, 
Masaka, 18/05/2018).  
These figures also tend to be the ones maintaining the local office if there is one 
(int. BF47, Ouagadougou, 08/08/2018; int. UG52, Gulu, 11/05/2018), and are often 
expected to help out party activists and local citizens more broadly, as respected local 
figures. This may involve helping with school fees or donating for wedding or burial 
processes (Kibora 2019: 80; see also Gadjanova 2017). In the case of the UPC in 
Burkina Faso, the set-up of local structures was done, from the start, by local leaders 
using their own means to develop the party and position themselves as viable 
candidates.  
As said earlier, local correspondents were co-opted and tasked with setting up a 
local presence. An MP explained that: ‘the condition to be a party correspondent is to 
agree to work without the party’s help and to establish the party using one’s own 
means and relations’ (int. BF46, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018). According to some UPC 
MPs, the fact that local correspondents do not receive funds from the party’s national 
structures to establish local branches is a good thing, because it makes people ‘work 
more as it were for themselves’ rather than ‘sit waiting for money from the party’ (int. 
BF46, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018) and fosters a perception of mutual interest and buy-
in into the organisation.  
 
40 FCFA2,000 = £2.65; FCFA150,000 = £200 (April 2020). 
41 USh250,000 = £52 (April 2020). 
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Another MP argued that, ‘at the provincial level, I spend money too based upon my 
capacity and my position, it is a fair contribution so I consider that I own the party as 
much as the President’ (int. BF38, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018). But that also means 
that local structures tend to be loyal to the individual more than to the party. The same 
MP42 also argued vehemently:  
‘It is not the UPC that was elected in [this province], it was me. In the 
neighbouring province, the candidate with the same logo, the same contribution 
from the party, was not elected. I am the one going out bearing the logo, doing 
the work, canvassing the villages, with my own money.’ (ibid) 
The sources of party financing are important to consider when looking at party 
organisation because leverage derives from resources, especially in a context of cash-
strapped parties operating in a highly monetised political environment. Contrary to a 
mass party, the parties under study here do not rely on members’ dues, which even 
when they formally exist are not paid regularly. Both Uganda and Burkina Faso have 
provisions for public funding of parties’ activities, but this funding is scarce and tends 
to be largely monopolised by the incumbent.  
This leaves the responsibility of maintaining the party to the party’s elite. However, 
contrary to the context associated with the emergence of cadre parties (Duverger 1981: 
119), characterised by restricted suffrage, here parties have to build a presence across 
the country (see section 5.1). In most parties, this leads to scattered, top-down attempts 
to build party structures, which have very weak foundations. If the party manages to 
get an MP elected in the area, he or she can then maintain the party’s presence using 
 
42
 At odds with the party’s leadership at the time of research. 
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their parliamentary wages. If not, the local structures usually dwindle, as in the case of 
the UNIR-PS in Koudougou.  
The UPC provides a slightly different model. While party-building is still triggered 
from the top, it relies on the co-optation of local figures with resources to invest into 
the party themselves. This ‘franchising’ model enables the party to build a national 
presence more quickly, as long as it can co-opt affluent enough local figures. This 
requires access to private finance, echoing the arguments of Arriola (2013) on 
opposition coalitions, Koter (2017) on legislators’ wealth, and Kelly (2020) on party 
formation. It is also facilitated by a less restrictive environment, as it supposes that 
local figures not yet engaged in politics will not feel threatened to associate with an 
opposition party. The formation of the UPC in Burkina Faso fits this pattern very well. 
Yet, while this allows for a faster party-building process – as illustrated by the relative 
success of the UPC in the 2012 election – it also raises questions about the institutional 
sustainability of the branches, and the capacity of the party’s central office to control 
the party’s periphery. Indeed, the local elite financially supporting the party enjoys 
substantive leverage, which begs the question of how power is distributed within the 
party and how decisions are made. 
5.3 Decision-making 
I turn now to the relations between the party’s centre and periphery when it comes 
to making decisions. As in the case of party finances, the question of decision-making 
has tended to be analysed with a focus on electioneering – how parties decide whether 
to form coalitions (Arriola 2013; Beardsworth 2018) or how they select the candidates 
they field (Öhman 2004; Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2010; Daddieh & Bob-Milliar 
2012; Vokes 2016), rather than how parties make decisions in a broader sense. While 
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I do touch upon these dynamics here, I consider the decision-making processes as a 
whole and analyse the relations between the party’s centre and local branches over 
these decisions.  
Nationally, all parties have formal decision-making organs inscribed in the party 
constitution, such as a National Executive Committee (NEC) or Secrétariat Exécutif 
National in French to run the party day-to-day, a broader National Council (Bureau 
Politique National (BPN)) formulating policies, and a National Delegates Conference 
(Congrès National) held periodically or exceptionally to ratify the most important 
decisions. Officially, there are mechanisms for the grassroots to be consulted during 
decision-making, and for a mutual exchange of ideas between the centre and the 
periphery. In Burkina Faso, provincial coordinators (in the UNIR-PS) and 
correspondents (in the UPC) go to BPN meetings in the capital and report back to their 
branch. A UNIR-PS local leader explained:  
‘Together at the national level we gather and talk clearly and find solutions. Then 
upon my return, I go to the municipalities. When there is some information, I get 
in touch with the activists by phone or by going to their locality to spread the 
information.’ (int. BF24, Yako, 04/04/2018)  
They also organise consultations at the lower levels, usually in a top-down 
approach: the proposition comes from the national level and is discussed by local 
branches. A UNIR-PS MP explained ‘we receive directives from the national level, we 
gather the militants, we lay out the position, we ask them what they think, we write a 
report and we send it up’ (int. BF44, Ouagadougou, 26/07/2018). When asked, no 
respondent offered examples where the local structures challenged decisions made by 
the national leadership. Similarly, a UPC activist explained that, ‘the correspondent 
comes down with the talking points, we discuss, and if there are ideas, she goes back 
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up with these ideas. But it is not an effective strategy. […] Often, at the grassroots, it 
is difficult. If you start at the grassroots, you will never be done’ (int. BF31, 
Koudougou, 17/04/2018).  
In Uganda, similar mechanisms exist to allow for the consultation of the base and 
the transmission of information between the centre and the periphery. A local official 
in Soroti explained that locally-elected FDC people met every two months to discuss 
future prospects and share their views with the NEC (int. UG43, Soroti, 08/05/2018). 
Another FDC activist, still in Soroti, described the meetings as opportunities to receive 
information from the party’s leadership and, at the same time, to provide them with 
information about the reality on the ground:  
‘For example, two weeks ago there was a meeting called at the national level to 
tell us what is happening, what is our point, how do we emphasise it to the people, 
we have documented information we share. Also, during these meetings, we share 
what we have got on the ground, maybe the levels of poverty, of services given to 
the people. We inform the party and they also inform us, so it’s bottom-up and 
top-down.’ (int. UG46, Soroti, 09/05/2018) 
The nomination of candidates is usually a distinct process, but involves the same 
channels and principles. In Burkina Faso, the identity of the presidential candidate is 
rarely in question, but the candidacy of the party’s president usually is formally 
endorsed by the party congress. In Uganda, opposition parties have regularly attempted 
to form electoral coalitions and field a joint presidential candidate, though these 
attempts tend to quickly collapse (Beardsworth 2018). In the case of the DP, the party 
president is automatically the party’s presidential flagbearer if the party decides to 
contest the election (int. UG81, Namasuba, 22/05/2018; New Vision 22/01/2020). In 
contrast, the FDC holds elections to designate the party’s national flagbearer, who is 
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not always the party’s president. Indeed, while Besigye stepped down as party 
president in 2012, he was selected as the party’s flagbearer again for the 2016 elections 
(something I will come back to in Chapter 7).  
The selection of candidates at lower levels, either for parliamentary or local 
elections, is conducted differently in each party. In Burkina Faso, the local branches 
have obtained to be more involved in the process, and the nomination of parliamentary 
candidates is officially decided by consensus locally. In UNIR-PS, activists from Yako 
complained that the candidate ‘was imposed by the top of the party’ in 2002 and 2007, 
‘but in 2012, we said that we would propose the candidate among ourselves, that 
nobody would impose someone from the top’ (int. BF25, Yako, 05/04/2018). Yet, other 
activists in the rural village of Bokin continued to highlight internal disagreements 
over the process. Bokin and Yako are in the same province, the Passoré, where three 
parliamentary seats are contested. Each branch was therefore competing to have their 
local leader nominated at the top of the list – as chances were slim to have more than 
one MP elected. As no consensus emerged, it was the BPN in Ouagadougou that had 
to make the final decision.  
In the UPC, those wishing to be selected as candidates are supposed to consult each 
other and decide among themselves who will run, and their respective positioning on 
electoral lists. Only if no consensus emerges, a selection commission sitting in the 
party headquarters in Ouagadougou hears each candidate’s motivations and 
propositions and decides. As an MP explains:  
‘If we don’t manage to agree on the list at the provincial level, we transfer the 
applications to Ouagadougou where an ad-hoc commission is set-up to hear us. 
We were first received collectively, the thirteen candidates, then individually. 
Each one of us had to state what their respective contribution to broadening the 
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party’s base had been, what activities had been conducted.’ (int. BF45, 
Ouagadougou, 31/07/2018) 
In Uganda, the process is different again. FDC tends to organise party primaries, 
which have been described as ‘free and fair’ and giving the party the ‘moral high 
ground’ in some instances (The Guardian 20/10/2010), but violent and chaotic in 
others (The Observer 02/11/2015). Sometimes, primary losers decide to run as 
independents, and are therefore automatically excluded from the party, but this is less 
frequent than in the ruling party (Wilkins 2019: 9). Yet, candidate selection is still 
often done through back-door negotiations rather than open and democratic primaries, 
as Mugambe Mpiima (2016: 31) argues: ‘The politics of ring-fencing and building 
consensus replaced many would-be primaries and thus denied FDC a chance to bring 
new talent into national political office’.  
The DP, on the other hand, does not hold primaries and the process is less clear. 
Two DP figures from the same area gave different accounts of this process. The first, 
a local official, explained that ‘it is the constituency committee which nominates the 
MP [candidates]’ (int. UG72, Masaka, 18/05/2018), while the second, an elected MP 
in the area, stated that ‘you have to get endorsement from the headquarters’ (int. 
UG73, Masaka, 18/05/2018). Despite the fact that parties use distinct processes, 
candidate-selection remains an opaque process in most parties, characterised by an 
uneven inclusion of local party structures, and by the fact that the final word usually 
belongs to the central office.  
Overall, decisions about policy and strategy are usually taken in a top-down 
fashion: these are made by central organs and, sometimes, the information is 
disseminated to local branches through the local representatives. Even candidate-
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selection tends to be guided by the national leadership. Local officials act as 
intermediaries, but the consultation they perform is often geared towards information-
sharing, rather than meaningful participation of the grassroots. The lack of resources 
and high illiteracy are obvious challenges for such participation to be implemented.  
Yet, even though formal mechanisms do not really allow for the branches to 
challenge decisions made by the party’s central organs, informal practices still exist to 
express this kind of disagreement. A very good example of this was the consequence 
of the DP’s decision to back Mbabazi, and not Besigye, in the 2016 elections following 
the collapse of the TDA coalition (Beardsworth 2016). When Mbabazi was selected as 
the coalition candidate, the FDC pulled out and Besigye announced he was running as 
well. The DP faced a choice of backing one or the other.43 Their choice to align with 
Mbabazi can be explained in several ways. Beardsworth (2016: 756) has argued that 
‘as an independent candidate who originates from the NRM-dominated Western 
Region, Mbabazi did not pose a threat to the DP or UPC presidents or their electoral 
support’. This contrasted with Besigye, who undoubtedly funnelled supporters of the 
old parties into the FDC, and at times actively courted DP members into the party, for 
example through the Suubi pressure group in 2011. As an international NGO 
representative exclaimed, ‘No surprise that when offered the chance to stab Besigye 
in the back, Mao chose to support Mbabazi!’ (int. UG02, Kampala, 08/04/2016).  
Another consideration that may have brought the DP to back Mbabazi was the 
expectation that he had resources to share and spend on the campaign. Another NGO 
employee argued that ‘a few people walked out with him, but mostly it was the 
 
43 Mao could not have run for office as he was prevented from registering on the electoral lists. He 
initially intended to contest the legislative election in Gulu Municipality.  
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opposition parties who welcomed him, especially DP, thinking that Mbabazi was rich 
and he would support DP candidates’ (int. UG05, Kampala, 14/06/2016). Or, as an 
FDC activist puts it more crudely: ‘people supported Mbabazi thinking he had stolen 
enough money to be able to fund their campaign’ (int. UG54, Gulu, 12/05/2018). This 
hope was quickly dashed, however, as Beardsworth (2016: 759) explained:  
‘Despite the initial momentum that the campaign appeared to have, it lost steam 
by early December as Mbabazi’s spending declined by 41% […]. The facilitation 
funds promised to mobilisers and coalition candidates never materialised and 
their commitment waned’.  
The decision made by the DP’s leadership to back Mbabazi was questioned by 
many MPs (Uganda Radio Network 17/11/2015; int. UG89, Constituency, 2016) and 
local councillors (obs. 1, DP workshop, Masaka, 09/04/2016). Some prominent DP 
candidates also strayed from the party line and openly backed Besigye, in some cases 
because they knew that their voters supported Besigye and that backing Mbabazi 
would hurt their own electoral chances (int. UG24, Mukono, 17/11/2016). DP officials 
involved in the decision were also punished by voters during the elections, as this DP 
elder explained:  
‘In the countryside, because people hadn’t been consulted, they didn’t see the 
rationale of supporting Mbabazi, and they didn’t support him. There was no vocal 
disagreement, people kept silent, but people knew that [in] the countryside they 
had been suffering, they had been suffering with Besigye, and Mbabazi had been 
at the centre of the regime that was causing them to suffer. So since nobody had 
gone to them to explain otherwise, they just saw Mbabazi as part of the regime 
that had been oppressing them. […] It created anger at the leadership of the 
party. During the recent elections, all the members of the NEC of DP, whenever 
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they stood, they lost. […] That shows that people were angry and were ready to 
punish them for having taken them for granted.’ (int. UG03, Kampala, 
20/04/2016) 
Official processes fail to provide local activists meaningful channels to influence 
the decisions of the party’s central office, yet the parties’ central hierarchies should 
not take the support of local branches and activists for granted. All parties display poor 
internal democracy, despite formal consultation and accountability mechanisms, and 
loyalty may lie with local-level branches and figures, rather than the central party. In 
Burkina Faso particularly, local networks appeared tightly controlled by a local figure. 
In the case of the UPC, the ‘franchising’ model of party-building has led local figures 
to use their own resources to promote the party in their constituency in exchange for a 
parliamentary ticket. Because they were the ones setting up the party in their area, they 
see the local party as loyal to them, and that makes it difficult for the central party to 
control branches. But this is not unique to the UPC. In the case of the UNIR-PS, local 
tensions have affected the party in the Passoré province, one of its strongholds. This 
has mainly flared up when legislative candidates’ lists were being drawn up.  
As mentioned earlier, this dynamic was illustrated by a conflict over the selection 
and positioning of candidates which opposed two camps: those from the town of Yako 
– the provincial capital – and those from the village of Bokin. This conflict reveals 
deeper divisions within the party dating from the 2000 scission of the CPS and the 
uneasy patching-up of the Sankarist forces into the UNIR-PS in 2009. The Yako 
section is close to the UNIR-PS president Bénéwendé Sankara and historically 
belonged to the UNIR-MS after the 2000 split. The Bokin section, on the other hand, 
is headed by the Mayor of Téma-Bokin, Ernest Nongma Ouédraogo, the former 
President of the CPS. During a group discussion with party activists in Bokin, a young 
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man argued: ‘it is because of [Ernest Ouédraogo] that I am still a member, otherwise 
I would have left a while ago’. When discussing decisions made by the party’s 
executive, another added ‘If Ernest agrees with them, we follow. If he pulls out, we 
pull out’ (dis. 3, Bokin, 06/04/2018). This local control over the party branch illustrates 
the ‘power of proximity’ at play in Burkina Faso described by Stroh (2010), though his 
argument was focused on vote mobilisation rather than party organisation. These 
dynamics matter for the endurance of the party, which I will address further toward 
the end of this thesis (see Chapter 7).  
Conclusion 
This chapter’s focus has been limited to key dimensions of opposition parties’ 
internal organisation, feeding into a broader discussion of parties’ mobilisation 
strategies, such as political rallies (Paget 2018) or appearances at social events 
(funerals, weddings, church services) – a platform commonly used by politicians from 
all sides in Uganda (int. UG46, Soroti, 09/05/2018; int. UG73, Masaka, 18/05/2018).  
As I have argued in this chapter, opposition parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso 
have had to organise themselves facing a range of challenges, making it particularly 
difficult to set up local structures, a necessity to mobilise supporters and expand their 
grasp nationally. Parties’ central leadership have promoted the expansion of their local 
structures, with MPs and local figures playing an important role in setting up and 
maintaining branches. The financial resources of a party are intrinsically connected to 
its internal organisation, as funding is required to set up branches. MPs tend to be 
responsible for maintenance of the party structures in their constituency, giving them 
leverage over these structures and making MPs important stakeholders in the party – 
similarly to the findings of Osei (2016) in Ghana. Finally, decision-making processes 
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in all parties at hand tend to be top-down mechanisms, despite the existence of formal 
consultation processes. This obscures the role that local party elite can play, and the 
tensions that can exist if they contribute greatly to the party at the local level but have 
little power. It also overlooks the fact that activists and supporters themselves can 
express dissent toward central decisions, by shifting their loyalty.  
In a nutshell, local party elite, who can be branch officials, MPs, councillors (or all 
at once) can play an important role within parties. This is particularly the case when 
the local party elite have influence over the activists in their branch, and independent 
resources they can invest in the party and are therefore able to mobilise the local 
structures. While we often consider resources and directives to flow from the centre 
toward the periphery, it is crucial to consider the resources invested by local elite into 







Engaging the hybrid regime: what do opposition  
parties do? 
So far, we have seen what opposition parties are formed around (Chapter 4) and 
how they are built as organisations (Chapter 5), taking into consideration the 
constraints inherent to the hybrid regime they operate in (Chapter 3). We now turn our 
attention to what opposition parties actually do. What kinds of activities do they 
perform? What purpose do they serve?  
The limited scholarship on opposition parties’ activities tend to focus on their 
electoral strategies, such as the decision to contest or boycott the polls (Lindberg 
2006a), the building of electoral coalitions (Van de Walle 2006; Wahman 2011; 
Arriola 2013; Beardsworth 2018), or their campaign methods (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 
2010; Cheeseman & Larmer 2015; Paget 2018, 2019a). This has meant leaving aside 
other activities, both reflecting and feeding the perception that opposition parties 
become active around election time and then hibernate until the next electoral 
campaign starts. This perception is not completely misguided – opposition parties tend 
to have less resources to maintain branches and party offices outside election periods 
(e.g. Bob-Milliar 2012b: 680). Yet, some opposition parties are still active in other 
ways. They may sit in Parliament, local councils, and other institutions; they can 
organise consultations, press conferences and meetings with national and international 
stakeholders; they might challenge election results and controversial laws in court; or 
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they may sometimes organise or take part in protests. What do these actions amount 
to, and what can opposition parties achieve through them? How do some apparently 
contradictory tactics, such as taking part in elections and denouncing their fraudulent 
nature, intersect? This chapter addresses these questions by taking a broad and 
inductive approach about what these parties actually do on the ground.  
Most people I interviewed over the course of my fieldwork stated that the role of 
opposition parties in Uganda was, or should be, to provide alternative policy options, 
mobilise people around issues, and hold the government to account. Those 
expectations are in line with the traditional roles of opposition parties according to the 
liberal democratic model, from which most of the party literature has been derived and 
described in this thesis’s first chapter (Gunther & Diamond 2001; Erdmann 2004). 
Overall, (opposition) parties in African hybrid regimes only partially fulfil functions 
such as representation, integration, elite recruitment, and – in a very limited way – 
accountability facilitation (Randall & Svåsand 2002c) The very nature of the regime 
restricts their capacity and resources (see Chapter 3).  
Other scholars, such as Albrecht (2005), have considered the authoritarian nature 
of the regime, but focused on how opposition parties contributed to sustain it. 
Certainly, ‘briefcase’ parties or ‘alibi-candidates’ can provide the regime with a 
democratic cover, and real opposition parties can also inadvertently contribute to the 
survival of the regime they oppose by legitimising it or diffusing dissent. However, 
when looking at the cases of Burkina Faso and Uganda, it is clear that Museveni’s and 
Compaoré’s persistent hold on power has mainly been fuelled by other variables, such 
as the control of security forces (Kibandama 2008; Hilgers & Loada 2013: 194; 
Tapscott 2016), a strategic regional position making them agents of stability for the 
international community (Meunier 1998; Fisher 2014; Niang 2016), and fairly sizeable 
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support among the population’s rural majority fuelled by patronage (Loada 2006; 
Wilkins 2016). Looking at opposition parties’ role solely in terms of how they 
contribute to sustaining the regime is a narrow approach, which overlooks the other 
functions they can perform in such a context.  
Consequently, I investigate here the various ways opposition parties can engage the 
regime, and analyse what broader contribution this enables them to perform. Based 
upon the empirical evidence I gathered, I identified three key functions that opposition 
parties in Burkina Faso and Uganda can perform, and which are likely to be important 
within other hybrid regimes as well. Contrary to the functions addressed by authors 
such as Randall and Svåsand (2002a) or Albrecht (2005), and covered in Chapter 1, 
the functions I discuss here do not relate to sustaining the regime, but rather to 
opposing it. These functions are the denunciation of the regime; the mobilisation of 
dissent; and the preparation for succession. 
 Denunciation can be considered a limited version of horizontal accountability 
facilitation, in a context where the government is de facto unaccountable to their 
citizens. At the lowest level, denunciation is a way to embarrass the regime. As a 
UNIR-PS figure stated, ‘We were looking to piss Blaise Compaoré off, that’s it, and 
we were satisfied when we had pissed him off. We could do nothing, he controlled the 
situation, he knew all the tricks’ (int. BF28, Bokin, 06/04/2018). ‘Pissing off’ the 
incumbent and exposing the regime’s flaws were the least that powerless opposition 
parties could do at times of high repression and firm regime control. As such, it echoes 
what Jung and Shapiro (1995: 272) describe in a democratic setting as ‘asking 
awkward questions, shining light in dark places, and exposing abuses of power’.  
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The mobilisation of dissent broadens the mobilisation function described by 
Erdmann (2004: 67–68), which focuses largely on elections. In a hybrid regime, this 
mobilisation does not contribute to integrating people into the system, but on the 
contrary to fuelling dissent and keeping a certain level of pressure on the regime. A 
DP legislator explained the importance of having opposition MPs in the following 
way: 'At least being there in itself is important. Just the 15 of us in DP, joining others 
on the opposition to make about 60 of us, just our presence there is very important. It 
keeps the dream alive' (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016). ‘Keeping the dream alive’ is 
important to prevent political apathy in the face of the system and its abuses.  
Finally, succession refers to the preparation of an alternative by opposition parties, 
ready to take over after the fall of the current regime. It is related to both elite training 
and opposition moderation. Because of the existing constraints that they face, 
opposition parties may not be able to successfully topple the dictatorship despite their 
efforts at denouncing the regime and mobilising against it. However, they can still 
prepare themselves to take over when the opportunity arises. Successions within the 
regime, for example, are often a major challenge to the regime’s continued hegemony 
(Ottaway 2003: 159; Maltz 2007; Cheeseman 2010: 143), but to exploit this kind of 
opportunity, opposition parties must be organised and appear credible. 
Opposition parties have a broad range of activities at their disposal, from the classic 
political rally, studied in great depth by Paget (2018) to new forms of mobilisation 
through social media (Nyabola 2018; Dwyer & Molony 2019; Gadjanova et al. 2019; 
Hitchen et al. 2019). They sometimes control local governments (McLellan 2019), 
may sit in independent electoral commissions, and can introduce court challenges 
against election results and controversial laws. It is impossible to address them all 
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within the scope of a single chapter, and I therefore focus here on four principal 
approaches opposition parties used to engage the regime in Burkina Faso and Uganda.  
I start by discussing the boycott option, which has been used by opposition parties 
in both Burkina Faso and Uganda but later discarded. I then analyse how electoral 
campaigns allow opposition parties to denounce the regime and mobilise support, even 
though they are unlikely to (be allowed to) win the presidency or a legislative majority. 
Third, I analyse the actions of opposition legislators sitting in parliaments heavily 
dominated by the ruling party. Finally, I discuss the key role opposition parties play in 
organising anti-incumbent protests, a role often over-shadowed by their civil society 
counterparts, more prominent in the study of social movements. These four approaches 
provide a broad overview of opposition parties’ activities, both during and outside 
electoral cycles. Mobilisation strategies, like rallies or social media, can be used as 
part of these activities. For each of these approaches, I discuss how they contribute to 
performing the functions outlined above.  
6.1 Staying out: Election boycotts 
In both Uganda and Burkina Faso, boycott has been used as a strategy by opposition 
parties at some point but later dismissed. The boycott of elections refers to the decision 
of a political party or faction to refuse to take part in an election and to actively 
mobilise its supporters for non-participation. Scholars such as Beaulieu (2006), 
Lindberg (2006a), and Schedler (2009) have looked at why opposition parties choose 
to boycott and what effect boycott can have on democratisation outcomes and hybrid 
regimes. Opposition parties may choose to boycott elections they know are rigged to 
try and push for increased fairness in the long run, or they may use it as a strategy to 
mask their own weakness (Smith 2014: 749–750).  
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In Uganda, the DP called for a boycott of the 1996 legislative elections. This 
followed the defeat of its President Paul Ssemogerere in the presidential elections, held 
under the Movement system. Ssemogerere was running on behalf of a pro-
multipartyist alliance between the DP and UPC, the Inter-Political Forces for 
Cooperation (IPFC). He lost to Museveni with only 23.7% of the votes. The IPFC 
accused the regime of fraud in the presidential polls and withdrew most of its 
parliamentary candidates (Muhumuza 1997: 175). However, the alliance’s presidential 
campaign made serious strategic mistakes, such as overestimating the popular support 
for a return to multipartyism and not realising the fears and resentment toward Milton 
Obote’s UPC in some regions (Beardsworth 2018: 78). In spite of the boycott, some 
DP and UPC candidates still contested for legislative seats (idem). However, this 
decision to boycott the parliamentary elections has been a source of regret within the 
party, as it has been blamed for the DP’s atrophy. The current DP President Mao stated 
in 2014 that ‘DP boycotted the 1996 parliamentary elections and we lost most of our 
constituencies. We don’t want to repeat that mistake’ (New Vision 04/03/2014).  
While other factors have certainly played a part in explaining why the DP lost so 
much ground – including the ill-fated alliance with the UPC in the 1996 presidential 
polls, internal squabbles over leadership, or the decision not to front a candidate in 
2001 (see 3.2 and Beardsworth’s (2018) work) – this analysis has led to the 
abandonment of boycott as a strategy. Meanwhile, FDC flagbearer Besigye has said 
several times that running was pointless without electoral reform, but has nevertheless 
challenged Museveni in all four elections since 2001 (see 3.2). An FDC local official 
explained that Besigye was chosen as the party’s flagbearer despite his arguing against 
contesting, on the condition that he would abide by the party’s decision to take part in 
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the polls: ‘He had to come back to the ground and say OK, this is an electoral period 
so we have to go for election’ (int. UG70, Kasese, 17/05/2018).  
In Burkina Faso, opposition parties boycotted several elections between 1991 and 
2000. In the first presidential elections of the regime, held in 1991, opposition leaders 
refused to participate, in protest against Compaoré’s refusal to hold a national 
conference, like the one that occurred in neighbouring Benin (see Banégas 2003: 135–
171). Officially, Compaoré was re-elected unopposed with 86% of the vote, but with 
abstention reaching 75%. A law specialist explained that ‘the boycott of the 1991 
elections led President Compaoré to be ‘poorly-elected’, as some say his score was 
25%, and that he didn’t really have any legitimacy’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 
06/04/2017).  
Most of the opposition once again boycotted the 1998 presidential election. Two 
candidates appeared to run against Compaoré but openly supported the president and 
later joined his cabinet. They were ‘alibi-candidates’ (int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 
10/07/2018) whose role was to avoid the undemocratic outlook of a plebiscite-like 
election, as in 1991, even though Compaoré was similarly re-elected with 87.5% of 
the vote, with a turnout of 56%. The objective of the opposition’s boycott was to 
deprive Compaoré’s regime of a democratic legitimacy. A UNIR-PS leader explained:  
‘At some point we thought that by participating in elections, we would be 
cautioning him. People would believe that we had campaigned and that he had 
beaten us democratically. But we didn’t agree, it wasn’t true, he didn’t beat us 
democratically. But he did beat us anyway. So by boycotting, it was a form of 
resistance.’ (int. BF28, Bokin, 06/04/2018)  
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Many opposition parties also boycotted the local elections in 2000, arguing that, as a 
UNIR-PS MP stated, ‘then, the electoral commission was solely made up of known 
and acknowledged friends of the President, the voters’ registry was skewed, everybody 
already knew it was rigged’ (int. BF30, Ouagadougou, 10/04/2018).  
The boycott strategy in Burkina Faso was more efficient than in Uganda, as it did 
deprive Compaoré of legitimacy. Yet, ironically, it was the 1997 legislative elections 
– which opposition parties contested – which gave the ruling party a ‘monopolistic’ 
hold over the Parliament: with the CDP controlling 101 out of 111 seats, then deputy 
Secretary General of the CDP, Salif Diallo, admitted that ‘from an external point of 
view, it is rather embarrassing for a democracy’ (Loada 1998: 69). Still, with or 
without a boycott, such figures were indeed embarrassing, especially when foreign 
donors – on whom Burkina Faso was financially dependent – were demanding 
democratic reform as a condition for cooperation (Bolle 2001). This led foreign 
diplomats, and especially the French ambassador at the time, to intervene and convince 
the opposition that it was time for opposition parties to fully participate in elections 
(int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018).  
While some people believe this boycott strategy was useful in exposing the 
regime’s undemocratic nature and bringing about some reforms, they also realised that, 
as a journalist put it, ‘some things remain the government and ruling elite’s 
prerogatives. It is therefore more pertinent to go and sit in decision-making institutions 
like the National Assembly, so as to have an eye there and to influence policies’ (int. 
BF02, Ouagadougou, 17/03/2017). The boycott of the 2000 local elections, for 
example, allowed the ruling CDP to control all the municipal councils, which have the 
authority to allow or ban demonstrations. As the same journalist argued, in the context 
of the social movement that followed the assassination of journalist Norbert Zongo, 
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this proved an obstacle to later organising protests. Opposition parties therefore 
decided to take part in the 2002 elections, benefitting from the electoral reform 
Compaoré had been forced to concede following the ‘Zongo Affair’ crisis.  
In both countries, boycott has been discarded as a strategy for several reasons. First 
and foremost, some stakeholders have argued that it was ineffective. As a DP MP 
argued for the Ugandan case: ‘Museveni is shameless. He isn’t somebody who will get 
embarrassed just because you have boycotted an election’ (int. UG89, Constituency, 
2016). Similarly in Burkina Faso, a PDS-Metba activist argued that an empty-chair 
policy ‘can work in a democracy, but here it worked for the power, the military regime 
did not care about it’ (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017). If the regime has other 
sources of legitimacy than democratic-looking elections – e.g. control of the armed 
forces, strategic weight vis-à-vis foreign donors, development projects – an electoral 
boycott is unlikely to bring about a regime change, or even electoral reform.  
A Ugandan researcher also argued that, ‘Even if you boycotted ... the ruling party 
will manufacture one or two other parties to compete against it’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 
07/12/2016) to satisfy international demands for democratic credentials – just like 
Compaoré did in the 1998 elections. In 2009, there were 33 registered parties in 
Uganda (Makara 2009: 67), while Burkina Faso counted some 137 (CGD 2009: 27) – 
well above the handful represented in each national parliament. Many of these 
organisations can be considered ‘briefcase parties’ existing solely on paper and aiming 
at obtaining funding from the state, or even proxies of the ruling party (CGD 2009: 27; 
Makara 2010: 45). In Burkina Faso, Compaoré also actively co-opted opposition 
parties into taking part in elections in exchange for various inducements: the ADF-
RDA was therefore convinced to break away from the G14 opposition coalition in 
2000 and field candidates in the local elections, in exchange for positions in a broad-
197 
 
based government. Similarly, a section of the Sankarist CPS, led by its president Ernest 
Nongma Ouédraogo, went against the boycott call on the eve of the polls. This 
effectively led to the scission of the CPS, with Bénéwendé Sankara and his supporters 
– who had defended the boycott – creating the UNIR-MS.  
Meanwhile, the lack of coordination between opposition parties creates a zero-sum-
game situation where no party is willing to take the risk of boycotting the institutions 
because they are afraid another party will use this opportunity to supplant them. 
Lindberg (2006a: 128) noted that ‘even when it comes to protesting against an 
incumbent (as opposed to uniting for a common platform in electoral alliance), 
opposition forces cannot unite’. The individual decision to boycott by one party may 
be perceived by another as an opportunity to consolidate its base. An FDC activist, for 
example, argued that ‘if FDC did not participate […] we were not sure that DP would 
not come to fill the gap. During presidential elections, small candidates contested but 
were in fact sponsored by NRM. If we stepped down, some other people could have 
taken our place’ (int. UG20, Mukono, 15/11/2016). This echoes the work of 
Beardsworth (2016: 756) on opposition coalition-building. She argues that intra-
opposition competition for the same anti-incumbent pool of voters is a key factor 
undermining coalition-building between opposition parties. In my view, the same logic 
also prevents a common boycott strategy.  
The issue of boycott is divisive within parties as well, as MPs at the individual level 
have an interest in keeping their seat and sometimes decide to compete anyway 
(Carbone 2008: 111). Competition and manoeuvring, both among parties and between 
factions of one party, therefore make it difficult for opposition parties to work together 
and present a united front, either as an electoral coalition, or through a united call for 
boycott. On that subject, a UNIR-PS leader shared a telling – though maybe 
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embellished – anecdote from the 1991 election in Burkina Faso, for which the three 
main opposition leaders at the time – Ernest Nongma Ouédraogo, Gérard Kango, and 
Hermann Yaméogo – had agreed to boycott in the election. But, she said:  
‘as there was distrust [among them], each prepared their candidacy registration, 
and each went to stand in a corner of the courthouse, to be able to see the 
entrance doors. If one saw another coming forward with his registration, the 
others would have filed theirs too, and they waited like that until the last hour.’ 
(int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018)  
Ultimately, the decision to discard the boycott strategy was about surviving as 
political parties. In addition to the regime’s attempt to manufacture a fake opposition, 
and to other parties’ seizing the opportunity to expend their networks, which I have 
already mentioned, parties also feared losing their meagre resources and local support 
if they were not seen as active organisations. As a PDS-Metba activist in Burkina Faso 
said, ‘by continuing to boycott, parties were going to disappear; they had to 
participate to promote themselves and continue to exist’ (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 
27/04/2017). By boycotting elections, opposition parties were denouncing the 
regime’s flaws, but the strategy proved unsuccessful and too risky, which led them to 
reconsider and decide to take part in elections. 
6.2 Running: Electoral campaigns 
Electoral campaigns provide opposition parties with rare opportunities to reach out 
to voters across the country, down to the grassroots. This is especially important in a 
context of high repression described in Chapter 1 where political activities are 
generally heavily restricted. A DP MP indeed argued that ‘The only time when we can 
talk to the people around the country is during elections’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 
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04/10/2016). An FDC leader corroborated that ‘elections are the easiest way to reach 
people’ especially in the countryside: ‘In urban areas, people have access to the 
media, but in rural areas, the only way to reach people is through meetings and rallies’ 
(int. UG20, Mukono, 15/11/2016). The same is true in Burkina Faso, where elections 
also provided opposition parties with an opportunity to criss-cross the country to 
spread their ideas. ‘Being able to campaign meant to go to the grassroots, which wasn’t 
easy’, a UNIR-PS leader argued, adding that though their means were far behind those 
of the ruling party, it was important to ‘be able to go to the grassroots and defend the 
ideas we were fighting for’ (int. BF39, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018).  
As discussed previously, the use of social media has become increasing widespread 
in recent years across Africa (Dwyer and Molony (eds) 2019), and may shift these 
dynamics in future elections. However, existing research has shown that social 
networks complement rather than replace traditional forms of mobilisation – such as 
rallies and door-to-door campaigning – and still requires a network of activists on the 
ground. In Burkina Faso, social media registration rates are relatively low compared 
to neighbouring countries (Saidou 2019), and while social networks – in particular 
Facebook – have been used during the mobilisation that led to the 2014 insurrection, 
their impact should not be exaggerated (Sawadogo 2017: 87). In Uganda, Chibita 
(2016) has shown that digital activism has been curtailed by the government, 
especially during protests and elections. In July 2018, the Ugandan parliament passed 
the ‘Over-The-Top’ bill, more commonly known as the Social Media Tax bill: it 
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imposed a USh200 daily tax44 to be able to use a range of mobile applications, 
including Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp (Wired 19/07/2018).45  
Over the course of my research in Uganda and, more so, in Burkina Faso, social 
media did not emerge as a factor that significantly affected the way parties were 
organised – though it appears to be changing fast, as illustrated by the mobilisation 
strategy employed by Bobi Wine in Uganda (Ephraim 27/08/2018). Moreover, 
Gadjanova et al. (2019: 13) have shown that contrary to expectations, social media 
does not necessarily help to close the gap between larger and smaller parties, and on 
the contrary has increased the costs of campaigning. This means that even though 
social media can increase opposition parties’ ability to reach out to citizens outside of 
electoral cycles and their capacity to mobilise support, elections still provide a valuable 
opportunity to convey their message. 
Elections provide such an opportunity for several reasons. First, many interviewees 
stated that they were freer to conduct activities around elections that at other times. 
For example, an FDC activist said that ‘if now [Besigye] came to Soroti and said he 
wanted to talk to the people, he would be blocked, tear-gassed [whereas] when there 
is an election, he’s fairly free to go and talk’ (int. UG48, Soroti, 09/05/2018). This 
does not mean that repression ceases altogether during campaigns. Indeed, in the most 
recent elections held in February 2016, a large number of opposition campaign rallies 
were either banned by the police under POMA or violently repressed when they went 
 
44 £0.04 (July 2018). 
45 Museveni proclaimed this was aimed at discouraging ‘gossip’ and ‘idle talk’, but opposition and 
civil society activists have denounced it as an attempt to curtail free speech. This sparked a protest led 
by Bobi Wine, but also led to a massive reduction of subscription to these services, though many people 
may have resorted to VPNs to circumvent the tax (The Guardian 27/02/2019; DW 21/07/2019).  
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ahead anyway. Besigye, in particular, was repeatedly arrested and detained, only to be 
released without charge later (Nkuubi 2016: 427).  
Second, election cycles provide fundraising opportunities for political parties, 
which enables them to conduct more activities than outside electoral campaigns. 
Parties and candidates themselves receive donations from family, friends, and business 
operatives to contribute to their campaign costs (Golooba-Mutebi 2017: 9–10). In 
Burkina Faso, all presidential candidates also receive an equal amount of public 
funding, though this amount is far below the real costs of a competitive campaign 
(Loada 2006: 26). In Uganda, however, a similar provision was abolished in 
September 2015 (EU EOM 2016: 18).  
Campaigns give opposition parties a platform to speak to voters, as a way to 
mobilise but also to educate and sensitise them. A DP MP stated that during 
campaigns, ‘the opposition has to explain the political environment, how it is 
impossible to win an elections; it is a front to advance the cause, to try to change how 
people think’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 04/10/2016). This echoes the survey findings of 
Conroy-Krutz (2016), who argued that the 2011 electoral campaign in Uganda was a 
learning opportunity as citizens’ exposure to parties’ electoral activities – e.g. door-to-
door canvassing, political communications, and politicised media content – increased 
their knowledge on candidates, office holders, and institutions, including among 
groups who usually had less access to such knowledge, such as women, rural dwellers, 
and poorer or less educated people. Opposition activists therefore use campaign events 
as opportunities to denounce the regime’s authoritarian practices. As an FDC activist 
put it, ‘We believe that by the time we go to elections, we shall have time – two or three 
months before the elections – to go around the country telling people about the evils 
of the government’ (int. UG51, Soroti, 10/05/2018). This message may be reinforced 
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by the repression they suffer. Indeed, the disruption of campaign rallies by security 
forces and the repeated arrests of opposition leaders – including presidential candidates 
such as Besigye – give credit to their denunciation of the regime’s authoritarian nature 
(Nkuubi 2016).  
Running in elections also gives opposition parties an opportunity to expose electoral 
malpractices themselves. As a UNIR-PS leader argued, it gave the opposition 
arguments to demonstrate ‘the non-democratic situation of these elections which are 
repeated and are systematically won by the same person’ (int. BF40, Ouagadougou, 
10/07/2018). In Uganda, this was further demonstrated by systematic legal challenges 
of election results, both at the presidential and parliamentary levels. Admittedly, the 
tight deadline (ten days) to file the court challenge and fact that the heavy burden of 
proof rests on the petitioner makes it very difficult for the opposition to obtain the 
invalidation of the results at the presidential level. In addition, the Supreme Court 
judges seem to have ‘feared upsetting President Museveni’ and gave in to pressure 
from the executive. This led to contradictory judgements which admitted the 
occurrence of frauds but considered they were not substantial enough to warrant 
cancelling the results (Kabumba 2016).  
After Besigye unsuccessfully petitioned against the re-election of Museveni in 2001 
and 2006, he decided to abandon court challenges and focus on an activist denunciation 
of fraudulent elections, through the Walk-to-Work protest in 2011 and the Defiance 
campaign in 2016 (see Section 6.4). In 2016, Besigye was placed under house arrest 
on Election Day for 43 days, effectively preventing him from filing a petition, even if 
he had intended to. It was Mbabazi, the third-placed presidential candidate with only 
1.4% of the vote, who challenged the results. The Court once again dismissed the 
challenge and upheld the results (Kabumba 2016). Even if court challenges at the 
203 
 
presidential level are unlikely to be successful – Kenya and Malawi providing 
unexpected exceptions in recent years – it can be argued that they are still useful as 
they contribute to illustrate the regime’s lack of legitimacy. As Twinomugisha (2016: 
450) writes:  
‘By presenting the evidence of malpractices in court, the petitioner exposed 
Museveni’s victory as hollow. It also exposed the judges who fear to exercise 
their judicial independence boldly and creatively and are interested in 
maintaining the status quo where the Constitution and electoral rules are violated 
with impunity’.  
Moreover, court petitions have had some success at the parliamentary level in 
Uganda, with the invalidation of the 2016 election of at least ten MPs on account of 
voter bribery or lack of required academic qualification leading to by-elections for 
these seats – not an insignificant outcome for opposition parties which tend to be more 
competitive in by-elections (Perrot 2014: 438).  
In Burkina Faso, court challenges have been less frequent, partly because voters 
may fear to denounce malpractices (CGD 2008: 31) and because courts were seen as 
deeply corrupt and co-opted by the regime (Harsch 2017: 166–169). In 2010, four 
opposition candidates challenged the election’s outcome in court, on the basis that 
voter’s cards did not conform to the law – they did not bear the place and full date of 
birth of the voter as required. The Constitutional Court dismissed the case (le faso.net 
04/12/2010). In 2012, the UPC introduced 21 challenges concerning the legislative 
election results, mainly regarding results from polling stations in the Kadiogo 
Province. The Constitutional Court however dismissed the case, not even bothering to 




In summary, opposition parties participate in unfair elections as a way to reach and 
mobilise people across the country, sensitise them about the regime’s authoritarian 
nature, and shed light on repressive and fraudulent practices. While they may not come 
to power through the ballot box, they do gain entry in institutions such as parliament 
– yet another mobilisation and denunciation platform. 
6.3 Sitting: Opposition MPs 
With the discard of electoral boycotts, opposition parties gained representation in 
institutions such as the legislature, local governments, and other committees – albeit 
in rather small numbers.  
A few authors have made impressive contributions to our understanding of how 
opposition parties have engaged with devolution processes, and the constraints they 
face within local governments, such as McLellan (2019) in Tanzania, Lambright 
(2014) in Uganda, Waddilove (2019) in Kenya, or Barry and Hagberg (2019) in 
Burkina Faso. Local councillors in Burkina Faso and Uganda told me that by 
participating in, and sometimes controlling, local governments, they could gain 
experience (int. UG80, Masaka, 19/05/2018) and deliver services to the population 
(dis. 4, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018; int. UG69, Kasese, 17/05/2018). A DP councillor also 
argued that their performance at the local level could demonstrate what their party 
could do more broadly: ‘we are trying to give people an example of what DP can do 
when it gets state power’ (int. UG79, Masaka, 19/05/2018).  
However, my focus here is on the national legislature in each country. The role of 
opposition MPs within parliaments heavily dominated by the ruling party has received 
little attention. Yet, it is an important institution, and findings about the role of the 
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opposition in this national arena can certainly inform our understanding of the 
opposition’s action at lower levels.  
The ruling party’s dominance over the parliamentary arena obviously restricts the 
capacity of opposition MPs. In the Ugandan parliament, Museveni’s NRM currently 
occupies 306 seats. If we combine the four other parties represented in this Parliament 
(the FDC, DP, UPC, and JEEMA), they only amount to sixty MPs. This is even less 
than the number of independent MPs46 – a large number of which are NRM-leaning 
politicians who lost the party primaries but still contested the parliamentary election 
(see Wilkins 2018). In Burkina Faso, the ruling party ODP-MT, turned into the CDP 
in 1996, was ultra-dominant throughout the 1990s after its incorporation of various 
smaller parties. This culminated in 1997 with the CDP winning 101 out of the 111 
parliamentary seats. Even though the opposition made gains in subsequent elections, 
Compaoré co-opted the ADF-RDA to regain control over the National Assembly (see 
3.1).  
Benefitting from two-third majorities, both Compaoré and Museveni have been able 
to pass legislation suiting them, even when it was widely unpopular. Indeed, in 2018, 
Ugandan MPs passed the Age Limit Bill which removed the minimum and maximum 
age threshold to stand for election – therefore enabling Museveni to stand for a sixth 
time in 2021. This occurred despite widespread opposition among the population47, so 
 
46 These figures were shared by the EC and are accurate as of 1 November 2018. They differ from 
parliamentary results from 2016, as they take into account a series of by-elections which took place 
since then for various reasons (court challenge, seat vacant, new constituency or district). These figures 
exclude representatives of the Ugandan Police and Defence Forces (UPDF) and Ex-Officio members, 
as they are unelected, but do include indirectly elected representatives of special interest groups 
(workers, youth, persons with disabilities).  
47 An opinion survey conducted by a Ugandan company, Research World International, in October 
2016 found that 73% of the respondents thought that the constitution should not be amended to allow a 
person over 75 years old to contest for President (UNNGOF 2016: 27). 
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much that even NRM MPs had to be induced with both money and an extension of 
their current term by two years to vote for it48 (New Vision 26/07/2018). In Burkina 
Faso, the leader of a small opposition party argued that ‘in 2014, if there hadn’t been 
the popular insurrection, the National Assembly would have voted the modification of 
the Constitution’ (int. BF10, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017) – an hypothesis widely 
shared, which led protestors to storm and burn down the parliament to physically 
prevent the vote from taking place (Burkina 24 30/10/2014). 
 The capacity of opposition MPs (or lack thereof) to influence policies and make 
the government accountable is also informed by the independence and capacity of the 
legislature itself vis-à-vis the executive. The Ugandan Parliament was considered 
among the strongest legislative institutions on the continent during the Movement era 
(Barkan (ed.) 2009). Despite its paradoxical taming since the return to multipartyism 
(Keating 2011; Goodfellow 2014), it has retained a certain assertiveness (Collord 
2016). The Ugandan legislature is characterised by a high number of independent MPs 
who make up 15% of the legislators, reducing parties’ ability to control the debates. 
Even the NRM caucus is a weak institution, illustrated by Museveni’s need to regularly 
buy the support of his own MPs (Collord 2016), though their bargaining power is 
diminished by a high turnover and ever-growing campaign expenditures, which make 
them more vulnerable to financial inducement (Wilkins 2018: 11).  
Some Ugandan MPs interviewed argued that they had been able to influence 
policies. For example, an FDC MP stated: ‘Sometimes it does not look like the 
opposition is making any headway, but sometimes the pushing, the pressure the 
opposition puts on the ruling party makes the ruling party to bend a bit, and they have 
 
48 The parliamentary term extension was struck down by the Supreme Court.  
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been bending’ (int. UG27, Kampala, 24/11/2016). The MP gave specific examples of 
the Juba talks between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in 
2006, and of the holding of the 2005 referendum over a return to multipartyism, which, 
she claimed, opposition pressure in parliament contributed to make happen. However, 
this positive view of what the opposition can achieve through these means is not shared 
across the board, and the party’s flagbearer Besigye himself is generally very 
dismissive of parliamentary politics. Furthermore, it is debatable how much these 
decisions can really be attributed to opposition pressure. The reintroduction of 
multipartyism in 2005, for example, worked in Museveni’s interest as it enabled him 
to remain in control of the transition process, to purge the NRM of opponents, 
including Besigye, and to remove term limits at the same time (Makara et al. 2009; 
Keating 2011).  
Yet, even though they may not be able to block legislation when it comes to a vote, 
opposition MPs may still play an oversight role, especially in terms of shedding light 
on policy-making and opening debates over some issues. Indeed, sitting in parliament 
provides the opposition with some protected space to call out the regime and expose 
the government, and with visibility when doing so. MPs have some kind of immunity 
to express their views, in a way ordinary citizens cannot – a dynamic that transpired 
throughout the data collection, during which local activists attached more importance 
to anonymity than MPs and party officials. A DP MP explained that ‘Parliament is a 
platform, it gives immunity for what we say’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 04/10/2016). 
Opposition MPs use it to move motions, engage in debates, and hold press conferences. 
An FDC mobiliser, who unsuccessfully ran for parliament in 2016, also argued ‘When 
I am a Member of Parliament, government gives me respect. I am given a car and I 
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am given a right to go and talk to people. […] If I am not an MP and I try to mobilise 
people they call it an illegal rally’ (int. UG51, Soroti, 10/05/2018).  
Opposition parties can also play an (albeit limited) oversight role. As the main 
opposition party, FDC gets to appoint a Leader of Opposition in Parliament (LOP) to 
head a Shadow Cabinet. The LOP position was created by the Constitutional 
Amendment of 2005 that reinstated multipartyism, though a similar position had 
existed under Obote’s two regimes. The LOP’s purpose is to provide leadership and 
act as a spokesperson for opposition MPs, and to present alternative policies to those 
of government. The shadow cabinet includes MPs from other opposition parties as 
well as independents. Unlike the CFOP institution in Burkina Faso, which is rooted in 
parliamentary representation but whose mandate goes beyond the legislative arena, the 
LOP in Uganda has no real clout outside of the legislature (int. UG70, Kasese, 
17/05/2018).  
The LOP is appointed by the main opposition party, namely the FDC, following a 
decision by the party’s NEC. The first LOP, appointed in 2006, was Morris Ogenga 
Latigo, an MP from Acholi. Latigo failed to get re-elected in the 2011 elections, which 
saw the NRM make inroads in Northern Uganda (Daily Monitor 20/02/2011). He was 
replaced as LOP by Nathan Nandala Mafabi, an MP hailing from the Eastern region. 
Amidst tensions within the FDC between Mafabi and newly-elected party president 
Muntu – who had defeated Mafabi in the internal election – he was removed from the 
post in 2013 and replaced by Philip Wafula Oguttu (Uganda Radio Network 
04/02/2014). Oguttu lost his seat in the 2016 election and was replaced as LOP by the 
Kasese District Woman MP, Winnie Kiiza. In 2018, following the breakaway of the 
Muntu faction from the FDC, Kiiza was replaced by the Woman MP from Gulu 
District, Betty Aol Ochan, in a process marred by miscommunication and internal 
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conflict (New Vision 05/08/2018). The appointment as LOP appears to recognise the 
political weight of certain regions within the party, but also the factionalism at play 
within the FDC. 
The opposition also heads the three accountability committees in Parliament: the 
Public Accounts Committee; the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities 
and State Enterprises; and the Committee on Local Government Accounts. The 
Parliament’s oversight function has been deemed weak because committees work 
slowly and their recommendations are often ignored by state institutions, making the 
Parliament not so effective, despite a strong and enabling legal framework (Titriku 
2020: 93). Yet, in the words of a Kampala-based civil society figure, ‘Weak as it is, 
[opposition parties] still provide this platform: they help to raise concerns on 
government excesses, they run oversight committees, they raise issues for reform and 
accountability’ (int. UG26, Kampala, 21/11/2016), even if these accountability 
committees have limited capacity (Collord 2016: 648). This oversight role is also 
carried out more informally, by voicing disagreement and raising issues. In this vein, 
a DP MP summarised her role as follows: ‘We are watchdogs. Yes, we cannot win 
when it comes to voting in Parliament, but you can look at the debates we put up. And 
when we talk, the country hears. This is important that there are still some sane voices 
coming out of that house' (int. UG89, Constituency, 2016).  
In contrast, the National Assembly of Burkina Faso under Compaoré was much 
more subservient to the executive. Until 2002, the ruling party, originally known as 
the ODP-MT, routinely swallowed small parties to ensure its hegemony, culminating 
with the formation of the CDP in 1996, becoming ‘an “ultra” majority party’ (Harsch 
2017: 123). After the 2002 elections, it relied on the support of the ADF-RDA and 
smaller parties belonging to the ‘presidential current’ (idem: 134). In the words of a 
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young opposition activist, ‘MPs from the Majority were controlled remotely’ by the 
executive (int. BF11, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017), while a law scholar similarly argued 
that ‘party discipline was such that these MPs could not be expected to hold a position 
different from what the executive wanted’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). 
Meanwhile, the controlling power of parliamentary commissions have been described 
as ‘broadly fictitious’ because of the ruling party’s influence and disruption from the 
Ministry of Justice (Delavallade 2007: 284).  
When opposition MPs entered the National Assembly in large numbers in 2002, it 
appeared to shake the legislature: a UNIR-PS member of Parliament argued that  
‘for the first time the population was interested in parliamentary debates. Before 
that, [MPs] were just people who went to sleep in the House, but after 2002 […] 
a number of figures gave importance to the parliamentary debates.’ (int. BF30, 
Ouagadougou, 10/04/2018)  
The same MP also argued that opposition legislators headed inquiry commissions that 
helped to shed light on corrupt practices, for example in the health sector and in the 
attribution of public contracts, though the real impact of this oversight has been 
limited, as previously stated (Delavallade 2007).  
Other people have argued that, while opposition parties had attempted to take part 
in processes at first, they had ended up being demoralised. As a young UNIR-PS 
official argued:  
‘at the beginning, [opposition MPs] were speaking out and everybody applauded. 
But there is a vote in the end, and two cannot vote against one hundred. 




The role of opposition MPs then becomes one of relaying information outside of the 
parliamentary arena, to enable public debate and inform mobilisation through other 
means. Most stakeholders described their action in these terms: opposition legislators 
had access to ‘internal’ information about policies and governance and could serve as 
‘informants’. Indeed, a civil society leader argued that ‘We must not desert the 
National Assembly because it allows us to get the information out’ (int. BF06, 
Ouagadougou, 28/03/2017), while another stated that ‘at least it made it possible to 
open up the internal political debate to public opinion’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 
06/04/2017).  
This linkage role between the National Assembly and the broader opposition has 
been strengthened by a particular institution known as the CFOP since 2009. Its 
acronym stands for ‘Chef de File de l’Opposition Politique’ in French (literally ‘head 
of rank’ of the political opposition), making this standing that of a convenor and 
spokesperson rather than a leader. Moreover, it designates not only a person – the 
president of the largest opposition party – but also a formal framework for all 
opposition parties. The position is held by the leader of the opposition party with the 
most seats in the National Assembly, which means that the CFOP is not necessarily a 
parliamentarian themselves, but their legitimacy is grounded in their party’s weight in 
the legislature.  
The CFOP as an institution, on the other hand, gathers all political parties registered 
in the opposition, including those without parliamentary representation. Within this 
framework, MPs were considered the opposition’s ‘ambassadors in the Parliament: 
they brought us back information and expressed discontent by leaving the room 
[during parliamentary debates]. They were truly the intermediaries between the 
CFOP and the Parliament’, in the words of a UPC official (int. BF15, Ouagadougou, 
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11/01/2018). The way it was set up meant the CFOP was rooted in the legislature yet 
not restricted by it, and could have a broader role in the political sphere (see Chapter 7). 
Entering parliament can be a double-edge sword, especially for parties denouncing 
the government’s poor governance and projecting a ‘clean’ image. In Burkina Faso, 
notably, opposition MPs have been tarnished by corruption scandals and for happily 
enjoying the perks awarded to them while claiming to defend probity. A civil society 
figure made the following statement:  
‘These parties pretended to be clean enough, but when they got into Parliament 
and these stories came out about the FCFA3 million [each MP] received to 
celebrate [the winter holidays], people weren’t angry towards the CDP – those 
are the CDP’s habits – but towards those who were pretending to embody change 
while sustaining the same practices.’ (int. BF04, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017)  
Their counterparts in Uganda have at times tried to avoid this issue, for example in the 
2018 age-limit debate when some MPs publicly refused to receive USh29 million49 to 
hold consultation meetings – which they denounced as a bribe50 (The Observer 
27/10/2017). 
Overall, the opposition’s participation in the legislature has a range of benefits for 
the parties’ involved. As we have seen, by sitting in parliament, opposition parties gain 
a platform and a status, enabling them to denounce the regime. This status gives them 
more leeway to hold rallies – though they may still be prevented from doing so, as the 
case of Bobi Wine demonstrates (Daily Monitor 03/09/2018). It also provides them 
with a position of authority, from which they can hold press conferences and are likely 
 
49 Around £6,000 (October 2017). 
50 Though others preferred to keep the money and vowed to spend it on their constituency’s demands 
such as health and education infrastructure and equipment.  
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to be interviewed by the media. For example, in Uganda, the LOP and the Shadow 
Cabinet have regular press conferences during which they tackle the government’s 
actions (Uganda Radio Network 31/03/2020).  
Opposition parties also gain financial resources through their representation in 
parliament: a fixed share of MPs’ wages go into the party’s coffers and they tend to 
support the party’s structures and activities in their constituency using their 
parliamentary income and benefits, while state funding for political parties is 
calculated based upon parliamentary representation. This feeds their mobilisation 
capacity. Taking part in the state’s institutions, such as sitting in parliament, occupying 
positions in the shadow cabinet or in oversight committees, is also a way for opposition 
parties to present themselves as credible successors to the incumbent. These activities 
provide MPs with the opportunity to get experience and a local status. They develop 
an understanding of how governing works and acquire practical skills useful to conduct 
parliamentary activities. Indeed, an FDC legislator stated: ‘[then FDC party president] 
Muntu says the regime will collapse and we need to continue to train, in order to be 
ready. […] We need to prepare ourselves to govern.’ (int. UG29, Kampala, 
05/12/2016).  
Opposition parliamentarians also obtain a status in their constituency through their 
position as an MP, and their ability to reinvest financial and political capital back into 
their community. Through these means, they build their credibility as an alternative 
governing elite. An activist from the People’s Development Party (PDP), a smaller 
opposition party in Uganda, argued that ‘As opposition we need to increase the 
numbers in parliament and build a larger local government control. We can groom 
people to become MPs and then challenge Museveni’ (int. UG49, Soroti, 10/05/2018). 
In both countries, legislators have argued that by putting up debates and moving 
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motions in parliament, they are able to expose some of the regime’s faults and mobilise 
dissent within and outside the parliament. They can also provide an alternative 
narrative, even if there are too few of them to actually win a parliamentary vote. In the 
end, it is all about occupying a space which is available, so that, as a DP politician puts 
it, ‘you don’t allow the state to take everything’ (int. UG17, Kampala, 04/10/2016).  
These findings echo the argument made by Loidolt and Mecham (2016: 998) about 
opposition parties in Egypt, in which they argue that even within ‘rubber-stamp’ 
parliaments, opposition MPs can ‘gain both short- and long- term benefits’ such as 
monitoring the government’s performance, gaining popular legitimacy, collecting 
information, benefitting from protection, and projecting a political agenda.  
6.4 Marching: Anti-incumbent protests 
While opposition parties have participated in the regime’s institutions – including 
elections and the legislature – they have also engaged in mobilising against the 
institutions. One way of doing so has been to mount legal challenges against laws or 
practices. Uganda recently provided a successful example when the Supreme Court 
struck down POMA, a law passed in 2013 routinely used by the regime to ban 
opposition rallies and meetings (Chapter Four 29/03/2020). However, such challenges 
are constrained by the (real or perceived) lack of independence often characterising 
the courts (Twinomugisha 2016; Harsch 2017: 166–169).  
Another way to mobilise against the institutions is through protests and civil 
disobedience. Protests may take many forms, and involve more than ‘marching’. But 
the most prominent forms of protests in both Uganda and Burkina Faso have involved 
people taking to the streets in demonstrations. The 2011 Walk-to-Work movement in 
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Uganda led analysts to talk about ‘political walking’ (Branch & Mampilly 2015), and 
more recent protests led by Besigye or Bobi Wine usually involved rallies and 
impromptu marches (The Observer 07/11/2019). In Burkina Faso, the largest protest 
movements against the Compaoré regime have involved marches organised by either 
trade unions, student organisations, or opposition parties.  
In the context of hybrid regimes, opposition parties have to push the boundaries of 
the political space they have, at risk of being pushed back violently by the state. Indeed, 
protest in hybrid regimes can be outrightly banned, or violently repressed – sometimes 
leading to fatalities among protestors. As Branch and Mampilly (2015: 6) have 
observed, ‘it is indisputable that, again and again, protests across Africa seem unable 
to effect substantive reform in national politics despite their success in bringing tens 
of thousands of people into the streets’. Yet, Burkina Faso provides a striking example 
of what protests can achieve. Even when protests ultimately fail to achieve their stated 
objectives, they can have a lasting impact on a country’s political dynamics and 
consciousness (Branch & Mampilly 2015). 
Contrary to the institutional approaches we discussed so far, protests can be 
performed by other actors than just political parties. In particular, civil society has been 
a prominent actor that received much attention in the democratisation processes of the 
late twentieth century (Bratton 1989; Lewis 1992; Harbeson et al. 1994; Bratton & 
Van de Walle 1997). Civil society is a broad concept that has been diversely 
interpreted (see Seteolu & Okuneye 2018). I borrow here its definition by Diamond 
(1994: 5) as ‘the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, 
(largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a 
set of shared rules’. In this dissertation, civil society includes a range of organisations, 
from trade unions to domestic NGOs and community associations.  
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In Uganda, the succession of repressive regimes and the absence of a history of 
corporatism or ideological battles have left a certain void. The trade union movement 
has been completely co-opted by the NRM regime (Barya 2010). Meanwhile the legal 
framework governing NGOs has forced an otherwise active and diverse civil society 
to work in a mostly apolitical and technical manner (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 120; 
Nassali 2016: 282; Tripp 2018: 91), though more recently, a few human rights 
organisations have organised to promote civil liberties and good governance, 
illustrated by the court action against POMA (The Guardian 28/03/2020; see 3.3).  
In contrast, the Burkinabè civil society has long been more vibrant, politically 
engaged, and ideologically driven. The Sankarist revolution obviously left its mark on 
the Burkinabè elite, but activists – especially in the labour movement – also draw from 
a longer history of successful mobilisation (Kabeya Muase 1989). Yet these 
organisations have often shown mistrust and contempt toward opposition parties and 
have been wary of being instrumentalised.  
Opposition parties in Burkina Faso and, even more so, in Uganda have played a key 
role in leading and coordinating protests against the Compaoré and Museveni regimes. 
In Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s regime was faced with a long series of social 
movements. Three episodes are particularly interesting to unpack in terms of the 
implication for opposition parties, as this demonstrates a progressive ‘coming of age’ 
of the Burkinabè political opposition: the 1999 mobilisation following the 
assassination of journalist Norbert Zongo (‘Trop c’est trop’), the 2011 wave of 
mutinies and protests that ended with the failed ‘Blaise Dégage’ rally (hereafter the 
2011 crisis), and the 2013-2014 series of marches and rallies against the creation of a 
Senate and the modification of the Constitution’s Article 37 culminating in the ousting 
of Compaoré on 30 October 2014 (the 2014 insurrection).  
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The ‘Trop c’est trop’ movement in 1999 was spearheaded by a Collectif made up 
of three opposition streams: the radical trade unions and associations influenced by the 
clandestine, Marxist-Leninist Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire Voltaïque (PCRV), 
less politicised associations of intellectuals (lawyers, medical doctors, academics, 
etc.), and finally a dozen opposition parties. The radical civil society was the real driver 
of the coalition – illustrated by the fact that the Collectif’s President and Vice-President 
both came from its ranks. The assassination of Norbert Zongo brought these groups 
together for the first time for two reasons: it forced so-called apolitical NGOs working 
on democracy promotion in broad terms to become more engaged now that the regime 
had shown its true colours, and it led the more radical organisations to agree to work 
with political parties they did not really trust (Loada 1999). Most opposition politicians 
at that time had been discredited by their association with Compaoré at one time or 
another, and they saw this movement as an opportunity to bounce back (Loada 1999; 
Sanou 2010). The movement indeed forced the executive to conduct some reforms, 
including a change of the electoral code which enabled opposition parties to get a 
record number of seats in the 2002 legislative elections. 
The 2011 crisis was much less cohesive than Trop c’est trop. As described earlier, 
it was a disparate series of protests and mutinies affecting a range of social sectors (see 
3.1). Contrary to the protests a decade earlier, discontent in 2011 was expressed 
through disorganised and fragmented protests, without coordination by a specific 
organisation and without a clear platform of demands (ICG 2013: 30). Protests were 
disorganised riots at first, then marches called for by various unions, and finally 
mutinies within military barracks. Opposition parties played only a minor role in this 
mobilisation, even though they were accused – both by the government and protest 
activists – of taking advantage of the crisis to promote themselves.  
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Still, opposition parties published communiqués denouncing the repression, and 
some of their local figures were arrested for having encouraged young protestors to 
riot. At the end of April 2011, the opposition’s chef de file, Bénéwendé Sankara, 
attempted to build upon the disparate movement and turn it into a political opportunity 
to topple the government. On behalf of the opposition, he called for a rally against 
Compaoré himself with the slogan ‘Blaise Dégage!’, a reference to the Tunisian 
Jasmine Revolution. Contrary to the movement a decade earlier, there was no real 
coordination between civil society and political parties. On the day of the rally, less 
than 400 people gathered – a disgrace for an opposition counting 34 parties. 
Yet, the next couple of years demonstrated a real coming-of-age of the Burkinabè 
opposition, with a wave of new protests starting in mid-2013 and ultimately leading to 
Compaoré’s resignation. This movement genuinely started with an opposition-led rally 
against the creation of a Senate – but with broader demands as well around living 
conditions and good governance – held on 29 June 2013 that brought around 50,000 
protestors together in the capital. Throughout the second half of 2013 and the better 
part of 2014, marches and rallies were organised by the CFOP to maintain pressure on 
the government on the connected issues of the Senate on the one hand, and the term-
limit provided by the Constitution’s Article 37 on the other (see Wienkoop 2019).  
The old civil society organisations which had been at the forefront of the Trop c’est 
trop! movement in 1998 refused to be formally associated with these actions, 
preferring to hold parallel protests focusing on living conditions, once again showing 
their mistrust of opposition parties (Harsch 2017: 197). Yet, even though unions and 
parties acted separately, their parallel actions contributed to maintaining a continuous 
pressure on the government.  
219 
 
Civil society then also included new actors coming to light at that time, in particular 
activists networks such as Balai Citoyen, the Comité Anti-Référendum (CAR), and the 
Front de Résistance Citoyenne (FRC). This section of civil society, while remaining 
autonomous from the political opposition, acted in coordination with the CFOP and 
played an important mobilising role. Yet, the attention given to the Balai Citoyen and 
its peers, by both scholars and journalists, has tended to overstate their role (Chouli 
2015: 326) and ignore the fact that the insurrection was in large part driven by the 
political opposition. A scholar active one of these structures acknowledged that:  
‘The movements in 2013-2014 were mainly the work of political parties. Never, 
for example, has the Balai Citoyen been able to organise a meeting alone. All the 
large rallies against the Senate and against the modification of Article 37 were 
called by the UPC, which was the nucleus [of the mobilisation]. The citizens’ 
movements came in support.’ (int. BF07, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017). 
This corroborates claims of UPC figures that they – as the main opposition party and 
through the CFOP institution – were the ones driving the contestation (int. BF15, 
Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018).  
That time around, the political opposition was able to play a stronger role than on 
previous occasions for several reasons. First, the protests were from the start of a 
political nature, aimed at stopping the creation of a Senate and the removal of 
constitutional term-limits, which made political parties the logical front-runners of the 
contestation. Second, and most importantly, the UPC and, after the defection of key 
figures of the CDP in January 2014, the newly-created MPP had unprecedented 
financial resources at their disposal – the former drawing from their own personal 
earnings and parliamentary salaries, the latter by putting to use the wealth they had 
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accumulated during their years in power (int. BF20, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018). This 
allowed for an efficient coordination and mobilisation of protestors against the regime.  
Protesting enabled Burkinabè opposition parties to perform the various functions 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Marches and rallies contributed to the denunciation 
of the regime’s wrong doings, such as political violence and impunity, poor 
governance and corruption, and the absence of alternance. They also contributed to 
the mobilisation of dissent throughout the country: the mobilisation of protestors 
themselves, who took to the streets and marched, but also of the population more 
broadly through the press coverage of the demonstrations. Finally, it contributed to the 
succession function by allowing the opposition to be perceived as an alternative, 
assuming positions of leadership within the mobilisation. The protests can also have 
practical consequences that contribute to this function, such as the electoral reform that 
resulted from Trop c’est trop and, most importantly, the resignation of Compaoré in 
2014 that precipitated a regime change.  
In Uganda, Museveni’s regime has also been faced by waves of protests. The most 
significant has been the Walk-to-Work movement that occurred in 2011, and since 
then, a section of the opposition has been keen to use protests as extensions of electoral 
periods and to build a defiance movement. The Ugandan civil society is not as 
politicised as in Burkina Faso. The mobilisation has therefore mostly been coordinated 
by political parties – or at least by political figures.  
Following the February 2011 elections, Besigye decided not to challenge the results 
in court, but instead attempted to take to the streets. The opposition called for protests 
to denounce the election’s outcome, but these calls had little traction. However, in 
April, the opposition formed a pressure group called Activists for Change (A4C) and 
221 
 
launched a new movement with broader demands regarding living costs and poverty, 
in a context of soaring inflation partly resulting from the monetisation of the elections.  
This focus on very real issues – such as the cost of transport and food – instead of 
abstract concerns regarding election rigging, and the fronting of an independent, 
activist group rather than competing political parties and politicians had a resounding 
appeal (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 128). Opposition figures and activists took to the 
streets in an innovative manner: denouncing the sky-rocketing prices of fuel, taxi and 
boda-boda51 fares, they started to ‘walk to work’ in solidarity with the poorer 
Ugandans no longer able to afford another means of transport. The violent reaction 
from security forces – arguably expected and even counted on by the organisers – took 
the form of massive arrests and beatings, themselves leading to further mobilisation 
and unrest (Perrot 2014: 426). Branch and Mampilly (2015: 130–131) provide a good 
picture of this routine:  
‘Monday and Thursday were established as Walk-to-Work days. On these days, 
a few local political figures would begin walking, only to be met by a swarm of 
police. The radio, heard constantly in the shops and roadsides of urban Uganda, 
would announce opposition leaders having been arrested. This would bring large 
numbers of people into the streets, and running battles would erupt, involving 
stone-throwing, erecting barricades, and physical clashes between police and 
protesters.’ 
The 2011 Walk-to-Work protests were not the first instance of urban protests in 
Museveni’s Uganda. The arrest of Besigye in 2006 had already caused some unrest, 
and other notable outbursts with more specific causes include the protests to save 
 
51 Moto-taxis popular in Uganda. 
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Mabira Forest in 2007 (see Chibita 2016: 79) and the Buganda riots in 2009 (see 
Golooba-Mutebi & Sjögren 2017: 11–12). But the Walk-to-Work protests appeared to 
be more organised that previous mobilisations. Indeed, even prior to the 2011 
elections, the opposition appeared to be talking about protests, and Besigye himself 
was already stating he would not go to court to redress electoral injustices but would 
instead take to the streets (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 125). The Walk-to-Work protests 
also appeared to have a broader agenda than the 2007 and 2009 events. They have been 
considered particularly meaningful despite being concentrated in the capital and a few 
major urban centres and involving a limited number of people, because they were the 
‘longest demonstration yet initiated by opposition leaders’ and due to the widespread 
coverage – by national and international media – of the state’s violent response, which 
helped to further tarnish Museveni’s image (Perrot 2014: 426–427). 
 The Walk-to-Work protests illustrate a broader trend which sees urban riots 
becoming more recurrent in Uganda since the return to multipartyism (Goodfellow 
2014: 760), a trend that, according to Golooba Mutebi and Sjögren (2017), is due to 
the fact that social, economic, and political grievances have only been partially 
channelled through party politics. In fact, political parties themselves contribute to this 
trend, as a section of the opposition has proclaimed that it is ready to abandon party 
politics in favour of an alternative centred around civil disobedience. This was 
illustrated by Besigye’s own decision to step down as FDC president in 2012 and his 
growing disillusion with partisan participation. In his biography of Besigye, Kalinaki 
(2014: 312) describes that:  
‘As he drove home from the meeting with donors, Besigye was convinced it was 
time to declare a new war against abuse of office and the corrupt entrenchment 
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of power. Unlike 1981, this war would be fought not with arms but through people 
power and a campaign of defiance and resistance’.  
As Mutyaba (2018: 4) puts it, ‘the protests left a lasting sentiment in Uganda’s opposition 
that protest, as opposed to elections and legislative politics, was perhaps a more realistic 
route through which to seek political change’ (see also Branch & Mampilly 2015: 147–
148). The next few years saw little activity, as the ‘For God and my Country’ (4GC) 
network, which succeeded A4C when it was banned, proved unable to carry out activities 
at the same scale as that of the Walk-to-Work protests. This failure has been attributed 
to the massive repression imposed by security forces, and to the movement’s inability 
to reach areas beyond the capital and the Central and Southern regions (Perrot 2014: 
430).  
It was around the next election that protests became salient again. A section of the 
opposition, spearheaded by Besigye himself, increasingly believed in an activist 
approach to defeat the regime, and saw elections and other institutions as pointless. 
Museveni was re-elected in 2016 with official results giving him over 60% of the vote. 
However, the FDC, who claimed to have parallel results showing that Besigye won 
with a 52% score, did not file a court challenge. Whether Besigye had wanted to or not 
– having shown his mistrust to the process in 2011 – he was prevented from doing so 
by being put on preventative arrest for 43 days. This also barred him from organising 
street protests, while rallies organised across the country to demand his release were 
thwarted by the police and army (Nkuubi 2016: 425–426).  
In response, Besigye launched what has been known as the Defiance campaign, an 
extension of the electoral campaign aimed at keeping his base mobilised through civil 
disobedience and a series of targeted actions. As a civil society figure argued:  
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‘The Defiance campaign can act as a rallying point for membership mobilisation, 
for continuing the civic engagement outside of government structures. That is 
important for organising, for keeping the party base and party membership 
energised and engaged in non-election periods.' (int. UG 27, Kampala, 
21/11/2016) 
However, there was a lack of clarity on what defiance actually is, lamented the same 
person, which left the ruling party able to define it. For example, Security Minister 
Mary Karooro Okurut stated that the Defiance campaign meant:  
‘[C]ausing riots, overall civil disobedience and general mayhem with a basic 
objective in mind; cause so much chaos that it is impossible and impracticable to 
hold elections or in the alternative impossible to govern the country after 
elections by organising insurrections’ (Daily Monitor 22/05/2016).  
This was a serious shortcoming for the campaign, which also suffered from a lack of 
appropriation by the opposition as a whole, making it clearly less successful than the 
Walk-to-Work protests had been. This was acknowledged by political figures involved 
in the Defiance campaign themselves. For example, a DP MP, close to Besigye, stated 
that:  
‘It seems that we as leaders in the opposition haven’t been able to build a 
consensus about the defiance project, not even within FDC. I can tell you that the 
majority of FDC MPs don’t subscribe to the Defiance campaign. This is the 
debate I want to start, the conversation we should have. I think the people are 
ready to defy this government but for various reasons we are failing to give them 
leadership.’ (int. UG25, constituency, 18/11/2016)  
At the top, defiance was carried out through high-profile actions such as the mock 
swearing-in ceremony of Besigye as the ‘People’s President’ in May 2016, which was 
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videotaped and posted on social media platforms, planned or impromptu protests 
surrounding his multiple arrests and court appearances, and food distribution in 
famine-struck districts in April 2017. But at the grassroots level, defiance was more 
abstract, with FDC activists around the country defining in the following terms. In 
2016, a party figure in Mukono stated that ‘in concrete terms, non-compliance means 
we oppose most of what they say […] It translates in trying to mobilise masses, 
especially in big cities’ (int. UG26, Mukono, 18/11/2016). A young party activist, 
meanwhile, explained that ‘at the lower lever, we do it at the personal level because 
we are oppressed by the police. We are bearing in mind that our government and 
president are in Kasangati [Besigye’s home]’ (int. UG24, Mukono, 17/11/2016). A 
year and a half later, defiance did not appear to be defined more precisely. In Soroti, a 
party mobiliser simply stated that ‘defiance is just saying no’ (int. UG49, Soroti, 
09/05/2018), while in Gulu, a local official defined it as ‘message or sign or indicator 
which is given to the government so that they know that what they are doing is wrong’ 
(int. UG56, Gulu, 12/05/2018).  
Despite this rhetoric, there has not been any significant protest to the scale of Walk-
to-Work since 2011 (Mutyaba 2018: 6), possibly due to an increasingly repressive 
environment, characterised by the adoption of POMA in 2013 (Goodfellow 2014: 
768), the recruitment of so-called crime preventers in 2015 (Nkuubi 2016: 409; 
Tapscott 2016), and the re-emergence of state-inspired disappearances (idem: 420). 
Even the adoption of the Age Limit Bill, removing the last constitutional provision 
barring Museveni to run again in 2021, did not spark more than a scuffle.  
Whereas in Burkina Faso such an attempt led to a full-blown insurrection in 2014, 
Ugandan stakeholders seemed to perceive Museveni’s candidacy in 2021 as a fait-
accompli, when the 2016 elections had just been concluded, possibly due to a lack of 
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confidence in the Parliament and the courts to stop it, and the recognition that the 
opposition was unable to mobilise enough dissent around political issues to reach an 
insurrection just yet. For example, an NGO representative interviewed in 2016 
expressed doubt that large-scale protests like Walk-to-Work could happen again then, 
even if Museveni attempted to change the constitution: ‘I think unless the economy 
depreciates and breaks down, any constitutional issues involving how politics will be 
run cannot be an effective rallying point for people to come to the streets’ (int. UG15, 
Kampala, 21/09/2016).  
The wave of protests to protect term-limits and others constitutional means to 
guarantee turnover across the continent (see Durotoye 2016; Wienkoop 2019) does not 
appear to have had the same impact as the Arab spring on Ugandan minds. Yet, this 
does not mean that protests have been discarded by the political opposition in recent 
years. Quite the contrary, Besigye’s activist approach has continued. It has also been 
replicated by new opposition figures. In particular, the popular musician and 
independent MP Bobi Wine has spearheaded a movement known as ‘People Power’ 
and has continued to organise popular rallies and concerts (often blocked by the police) 
even after getting elected to parliament (The Observer 19/10/2017).  
 From these events, we can see that Ugandan opposition parties have played an 
important role in organising protests, in a context where other actors such as civil 
society organisations have been wary of being seen as involved in politics due to a 
constraining environment. The Walk-to-Work protests, the Defiance campaign and the 
more recent protests around the figure of Bobi Wine are ways to denounce the 
authoritarian nature of the regime and its failings. The violent repression of those 
protests – and the coverage in national and international press of arrests and beatings 
– further feeds this denunciation efforts and mobilise discontent among civil society 
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and the broader civil society. As previously argued, opposition figures such as Besigye 
and, more recently, Bobi Wine, are perceived as credible and trustworthy opposition 
leaders partly because of their treatment by the state: they are beaten, arrested, tortured 
but continue to oppose the regime, which gives them credibility as challengers and 
alternatives to Museveni.  
Yet, the increasing focus on protest and defiance as a strategy by a section of the 
opposition has also been accompanied by the perception that political parties are not 
relevant institutions that deserve to be strengthened, as far as they are not able to topple 
Museveni’s regime through institutional means. This has created a rift between those 
supporting activism and defiance on the one hand, and those defending participation 
and organising on the other, as if they were necessarily contradictory approaches.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed some of the key ways opposition parties engage the 
regime in Uganda and Burkina Faso. While boycott has been used as a strategy in both 
countries at some point to try and deprive the government of a democratic-like 
legitimacy, opposition parties soon realised that they risked losing relevance by using 
this approach. By participating in elections and sitting in parliament, opposition parties 
may not be able to meaningfully compete for power and to influence governance, but 
they can use these institutions as platforms to engage citizens and denounce the regime. 
Meanwhile, protests have also been used by opposition parties in both countries. This 
is not an exhaustive coverage of opposition parties’ activities, which is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. For example, opposition parties also use the courts to challenge 
electoral results and pieces of legislation, sometimes in association with civil society 
organisations. Opposition figures travel abroad to lobby international partners through 
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foreign visits (Daily Monitor 08/09/2016) and participation in international party 
federations (int. BF57, Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018). As I have stated previously, social 
media is also an increasingly popular platform used by opposition figures (Ephraim 
27/08/2018). 
The combination of these disparate strategies, some of them involving participating 
in the regime’s institutions (elections, parliament, courts) and others taking the form 
of (sometimes illegal) protests, begs the question of how they intersect. While they can 
feed each other and be complementary, these approaches can also be pitted against one 
another and lead to divisions. In Uganda particularly, the fact that the opposition was 
taking part in elections and institutions and, at the same time, calling for civil 
disobedience has been used to discredit them. A civil society activist described this 
predicament as such:  
‘They [FDC] find themselves in a very tricky situation. While on the one hand 
they are saying they should defy this government because it is illegitimate, they 
were happy to appoint a shadow cabinet in Parliament. That has been used 
against them to say: “You're not sincere. You either defy or you don't, you cannot 
defy and cooperate.”’ (int. UG26, Kampala, 21/11/2016) 
As Mutyaba (2018) pointed out, both factions of the FDC have kept proclaiming that 
both approaches are equally important and complementary and that they were willing 
to find a middle ground – a position echoed by many party stakeholders I met myself 
in 2018. However, this discourse has not been accompanied by concrete actions. With 
the ‘defiance’ faction winning over the ‘organisers’ in the 2017 leadership contest, the 
party has strengthened its own brand in terms of protest and change – which I have 
previously argued is the core of the FDC (see 4.2), but has also seen the ‘organising’ 
wing of the party led by Muntu defect (The Observer 25/09/2018).  
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Yet the 2014 insurrection in Burkina Faso illustrates how protest and participation 
can intersect positively and pose a real challenge to the regime. By sitting in the 
legislature, opposition MPs were able to monitor and report on the government’s 
moves – especially about Compaoré’s ploy to amend the Constitution. This allowed 
them to mobilise outside parliament by other means, including protests and civil 
disobedience. This juncture between participation and protest is exemplified by the 
Kombissiri Address, a declaration made in May 2013 by the CFOP calling the 
population to use civil disobedience to oppose the creation of the Senate and the 
removal of term-limits:  
‘The MPs of the parliamentary groups ADJ and UPC reject the set-up of the 
Senate; call upon their activists and supporters, women, young people, pupils and 
students, unions, civil society organisations, and the whole people to mobilise 
against the set-up of the Senate which constitutes the first step in the process to 
modify the Article 37.’ (le faso.net 10/05/2013)  
The parliamentary opposition therefore were the ones calling for civil disobedience, 
and opposition MPs played a key role in the resistance in the streets, by providing both 
funding and intelligence to organise the protests. Indeed, during this period, each 
opposition MP was making a special contribution amounting to FCFA100,00052 per 
month to the CFOP to cover the costs of protests (int. BF49, Ouagadougou, 
14/12/2018), while slogans and directives were formulated based upon the information 
that they provided (int. BF19, Ouagadougou, 24/01/2018).  
Whereas participation and protest appeared contradictory and counter-effective in 
Uganda, they are in fact complementary. In order to adapt to a shifting environment, 
 
52 £119,000 (October 2014). 
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opposition parties must combine and mix boycott and participation, protest and party-
building to engage the regime, just like the ruling elite mixes ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
strategies to remain in power (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey 2016). Through these 
activities, opposition parties perform a set of functions, outlined in this chapter’s 
introduction, that can contribute to a regime change.  
The function of denunciation is performed quite well by all opposition parties dealt 
with in this thesis. Indeed, by boycotting elections, through campaign rallies and 
protest marches, or during parliamentary debates, opposition parties denounce the 
regime’s wrong doings, ranging from poor service delivery to human rights abuses, 
election fraud, and corruption. It is a way to make people aware not just of the 
government’s failings, but of the flaws of the wider system, the skewed rules of the 
game. According to a young official in the UNIR-PS, popular expectations towards 
his party were mainly to perform this kind of denunciation, not to obtain power: ‘We 
are asked to play the role of a sentinel, to be there to hit when things get messed up’ 
(int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018). The denunciation function plays out 
domestically, but also internationally. Foreign partners notice opposition boycotts and 
the repression of rallies and marches, and opposition leaders have also taken to travel 
abroad and lobby foreign stakeholders themselves (Daily Monitor 08/09/2016).  
A second function that opposition parties perform is the mobilisation of dissent, 
though with uneven success. The 2011 Walk-to-Work protests in Uganda and the 2014 
insurrection in Burkina Faso are key instances of parties’ capacity to mobilise support, 
but the Defiance campaign (Uganda, 2016) and the ‘Blaise Dégage’ rally (Burkina 
Faso, 2011) have been much less successful. Yet, despite a repressive political 
environment and other obstacles, opposition parties continue to organise protests, even 
outside of election periods. In Uganda, this has led a section of the opposition to 
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perceive itself more as a liberation movement than as political parties and to favour an 
activist – yet non-violent – approach.  
Opposition legislators also play such a mobilising role within parliament, by putting 
up debates, providing a sane voice, and keeping the dream alive (int. UG89, 
Constituency, 2016). The mobilisation capacity of opposition parties’ depends on their 
individual spread and resources, as local branches, activist networks, and money are 
all important components of any mobilisation strategy. Mobilisation is also enhanced 
by inter-party collaboration, and coordination with other actors, such as civil society 
organisations, trade unions, and, in Uganda, independent politicians. The 2014 
insurrection in Burkina Faso is a case in point. I will address these cooperation 
dynamics in more detail in the next chapter (see 7.2).  
A third function that opposition parties can perform to contribute to regime change 
is the preparation for succession. This function is partly performed by taking part in 
the state’s institutions, such as sitting in Parliament, occupying positions in the shadow 
cabinet or in oversight committees. These activities provide MPs with the opportunity 
to get experience and a local status. They develop an understanding of how governing 
works and acquire practical skills useful to conduct parliamentary activities. They also 
obtain a status in their constituency through their position as an MP, and their ability 
to reinvest financial and political capital back into their community. Through these 
means, they build their credibility as an alternative governing elite. This is also 
performed through the building of the party as an organisation, the development of a 
supporters’ base, and the design of policy proposals. The argument made by this DP 
activist illustrates this point: 
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‘If we may ask ourselves; what is our plan after Museveni? Ugandans should now 
prepare themselves; how are we going to move on after Museveni? […] If we 
disagree with the system then we should think of changing the system not just the 
man.’ (int. UG52, Gulu, 11/05/2018)  
Finally, appearing as a committed opposition to the regime (in Parliament or in the 
streets), and arousing popular support, places the opposition (as parties or as 
individuals) in a good position to claim legitimacy after the regime’s fall. Yet, the 
extent to which this function is actually performed should be tempered. As Kelly 
(2020: 137) demonstrated in the case of Senegal, turnovers are often performed not by 
opposition parties but rather by regime insiders, who benefit from previously 
accumulated resources and name recognition. We can see the same dynamic at play in 
Burkina Faso, with the MPP splitting from the CDP less than a year before the 
insurrection and getting elected in the post-transition elections of 2015. Despite their 
best efforts at denouncing the regime and mobilising dissent, opposition parties still 
suffer from low confidence levels across the continent (Logan 2008; Bratton & Logan 
2015). Opposition parties’ capacity to endure and coordinate are important elements 
to consider, particularly in order to assess their ability to perform the functions at hand 
and promote democratisation. This is why I address these issues in the last empirical 







Party endurance and opposition coordination 
This dissertation has addressed various aspects of opposition parties’ operation in 
hybrid regimes such as Burkina Faso and Uganda, from the constraints that they face 
to their internal organisation and their approaches to engage the regime. Their poor 
performance is also often attributed to their volatile and fragmented nature. For 
example, Randall and Svåsand (2002c: 38) argue that African parties ‘tend to be 
ephemeral as organizations and fail to establish themselves as credible alternatives in 
the eyes of the voters’. Van de Walle (2006: 77), meanwhile, argues that ‘divided 
opposition expend energy and political capital in internal squabbles. They criticize 
each other publicly as much as the incumbent and the ruling party and inevitably lose 
some legitimacy in the process’.  
This leads me to analyse these dynamics in the last chapter of my dissertation: what 
in the nature and operation of opposition parties enable or hamper their endurance as 
individual organisations? How do these individual parties collaborate amongst 
themselves and with other stakeholders to form a collective and coherent political 
opposition? And, ultimately, how does it affect the regime’s trajectory in each country?  
The organisational endurance of political parties is closely related to the concept of 
institutionalisation. Party institutionalisation was defined by Huntington (1968: 12) as 
‘the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’. The 
institutionalisation of political parties and party systems has been shown to be a key 
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element of democratisation in other parts of the world (Diamond 1989; Lewis 1994; 
Dix 2016). Randall and Svåsand (2002b: 8), in their work on African politics, highlight 
how the institutionalisation of individual parties and that of the party system as a whole 
can sometimes be at odds. In particular, an uneven institutionalisation of political 
parties – with the ruling party benefiting from historical legacies and controlling public 
resources – often leads to institutionalised but uncompetitive party systems that are 
detrimental to democratisation prospects.  
Consequently, the institutionalisation of opposition parties is important, in terms of 
the functions they can perform both within the regime, and in helping to bring about 
and consolidate democratisation. Even though party system volatility is not necessarily 
a bad thing in a democracy (Riedl 2014: 4), volatility of opposition parties within a 
one-party dominant system is more problematic. As Nijzink and Doorenspleet (2013: 
199) have argued, the opposition’s ability to galvanise growing popular dissatisfaction 
informs the endurance (or not) of a one-party dominant system, with Namibia, 
Tanzania and South Africa being cases in point where that did not happen.  
In order to galvanise such dissatisfaction, opposition parties need to be cohesive 
and socially-rooted (LeBas 2013). Considering the high level of fragmentation among 
opposition parties in Uganda, Burkina Faso and much of the rest of the continent, 
cohesion requires cooperation among opposition parties. For their action to be socially 
rooted, they need to build ties with other structures in civil society. Widner (1997) has 
shown that in general, African political parties have rarely tried to mobilise civil 
society organisations, because these organisations had little capacity to deliver their 
member’s votes or were wary of taking a political stance.  
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This last chapter examines how the dynamics addressed throughout this dissertation 
– parties’ core, internal structuration, and activities – influence the performance of 
opposition parties when it comes to the critical areas of party endurance and opposition 
coordination, and what it means for the regime’s trajectory in each country. 
7.1 Surviving in a hybrid regime: the endurance of opposition parties 
The endurance of opposition parties is an important factor in understanding what 
role they are able to play. As Randall and Svåsand (2002c: 38) explain, ‘To offer voters 
a choice between alternatives and provide them with an opportunity to evaluate past 
performance, parties need to endure’. While party endurance is a concept closely 
related to party institutionalisation, I prefer the first phrasing. As Stroh (2019) has 
convincingly argued, institutionalisation can be at odds with the flexibility opposition 
parties need in order to adapt to changing circumstances. Furthermore, parties can still 
conduct a range of activities despite weak formal structures, such as rallies or protests.  
I argue that there are two main inter-related elements that determine whether a 
political party can endure: the sustainability of its core, and its ability to emancipate 
itself from its founder. Of course, the party’s financial viability is also a key factor in 
its ability to exist, organise, and subsist. Yet, even within a heavily monetised political 
environment (see Chapter 3), smaller and poorer organisations can outlast larger and 
relatively wealthier parties. A poorer party may have more limited mobilisation 
capacity and territorial penetration, but that does not mean it cannot endure. Instead, it 
is the origin of a party’s resources, not the amount, that – by determining the internal 
power dynamics within the party – is an important predictor of whether or not a party 
will endure.  
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 Sustainability of party cores 
In Chapter 3, I have discussed what constitutes a party’s core: what the party is 
formed around, what constitutes its identity, and where it derives its legitimacy from. 
I have argued that these opposition parties are not empty shells merely revolving 
around a politician, and that a more complex ‘core’ attracts activists and gives the party 
a level of cohesion. This is closely related to the concept of ‘value infusion’ in the 
institutionalisation literature, which ‘refers to the extent to which party actors and 
supporters […] acquire an identification with and commitment to the party which 
transcend more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement’ (Randall & 
Svåsand 2002b: 13; see also Selznick 1957; Levitsky 1998). I have categorised the 
parties under study here in two party types based upon the kind of core they display: 
historical values’ trustees (the DP in Uganda and the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso) and 
credible change bearers (the FDC in Uganda and the UPC in Burkina Faso). An 
important question is therefore how sustainable this core is? 
A core revolving around the idea of ‘credibility’ and ‘change’ has an intrinsically 
weak sustainability. On the one hand, the party’s credibility can be lessened as they 
prove unable to win elections or topple the incumbent, putting them at risk of losing 
ground to new actors. In Uganda, the FDC has so far been perceived as the most 
credible opposition to take on Museveni, but the rise of Bobi Wine and internal 
fractures within the NRM has put this hegemony in doubt (The East African 
06/05/2019; New Vision 03/03/2020). A DP activist, when talking about the FDC and 
Besigye, said that, ‘you can’t contest for four times failing each time; people start 
losing faith in you’ (int. UG79, Masaka, 19/05/2018). The candidacy of Mbabazi in 
2016, which (wrongly) signalled elite fragmentation within the NRM, opened a 
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discussion over Besigye’s continuing credibility as opposition frontman (Oloka-
Onyango 2016; Beardsworth 2018: 105). The election results and the abysmal score 
of Mbabazi vindicated Besigye’s supporters. Yet the rise of a new popular figure, Bobi 
Wine, has re-opened these discussions ahead of the 2021 polls (The Observer 
04/12/2019; New Vision 30/07/2019; The Observer 24/07/2019), and it is uncertain 
who will be on the ticket against Museveni in the next elections. 
In Burkina Faso, an international analyst argued that the UPC’s leader, Diabré, 
‘succeeded at first, but some people stronger than him politically […] beat him to the 
punch and overtook him’ (int. BF03, by phone, 23/03/2017). Indeed, the MPP led by 
Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, Salif Diallo, and Simon Compaoré after their departure 
from the CDP in January 2014, managed to overshadow Diabré and the UPC after the 
insurrection and win the post-transition elections in November 2015. They were able 
to use the same strategy as Diabré, presenting themselves as credible reformers who 
had distanced themselves from Compaoré over the issue of Article 37. But they were 
able to overpass the UPC by drawing from more recent and consistent governmental 
experience, vaster resources, and richer networks than his. Such an outcome is not 
infrequent. As Kelly (2020: 137) demonstrated in the case of Senegal, it often tends to 
be defecting regime insiders that manage to defeat incumbents. The initial credibility 
of opposition parties like the UPC and FDC, who benefitted at first from an insider’s 
advantage, is therefore difficult to sustain overtime.  
On the other hand, while the idea of change may gain traction with time – as the 
regime loses popularity and/or legitimacy – this focus on change, reform, or turnover 
cannot long outlive the regime itself. To endure beyond the regime’s survival, the party 
will have to reinvent itself and rebuild its core. As Stroh (2019: 241) explained:  
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‘When Burkina Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré, was ousted in 2014, the 
former ruling party collapsed, although not completely, and the main valence 
issue that had structured party competition — the authoritarian character of the 
Compaoré presidency — disappeared with the ex- president’.  
This left the UPC in particular with a weakened narrative. This dynamic puts in doubt 
these parties’ ability to endure beyond the regime itself. It may not bother some 
sections of the opposition who perceive themselves more as a liberation movement 
than a political party, such as the more activist wing of the FDC in Uganda. Still, this 
is a challenge to a political party’s capacity to endure.  
In contrast, a core built around historical values can be more sustainable, especially 
when the party has managed to infuse in the national imagination that they are 
legitimate trustees of these values. This is an important element in explaining the DP’s 
endurance in Uganda. The party’s attachment to its founding values – truth, justice, 
human rights – dating from the pre-independence era has remained very strong among 
its followers until today. Relatedly, attachment to the party and its values is often 
grounded in family heritage. When asked when they joined the party, many 
interviewees explained that they grew up in DP families, were educated with DP values 
at a young age, and participated in DP activities even before they could vote or 
formally join the party. A party official explained: ‘I joined DP officially as a student, 
but really I have been a member since I was 9 years old, following my mother’ (int. 
UG08, Kampala, 30/06/2016). The sentiment of belonging to a ‘DP family’ was 
expressed by officials and activists alike throughout the country. A local official stated 
that in his area: ‘DP is in genetics, you can’t cross, it is in your family morals and 
beliefs’ (int. UG21, Mukono, 16/11/2016), while one of his peers in Gulu said ‘My 
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family, from my grandfather, have been members of the party. So as a family we 
understand what the party stands for’ (int. UG52, Gulu, 11/05/2018).  
Bob-Milliar (2012b: 680) observed similar sentiments when studying the 
motivations of party activists in Ghana. This kind of attachment fits with what Randall 
and Svåsand (2002b: 13) describe as ‘the party’s success in creating its own distinctive 
culture or value-system’, which can contribute to party cohesion. In the case of UNIR-
PS in Burkina Faso, Sankarist values may also be a relatively sustainable core, 
especially as the figure of Thomas Sankara became increasingly popular among young 
urban Burkinabè and the new generation of civil society organisations emerging from 
2013 such as Balai Citoyen (Bonnecase 2015: 162). However, other factors, detailed 
hereafter, foster a high level of fragmentation among Burkinabè parties, leading to a 
proliferation of organisations claiming to defend and uphold these Sankarist values 
(Harsch 2013: 359).  
 Leadership turnover norm 
Turnover, or alternance, is an important element of a democracy. Huntington 
(1993: 267), for example, established a benchmark of democratic consolidation known 
as the ‘two turnover test’. It has also been one of the chief demands of opposition 
parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso, with the incumbent’s long tenure decried as a key 
grievance. Yet the internal appropriation of such a norm by opposition parties 
themselves, and its application in the form of a leadership turnover within the party, is 
far from a given. Burkina Faso and Uganda represent two extreme cases on this issue.  
Burkina Faso’s partisan landscape does not exhibit a leadership turnover norm at 
all: no party – even beyond the two cases under focus here – have experienced a 
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smooth leadership transition. On the contrary, Burkina Faso is a great example of how 
leadership quarrels can fuel division and weakness. In contrast to other countries in the 
region, Burkina Faso does not have strong historical parties rooted in the independence 
struggle, due to a series of military regimes having since disrupted the partisan 
landscape. A partial exception is the ADF/RDA. The party emerged from the fusion, 
in 1998, of the RDA – founded in 1946 and originally part of the regional federation 
of the same name in Francophone West Africa – and the ADF – founded in 1990 by 
Hermann Yaméogo, the son of Burkina Faso’s first president Maurice Yaméogo.  
However, the ADF-RDA’s history has been marked by frequent splits and fusions 
as well as leadership disputes, and the party was allied with Compaoré from 2000 
onwards. In Chapter 3, I have already illustrated the high level of division among 
Burkinabè parties, with the example of the Sankarist party lineage. This frequency of 
party splits, often at least partly due to personal ambitions and leadership disputes, is 
best described by a Burkinabè proverb: ‘one prefers to be the rat’s head rather than 
the lion’s tail’ (L’Observateur Paalga 15/10/2007b) – politicians prefer to be at the 
head of their own party, however small it may be, rather than be a lower figure in a 
larger party. As a civil society figure argued, many Burkinabè parties ‘are the offshoot 
of their leader, who at a certain time, by his behaviour and activism, managed to 
gather a number of people around himself’ (int. BF09, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017). In 
this context, neither the UNIR-PS nor the UPC have provided the opportunity for a 
leadership change at the head of the party.  
Uganda, on the other hand, displays a rather strong leadership turnover norm within 
opposition parties. The DP is a success story in that regard: not only has its leadership 
been passed over peacefully multiple times, but the last two people to occupy the 
position have not come from the DP’s core constituency. While it is still considered 
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by many as a Catholic or a pro-Buganda party, the DP has had both a Protestant 
president (John Ssebaana Kizito, 2005-2010) and a non-Muganda president (Norbert 
Mao, 2010 to date, hails from the North). These leadership changes, despite the 
internal frictions they may have caused, demonstrate that institutions have outgrown 
the personal influence of an individual, which is necessary for a party to outlive its 
founder and have solid foundations.  
The emergence and consolidation of this norm within the DP can be observed at 
two critical junctures. One is after the death of Benedicto Kiwanuka, an early leader 
of the DP and the first Prime Minister of Uganda just before independence. Kiwanuka 
was assassinated in the 1970s under Idi Amin’s regime. In the words of a Ugandan 
civil society representative, ‘when Kiwanuka was murdered, his family wasn’t 
demanding space’ (int. UG15, Kampala, 21/09/2016). This contrasts with what 
happened in the other historical party in Uganda, the UPC: after former President 
Milton Obote died in exile in 2005, his wife Miria took over the reins of the party, and 
today the party is fractured into two factions evolving around their sons53, which shows 
that the UPC has not managed to come out of the Obote family’s shadow. In the case 
of the DP, the party’s leadership passed on to Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, Kiwanuka’s 
former Private Secretary (New Vision 16/03/2012).  
Though Paul Ssemogerere remained at the head of the party for over 25 years, he 
eventually stepped down in 2005. The same civil society actor explained that 
Ssemogerere ‘struggled for a long time, but agreed to hand over to someone he 
trusted’ (int. UG15, Kampala, 21/09/2016). Reflecting upon this, a Ugandan 
 
53 One of Obote’s sons, Jimmy Akena, heads a faction which allied with Museveni after the 2016 
elections. This decision was criticised by the other faction, led by the party’s disputed president Olara 
Otunnu, and by Obote’s eldest son, Tony Akaki (The Observer 10/06/2016). 
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researcher said: ‘I give credit to Ssemogerere; he could have stayed and become a 
strong man. He served and he went out.’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). This set 
a precedent, and with the transfer of power to Kizito, then to Mao, this precedent has 
become a solid norm, strengthened by the fact that Ssemogerere and Kizito remain 
respected elders in the party. The same academic further explained that ‘Ssemogerere 
and Kizito are pillars of DP now, and the young generation won’t change the rules 
with these elders around’ (int. UG31, Kampala, 07/12/2016). Even though the election 
of a party president may fuel tensions and factionalism, as occurred after Mao’s 
accession to the position, the principle of a turnover at the head of the party is not 
questioned. 
In the case of the FDC, the party’s constitution includes a term-limit: any elected 
position within the party can only be held for a maximum of two terms. Abiding by 
this provision, Besigye stepped down from the party’s presidency in 2012 and was 
replaced by Muntu following competitive internal elections. In 2017, Muntu was 
defeated by Amuriat. This apparent circulation of elites at the head of the party has, 
however, been undermined by the fact that Besigye has retained an important – albeit 
informal – role and influence within the party. Besigye was elected as the party’s 
flagbearer (i.e. presidential candidate) for every election. There is no limit to the 
number of times one can be the party’s flagbearer, as it is not a party position per se.  
Yet, Besigye’s flagbearer status has been extended beyond the election period, in 
line with the civil disobedience campaigns launched following the last two polls. 
Indeed, as I discussed in Chapter 6, the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests and the Defiance 
campaign launched in 2016 have been an extension of the electoral campaigns, and 
Besigye has retained real – if unofficial – leadership within the FDC. He is no longer 
the party’s president, but he is the ‘People’s President’, following the mock swearing-
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in ceremony in April 2016. This has meant that, as an international NGO representative 
explained, the FDC effectively had two leaderships during Muntu’s party presidency:  
‘There [was] the formal leadership of Mugisha Muntu, focused on building the 
organisation and regional structures; and the informal leadership of the party’s 
founding president Kizza Besigye, focused on activism, defiance to remove 
Museveni from power.’ (int. UG15, Kampala, 21/09/2016) 
The fact that the FDC, despite the norm of leadership turnover officially embraced, 
has found it difficult to separate the party from the figure of Besigye is directly 
connected with the party’s core. Indeed, the credibility of the party to deliver change 
is very much attached to Besigye’s popularity and perceived ‘electability’. This was 
described by a Ugandan civil society activist as follows:  
‘Besigye is known across this country, he has created an individual brand […] 
He has gone through the tranches, he has gone to prison, he has been beaten, he 
has been injured; this creates trust among the people that he is not pretending, 
he is not playing us.’ (int. UG01, Kampala, 06/04/2016) 
To summarise, party cores built on historically grounded values are more 
sustainable than those revolving around change and credibility, and a leadership 
turnover norm exists among Ugandan parties but not in Burkina Faso. This makes the 
DP the most enduring party in my sample: its core is a set of values that became the 
party’s motto, Truth and Justice, which have contributed to create a partisan identity 
transmitted within families from a generation to the next, and a strong leadership 
turnover norm has been set within the party. This means that despite losing ground to 
the FDC and having faced divisions after Mao’s election as party president, the DP 
retains entrenched support amongst activists in certain areas – mostly in Buganda but 
also, to a lesser extent, in Gulu – and is unlikely to disappear any time soon. The UNIR-
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PS in Burkina Faso has a similar type of core, but no leadership turnover norm at all, 
which encourages party fragmentation and therefore a multitude of parties claiming a 
similar party core of Sankarist heritage. This has made it difficult for the party to tap 
into the renewed popularity of Sankarist ideas in recent years, as illustrated by the 
feeble score achieved by the party in the 2015 (post-insurrection) elections.  
The FDC’s problem is exactly the opposite: while the party has an established norm 
of leadership turnover, with term limits inscribed in its constitution, its core is more 
fragile. In particular, the party’s credibility rests upon the figure of Besigye, which 
fuels the dual leadership issue and erodes the practical impact of the turnover norm. 
The FDC’s endurance is therefore dependent on a combination of, on the one hand, 
many people being tired of Museveni’s rule, and, on the other, the FDC appearing as 
the most likely to defeat him. Finally, the UPC in Burkina Faso has neither a 
sustainable core nor a leadership turnover norm, making it more difficult for this party 
to endure – especially beyond the post-insurrection reconfiguration. 
 The money element 
Resources also play a role in a party’s endurance, but are not a necessary or 
sufficient element to explain it. The DP as an organisation appears to be more likely 
to endure than the FDC, despite lower resources and a weaker performance. 
Nevertheless, and as argued in Chapter 5, the origin of a party’s resources and the 
leverage that it provides to certain actors is an important aspect to consider. Put simply, 
who contributes financially to supporting the party – either by investing their own 
resources, or by playing a key fundraising role, matters. Is the party’s leader funding 
the party, or do local elite have a financial stake too? This can affect the party’s ability 
to endure in the following manner.  
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When the party’s resources mostly come from the party’s founder or central leader, 
this erodes the leadership turnover norm if there is one, or helps to prevent one from 
emerging. This centralisation of resources, and therefore of leverage, reduces internal 
democracy but facilitates party cohesion because of the periphery’s dependence on the 
central leadership. If the party’s core is not sustainable, in other words, if it has not 
‘transcend[ed] more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement’ 
(Randall & Svåsand 2002b: 13), it increases the risk of defection and co-optation by 
the regime. When the party’s resources are less centralised, and local elite contribute 
to maintaining the party as well, the absence of a leadership turnover norm leads to a 
high likelihood of party splits: local elite who do not have a margin to evolve and 
progress within the party will be frustrated and attempt to create their own party. If 
there is a leadership turnover norm, this leads to a higher internal democracy, and helps 
ensure that a party is more likely to endure.  
This thesis has focused on individual opposition parties, but it is important to take 
a step back and look at the implication of my findings for ‘the Opposition’ more 
broadly, and particularly to analyse how opposition parties coordinate and cooperate.  
7.2 Opposition coordination and cooperation 
There appears to be a consensus in the literature that opposition unity is a necessary 
– though not sufficient – condition of an incumbent defeat (Van de Walle 2006), which 
has led scholars to investigate electoral coalition-building dynamics (Van de Walle 
2006; Arriola 2013; Souaré 2017; Beardsworth 2018). Yet opposition coordination for 
other purposes than electoral competition has not received the same level of attention, 
nor has the cooperation between opposition parties and other stakeholders such as civil 
society organisations. I therefore address these dynamics in this section, with the 
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overarching aim to analyse how individual parties’ internal dynamics and endurance 
impacts opposition cooperation and the opposition’s performance overall.  
 Electoral coalition-building in Burkina Faso and Uganda 
In neither Burkina Faso nor Uganda has electoral coalition-building been a 
successful endeavour. The Burkinabè opposition to Compaoré’s regime was 
characterised by its diversity and divisions, running along ideological lines, personal 
enmities, and strategic disagreements between confrontation and entryism. In this 
context, opposition parties were unable to foster cooperation among themselves to 
tackle Compaoré’s hegemony. As Harsch (2017: 137) explains:  
‘On issues of common concern, such as electoral fraud or political repression, 
the opposition parties usually were able to come together. At times they set up 
structures to coordinate their activities. But such collaboration usually broke 
down over ideological, personal, historical, and other differences’.  
Few electoral coalitions have been attempted, and none was able to bring together a 
large enough grouping of opposition parties. Even parties describing themselves as 
Sankarist have proven unable to present a united front at an election.  
In February 1998, a group formed of nine opposition parties, including the PAI, the 
FFS, and the ADF-RDA, was created to demand democratic reforms (le faso.net 
19/02/2008; int. BF08, Ouagadougou, 12/04/2017). It was called the February 14 
Group (G14). Created shortly after the 1997 legislative elections, which the opposition 
claimed were massively rigged, the G14 organised a boycott of the 1998 presidential 
polls. However, it was unable to present a common front in subsequent elections. This 
did not prove too detrimental in the 2002 legislative elections, as the reformed PR 
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system actually benefited small parties, and the opposition managed to obtain 49% of 
the seats (Santiso & Loada 2003).  
Ahead of the 2005 presidential elections, however, the coalition fragmented. 
Furthermore, nearly all of the parties involved suffered from splits themselves. In the 
end, the radical wing of the opposition, gathered in a new coalition named ‘Alternance 
2005’, officially fronted three different candidates, while other leaders decided to run 
as well anyway. Another grouping, (ironically) known as the ‘United Burkinabè 
Opposition’ (OBU), saw both Emile Paré and Laurent Bado contest after 
disagreements between their respective parties. Finally the ADF-RDA, the largest 
opposition party since 1997, but who had broken ranks with the G14 in 2000 and joined 
the unity government, officially backed the candidacy of Compaoré (Loada 2006: 29). 
In 2010, the opposition once again went to the polls divided, with six candidates 
running against Compaoré.  
In contrast, attempts at electoral coalition building have been a systematic feature 
of Ugandan elections throughout the NRM regime. However, these coalitions have 
been marred by internal divisions. Beardsworth (2018: 60) has provided the most 
detailed study of opposition coalition-building during the NRM regime, and argued 
that: 
‘[D]espite the recognition that coalitions are necessary, they almost invariably 
collapse when newly-elected party leaders withdraw from the alliance to run 
their own campaigns and test their electoral viability. When they perform poorly, 
these party leaders seek to enter into coalitions in later elections but the intra-
opposition competition for limited constituencies – due to the NRM’s hegemony 
– pushes party leaders to negotiate cynically within coalitions, ultimately leading 
to the collapse of the broader coalition’. 
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The first two elections held in 1996 and 2001 took place under the Movement 
system. This meant that candidates could not officially stand on party tickets. In both 
instances, the main electoral cleavage was around the reintroduction of a multiparty 
system. In 1996, the DP president, Paul Ssemogerere, who had been part of the NRM 
broad-based government, but who resigned in 1995 when the no-party system was 
inscribed in the Constitution, was supported by a coalition including the other 
historical party, the UPC, in an attempt to unseat Museveni. Though the coalition 
survived, Ssemogerere only received a quarter of the vote, and made a surprisingly 
weak showing in the Buganda region (Muhumuza 1997; Beardsworth 2018: 76–79).  
In 2001, with the emergence of Besigye from within the NRM, a new alliance was 
formed, which highlighted internal splits within both the DP and the UPC. While the 
DP’s leadership officially backed Besigye’s candidacy, a wing of the party fronted a 
dissident candidate, Francis Bwenge, who received only 0.3% of the vote 
(Beardsworth 2018: 79–82). The two elections held under the movement system 
therefore saw the opposition able to build an electoral coalition, despite internal 
divisions, but unable to actually unseat Museveni.  
The return to multipartyism ahead of the 2006 elections did not prove a positive 
driver of opposition cooperation. The following three electoral cycles have been 
characterised by initial attempts at coalition-building, and a subsequent collapse of that 
coalition before the polls could take place. In 2006, despite discussions starting two 
years before the polls among six opposition parties, the talks broke off over the 
selection of a common candidate. Besigye ran on the newly-formed FDC ticket, while 
the new leaders of the DP and the UPC both contested as well (Gloppen et al. 2006; 
Beardsworth 2018: 82–86).  
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Similarly in 2011, newly-elected DP president Mao broke away from the attempted 
Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC) coalition to protect the party’s identity and test his own 
popular support, while Otunnu contested on behalf of a divided UPC (Beardsworth 
2018: 91–99). In 2016, the coalition known as The Democratic Alliance (TDA) once 
again collapsed after former NRM insider Mbabazi was selected as the joint candidate 
with the support of smaller parties – including the DP and the UPC – and the FDC 
pulled out to front Besigye (Beardsworth 2016; Kayunga 2016).  
Overall, the opposition managed to build coalitions ahead of elections held under 
the movement dispensation but failed to unseat Museveni then. Since the return to 
multipartyism and the creation of the FDC, opposition coalitions have systematically 
collapsed. All parties involved have suffered from factionalism, which has affected 
their ability to come together. Smaller parties such as the DP and the UPC have been 
wary of losing even more ground to the FDC. This led them to pull out of coalitions 
as an attempt to safeguard what remains of their organisational power and identity. As 
an FDC activist acknowledged, ‘some parties are so thin in terms of support base that 
they fear coming together with the rest because they think even the small support base 
can be taken up’ (int. UG59, Gulu, 13/05/2018). Meanwhile, the FDC see themselves 
as the only credible challengers to Museveni, and therefore refuse to back a coalition 
if it is not fronted by their candidate. As Beardsworth (2018: 75) summarises:  
 ‘This stable history of interaction has created and entrenched grievances that 
have undermined successive coalitions, as party leaders (at various levels) have 
used coalitions as forums through which to achieve their own particularistic 
aims, rather than privileging the common aim of removing the incumbent’.  
It is quite clear that opposition parties in both Uganda and Burkina Faso have found 
it difficult to build and sustain electoral coalitions. Party proliferation, leadership 
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squabbles, and internal factionalism are obvious challenges to opposition cooperation. 
But as we can see from the Ugandan case, leadership turnover and the endurance of 
small parties, which are desirable outcomes at the party level, can actually pose a 
challenge to opposition coordination.  
Furthermore, coalition attempts, when they have been made, have focused on the 
presidential elections. This is understandable, considering the predominance of the 
executive branch in both countries’ politics. However, this raises the stakes for the 
individual party leaders during coalition negotiations, as only one of them can stand 
for president, with no tangible compensation for the others. The IPC framework ahead 
of the 2011 Ugandan election – supported by Western democracy-promotion 
organisations – tried to mitigate that by outlining in writing that the other party leaders 
supporting the IPC flagbearer would be considered for a key post (e.g. Vice President, 
Prime Minister, Speaker) and that cabinet positions would be equitably distributed 
(Beardsworth 2018: 91–92). However, this did not prevent the coalition’s collapse.  
Electoral cooperation, when it is discussed, remains at the presidential level, and 
does not encompass legislative or local elections. This leads to opposition parties 
splitting the anti-NRM vote in lower-level elections (see Beardsworth 16/02/2016), 
apart from a few exceptions; notably, during recent by-elections in Jinja East, Arua, 
and Bugiri (Daily Monitor 06/02/2019). Theoretically, legislative and local elections 
could provide an opportunity for a win-win situation for opposition parties. Parties 
could compromise and support a joint candidate in each constituency, ensuring balance 
nationally and playing on each party’s comparative advantage on the ground. This 
could enable the opposition as a whole to win a larger share of seats in parliament or 
control a bigger number of local councils. In Burkina Faso, where legislative elections 
are held under a PR system, joint provincial lists could obtain more support and 
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increase the opposition’s representation. However, as I have argued in Chapter 5, 
parties cannot be considered homogeneous and centralised entities: local dynamics are 
at play as well, and local party elite may end up on the losing side of such a win-win 
national alliance.  
In summary, opposition electoral coalitions can be hampered by parties’ internal 
dynamics. As Beardsworth (2018) has argued, factionalism and the wish of a newly-
elected party president to test their support are particularly detrimental to coalition-
building. Relatedly, the endurance of small parties and internal leadership turnover – 
while desirable outcomes at the level of individual parties – can make it more difficult 
for electoral coalitions to emerge and be sustained, especially at the presidential level. 
Recent by-elections in Uganda have illustrated how opposition alliances can be 
successful at the parliamentary level, but expanding this model for a general election 
requires consideration of the intra-party relations and tensions at the local level.  
 Other forms of cooperation: the interaction of formal institutions and 
protest coalitions 
The focus of scholars interested in opposition coordination has tended to be limited 
to electoral coalition building. Yet opposition parties can and should work together 
outside of electoral cycles as well. I am interested here in how opposition parties 
collaborate amongst themselves and with other actors. Specifically, I observe both 
formal institutions and informal protest coalitions in the two countries. I also discuss 
how the two dynamics (formal and informal) interact – positively or negatively – with 
each other.  
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In Burkina Faso, as mentioned earlier, opposition parties came together into the 
G14 grouping in February 1998. The purpose of this coalition was to boycott the 1998 
presidential elections, but to also make broader demands. After the assassination of 
Norbert Zongo, the G14 co-founded the Collectif along with civil society 
organisations, such as radical trade unions, human rights organisations, and 
professional associations, and took part in the wave of protests that shook the country 
in 1999. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, these protests were partly successful: 
Compaoré had to agree to some reform, including a modification to the electoral code 
that benefited the opposition, and the restoration of presidential term limits. But as we 
saw earlier, the G14 was broken apart by internal squabbles. For a long time, civil 
society appeared to be the decisive player in leading the contest against Compaoré.  
The relations between civil society and opposition parties, at some point united 
within the Collectif, were characterised by mistrust. The organisations at the head of 
the Collectif were radical organisations with ties to the clandestine Marxist-Leninist 
PCRV (Loada 1999). These organisations have often shown contempt for opposition 
parties, a feeling strengthened by the parties’ decision to discard the boycott strategy 
and run in the 2002 legislative elections. This dynamic was illustrated in 2011 with the 
failure of the political opposition to build upon the social crisis and unite grievances 
into an anti-incumbent protest. Yet, things changed two years later, and opposition 
parties then proved able to unite around the issue of term-limits, partly coordinate their 
action with civil society, and sustain a wave of protests, which ultimately resulted in 
Compaoré’s resignation (see Chouli 2015; Engels 2015a).  
This success was partly due to the institutionalisation of a cooperation framework 
particular to Burkina Faso: the CFOP. As mentioned earlier, the CFOP (Chef de File 
de l’Opposition Politique, literally ‘Head of Rank’ of the political opposition) 
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designates both an institution and a person. The institution regroups all registered 
political parties – with or without a parliamentary representation – who declare to be 
opposed to the ruling government. The person is the opposition’s designated 
spokesperson, a role attributed to the head of the opposition party with the most seats 
in the National Assembly. The CFOP was instituted in 2000, but it was not until 2009 
that it started to exist in earnest. Between 2009 and 2014, the CFOP has been headed 
by two different figures: Bénéwendé Sankara of the UNIR-PS (2009-2013) and Diabré 
of the UPC (2013-2014)54.  
The CFOP has served as a palliative for the opposition’s fragmentation by 
increasing polarisation between the majority and the opposition and by amplifying the 
opposition’s voice and reach (Bertrand 2018). First of all, the CFOP institution and, 
more broadly, the 2009 Law on the Statute of the Political Opposition was useful in 
that it clearly defined who was in the opposition. This clarification mattered because 
of the regime’s tendency to co-opt opposition leaders through patronage and to foster 
non-genuine competition to appear more democratic. With the new legal framework, 
political parties had to register with either the opposition or the majority, which limited 
the government’s ability to outwardly co-opt opposition leaders in exchange for 
government posts.  
Through the CFOP, the opposition was also able to use boycott by presenting a 
united front and preventing any opportunistic party to stand in as the opposition to 
serve as a democratic cover. Because the CFOP is acknowledged as the institutional 
opposition, processes boycotted by the CFOP lose legitimacy, even if other parties 
 




participate. This was the case during the political negotiations organised by the regime 
following the 2011 wave of mutinies and unrest. Those were attended by several small 
parties claiming to be in the opposition, but the boycott from the CFOP and the parties 
it represented, severely curtailed the process’s legitimacy. As a UNIR-PS official 
explained, ‘We legally had a framework that enabled us to say “since it is not us who 
are there, it is not the opposition”, and this left Blaise [Compaoré] with a legitimacy 
problem’ (int. BF17, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018).  
The CFOP also provided the numerous opposition parties an opportunity to come 
together under one roof, to present a coherent voice against the government without 
losing their individual identity. Considering their high diversity, the CFOP’s position 
is more one of fronting a consensual position rather than a real leadership role. A high-
ranking UPC official explained: ‘you are not the leader, you are the head of rank, it is 
not a structure that you command, you are merely a spokesperson’ (int. BF57, 
Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018). The CFOP must consult the various parties affiliated to 
the institutions in order to bring up their voice to the majority.  
Still, the CFOP institution proved to be an important framework for these various 
parties to come together, coordinate strategies, and build a united front on key issues. 
As a Sankarist politician explained, ‘it was a setting where the opposition, regardless 
of their political leanings, came together and could talk about how Blaise [Compaoré] 
was going to leave’ (int. BF35, Ouagadougou, 02/07/2018). This meant that even 
though individual opposition parties have remained poorly structured and fragmented, 
the CFOP has provided them with a way to work together without compromising their 
own identity or forcing them to settle their internal differences.  
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The CFOP provided a more stable, institutionalised framework for cooperation. It 
was able to accommodate new parties formed by CDP defectors, such as the MPP, and 
to foster cooperation with civil society organisations and citizen’s movements, who 
would have otherwise been wary of aligning themselves with the political interests of 
individual parties. The institution also removed individual ambitions and electoral 
considerations from the equation by laying out clear rules on who should serve as 
CFOP, rather than leaving it to inter-party negotiations, and by constraining this role 
as that of a spokesperson and facilitator, rather than a leader. 
In Uganda, various formal and informal processes exist, but instead of reinforcing 
each other, they tend to be pitted against one another. One institution I will briefly 
mention is the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD), a donor-funded 
mechanism created in 2010 to bring together political parties with representation in 
parliament. However, IPOD is not limited to the opposition, it includes the NRM as 
well. The platform’s activities have also been frustrated by inter-party squabbles, 
illustrated by the FDC’s absence from IPOD summits (Daily Monitor 10/11/2019). I 
will focus hereafter on the protest coalitions and parliamentary institutions aimed at 
fostering opposition coordination specifically. 
Despite the challenges of building coalitions around elections, as explained earlier, 
Ugandan opposition parties have been able to come together in times of protest. In 
particular, the Walk-to-Work protests in 2011 were remarkable in that they brought 
together the disparate opposition parties, which had failed to sustain a coalition only a 
few months earlier. Indeed, a pressure group was created in April 2011 by various 
opposition party figures, known as A4C. Besigye was the lead actor in this drama, but 
the protests also involved high-figures from other parties, including the DP’s Mao and 
the UPC’s Otunnu – who were arrested too – as well as activists from various parties 
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doing the bulk of the mobilisation efforts on the ground. This cooperation was all the 
more surprising because of the deep animosity between opposition parties ahead of the 
elections, notably illustrated by the failure of the IPC and the emergence of the Suubi 
pressure group during the previous election campaign (Beardsworth 2018: 91–96).  
In this context, the fact that opposition parties were able to work together during 
the Walk-to-Work protests, both at the leadership and the grassroots levels, is an 
interesting feat. It was also the first time that civil society allied with popular protests, 
which was possible due to the non-partisan nature of grievances and the violent state 
response (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 134–135). Contrary to the Trop c’est trop 
coalition in Burkina Faso, where civil society was the main driving force, Walk-to-
Work in Uganda was started and driven by opposition parties, with civil society joining 
in while loudly proclaiming their non-political nature. Branch and Mampilly (2015: 
136–137) argued that ‘political parties, and a few key politicians in particular, 
remained the only agents capable of generating popular political mobilization’, while 
‘no prominent individual aside from party leaders was willing to actually take to the 
streets […]. At no time in April were NGO leaders, church leaders, or business 
associations seen walking’ (idem: 139).  
Yet, despite the high-level coordination within A4C, the protests lacked 
community-level organisation: there was ‘no one planning day-to-day actions, and, in 
fact, no organization even as the protests continued’ (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 133). 
The protest revolved increasingly around the figure of Besigye, and therefore fizzled 
out when Besigye had to be flown out to Nairobi for medical treatment (Perrot 2014: 
426). Other opposition leaders made scattered attempts to carry on the protests, but 
none caught on (Branch & Mampilly 2015: 141–142). The more recent Defiance 
campaign and wave of scattered protests that occurred since the 2016 elections have 
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seen some opposition leaders coalesce, notably a section of DP activists and MPs who 
rallied behind Besigye in the name of the Struggle. But this has been counteracted by 
deep divisions within both parties over strategy.  
These divisions have also directly weakened the existing formal institutions, such 
as the LOP and the Shadow Cabinet (see 6.3), in sharp contrast to the Burkinabè CFOP 
which fostered inter-party cooperation. In 2016, following the disputed presidential 
elections, while the party’s organs under the leadership of Muntu re-appointed Winnie 
Kiiza as LOP, a section of the FDC called for a rejection of the official results and the 
boycott of institutions including Parliament. They also refused the label ‘opposition’ 
– as they claimed to have won the presidential elections – favouring instead the term 
‘minority’. Later on, the pro-defiance faction of FDC, which advocated for extra-
parliamentary activism as a way forward after the 2016 elections, announced the 
formation of a People’s Government. The People’s Government was perceived as an 
informal government-in-waiting – the supposed nature of the Shadow Cabinet – with 
an FDC activist explaining:  
‘The People’s Government remains a stand-by force. After the 2016 elections, we 
made clear our victory had been stolen and we would work to reclaim it. The 
People’s Government ensures there is no vacuum. If we reclaimed our victory, 
we would be ready to take the mantle of power.’ (int. UG86, Kampala, 
26/05/2018)  
The People’s Government included non-FDC politicians who supported Besigye’s 
candidacy, such as Betty Nambooze, the DP Jinja Municipality MP, and Erias 
Lukwago, the independent Kampala Lord Mayor. Some figures are both in the formal 
Shadow Cabinet and in the informal People’s Government, with different portfolios, 
illustrating how these two institutions are distinct but confused.  
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In summary, while opposition parties have failed to form multiparty electoral 
coalitions in both Burkina Faso and Uganda, they have at times managed to coordinate 
and collaborate with civil society organisations. The formation of the G14 and the 
Collectif in Burkina Faso in the late 1990s and the Walk-to-Work protests led by A4C 
in Uganda have been rather successful in bringing opposition parties and civil society 
organisations together along an anti-incumbent cleavage. Contrary to electoral 
coalitions, which are vote-seeking and therefore necessarily pit party leaders against 
one another for the flagbearer’s spot, protest coalitions can be more inclusive and 
cohesive.  
Instances of cooperation among parties and between parties and civil society have 
been the most successful at pushing the regime. In Burkina Faso, in the two instances 
when civil society and opposition parties formed a coalition and actively cooperated, 
the regime had to give in, at least partially. Trop c’est trop led to important electoral 
reforms (though they were later reversed), and the insurrection resulted in Compaoré’s 
resignation. In both cases, there was a significant coordination of efforts across 
opposition parties and civil society. This corresponds to the findings of Simons and 
Tule (cited by Wienkoop (2019: 16)) that incumbents’ attempts to meddle with term 
limits were successfully fought back when opposition parties and civil society 
combined forces. We can also see the importance of coordination between politicians, 
civil society, and other actors from the work of Nasong’o (2007) on the struggle for 
constitutional reform in Kenya, and Sishuwa (2020) on the term-limit debate in 
Zambia.  
In contrast, the 2011 crisis in Burkina Faso did not bring in any meaningful result 
for the opposition, because it was too disparate. In Uganda, the Walk-to-Work protests 
were impressive and occasioned an unprecedented alliance of opposition parties and 
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civil society organisations. However, the movement lost momentum when Besigye 
had to step away, showing the lack of sustainable structures to organise the movement.  
Finally, while the formal institution of the CFOP in Burkina Faso provided such a 
structure to foster cooperation and facilitate mobilisation, no similar mechanism exists 
in Uganda. The LOP and Shadow Cabinet’s prerogatives are confined to the perimeters 
of Parliament, while informal platforms such as the People’s Government are ill-
defined and poorly understood across the board.  
7.3 Opposition parties and regime trajectories 
Throughout this dissertation, I have analysed opposition parties in Burkina Faso 
and Uganda from various angles in order to better understand the constraints that they 
face, how they are organised, and how they operate. I have argued that opposition 
parties in hybrid regimes should be thoroughly investigated, beyond their attributed 
weakness, if we are to understand the role that they can play in democratisation 
processes.  
Democratisation can be brought in by two types of processes, or a mix of both: a 
sudden revolution brought forward by mass mobilisation (Della Porta 2016), or a 
slower reform of the regime through the strengthening of institutions and democratic 
norms, exemplified by Lindberg’s (2009) ‘democratisation by elections’ paradigm. 
These approaches echo the strategic choices that opposition parties face in a hybrid 
regime, described in Chapter 6: they can participate in the institutions – even though 
they are set up in a way that gives the incumbent an advantage – or they can use anti-
system methods such as protests and civil disobedience. As we have seen, they often 
use both concomitantly. The regimes of Compaoré in Burkina Faso and Museveni in 
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Uganda are particularly interesting cases to compare in that regard, considering their 
diverging trajectories during the period covered by this study.  
In Uganda, a section of the opposition has defended a reformist approach – pushing 
to build party structures, taking part in elections, and biding their time until Museveni 
is gone. However, these institutions do not appear to be more democratic over time: 
the electoral commission remains at Museveni’s mercy, the fairness of the elections 
has not improved since the return to multipartyism, and the level of repression of 
opposition activities appears to have increased. This shows that the regime is not 
moving toward more democracy, and instead that Museveni is ‘not even faking it 
anymore’ (Abrahamsen & Bareebe 2016). This is also demonstrated by the recent 
downgrading of the country’s status by Freedom House (2019) from ‘partly free’ to 
‘not free’.  
Meanwhile, others among the opposition have defended a more activist approach, 
focusing on the ‘Struggle’ and presenting themselves as a liberation movement (The 
Observer 07/11/2019). By taking to the streets, during the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests 
or the 2016 Defiance campaign for example, the opposition has faced violence and 
visible repression. This has led civil society organisations to become more political, 
and the international community to be wary of endorsing Museveni’s regime. For 
example, despite ‘pull[ing] its punches’ during a press conference (Cheeseman et al. 
29/04/2016), the EU Electoral Observation Mission criticised the conduct of the 
elections in its report in the following terms:  
‘At the same time, the Electoral Commission (EC) lacked independence and 
transparency, whereupon the elections fell short of international standards for 
the conduct of democratic elections at key stages. Furthermore, state actors were 
instrumental in creating an intimidating atmosphere for both voters and 
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candidates, and police used excessive force against opposition, media and the 
general public, justifying it as a “preventive measure”. This violated fundamental 
freedoms of movement, expression and assembly, and curbed access to 
information.’ (EU EOM 2016) 
More recently, the figure of Bobi Wine’s has been well publicised by Western media. 
The narrative offered by politicised artists plays well among foreign readerships, as 
the examples of the Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso and Y en a marre in Senegal 
previously showed (Wienkoop & Bertrand 16/05/2018). While it is hard to assess Bobi 
Wine’s real chances on the ground, it is undeniable that his movement and experience 
have greatly contributed to raising international attention to Museveni’s repressive 
regime (VOA News 26/12/2019; The Guardian 06/01/2020; Rolling Stone 
01/04/2020).  
In contrast, in Burkina Faso, Compaoré’s regime appeared to become more open 
over the years: the repression became less intense (despite not disappearing 
completely), the opposition gained ground progressively, and the UPC was able to 
organise with much more ease than older parties could in the previous decades (see 
Chapter 3). In the words of Loada (2020: 105), ‘the democratic institutions which 
[Compaoré] had erected to attempt to entrench his power in the end took on a life of 
their own, and ultimately slipped beyond his control'. It was particularly true of the 
Constitution and more particularly of its Article 37 providing term-limits, illustrated 
by the prominence of legalist arguments in activists’ discourse during protests in 2014 
(Brett 2020). This is in line with Posner and Young’s (2018) findings that institutions 
such as term limits do constrain incumbents, and that even when they are unwilling to 
respect them, they seek to change the rules through legal mechanisms rather than 
simply ignoring them.  
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Burkina Faso was, until October 2014, a case of a hybrid regime where opposition 
parties and other institutions were pushing for reform. Until the last hour, the protests 
that led to the toppling of the Compaoré regime were not of an insurrectionist nature: 
they were merely aimed at preventing the vote on the constitutional amendment. The 
attempt by Bénéwendé Sankara to build upon the 2011 protests to call for Compaoré’s 
resignation – embolden by the Tunisian revolution – had failed to gain momentum (see 
3.1), and the focus in 2014 was very much on protecting term-limits to ensure a more 
level playing field for the next elections scheduled in 2015. Consequently, when 
Compaoré announced he was pulling the controversial bill on the evening of 30 
October 2014 – after the National Assembly building had been burnt down by 
protestors – Diabré, as CFOP, initially called for the protestors to go home as their 
objective had been reached (Harsch 2017: 208). But the masses in the street and other 
actors within the CFOP saw an opening, and pushed him to call for the immediate 
resignation of Compaoré (Bonnecase 2015). The opposition had seen an opportunity, 
and the death of protesters had raised the stakes to a point of no return (Wienkoop & 
Bertrand 16/05/2018).  
The insurrection in Burkina Faso cannot be fully explained by looking solely at 
opposition parties. The defection of key CDP officials, the historical legacy of a radical 
and powerful civil society, the army’s decision not to repress protests, and the 
motivation of the urban masses that actually went and stayed in the streets all need to 
be considered to understand this event. However, we can still analyse the specific role 
of opposition parties. In particular, I argue that the fact that they were able to coalesce 
under the CFOP banner and work with civil society around the issue of term limits 
allowed participation and protest to feed each other and contributed to this outcome. 
As I have shown earlier in this chapter, the CFOP institution provided a more stable, 
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institutionalised framework for cooperation between opposition parties, and for 
coordination between the political opposition and civil society. The CFOP was 
bolstered by the UPC’s good results in the 2012 legislative elections, which gave 
Diabré a stronger hand as CFOP than his predecessor. Opposition MPs provided this 
status, but also contributed directly to the opposition’s mobilisation capacity by 
funding the organisation of protests (see 6.3). The defection of Roch Marc Christian 
Kaboré and his peers and the creation of the MPP gave an impetus to anti-incumbent 
protest – by providing additional resources, increasing the opposition’s mobilisation 
capacity, and signalling the vulnerability of the regime – but this energised a 
movement that already existed. 
Uganda and Burkina Faso therefore display different regime trajectories: in Burkina 
Faso, Compaoré’s regime became less repressive – though not necessarily more 
democratic – and the opposition was able to gain ground and organise. Compaoré’s 
attempt to meddle with constitutional term limits led to sustained anti-incumbent 
protests led by the CFOP, which involved civil society and regime defectors, and 
culminated in a popular insurrection and political transition. In contrast, Uganda has, 
since the return to multipartyism, paradoxically displayed a more repressive 
environment for opposition parties (Keating 2011; Abrahamsen & Bareebe 2016). In 
spite of this, opposition parties continue to subsist and organise, though they remain 
fragmented. 
Conclusion 
In summary, this last chapter has looked at two important dynamics contributing to 
opposition performance in hybrid regimes – party endurance and opposition 
coordination – and discussed the regime’s trajectory in each country. 
264 
 
Drawing from previous findings outlined throughout this thesis, I have argued that 
the sustainability of a party’s core and the existence of a leadership turnover norm are 
two important drivers of a party’s ability to endure. Parties with a sustainable core, 
such as grounded historical values, and an entrenched leadership turnover norm are 
most likely to endure. The DP in Uganda illustrates that well: despite losing a lot of 
ground to the FDC since 2006, it still benefits from a core support base that exists 
across ethnic, regional, and religious lines; and the leadership and MPs are amongst 
the most active politicians, even outside of electoral periods. Parties with a sustainable 
core, but no norm allowing for a circulation of elites, encourages fragmentation and 
party proliferation, exemplified by the UNIR-PS and the broader Sankarist party 
family in Burkina Faso.  
On the other hand, parties with a less sustainable core, such as those revolving 
around the ideas of change and credibility, may find it more difficult to endure as their 
credibility is likely to decrease the longer they stay in opposition – and therefore fail 
to provide the change promised – and this idea of change is tied to the incumbent, 
forcing the party to reinvent itself in case of a regime change. Even if the party has a 
leadership turnover norm, as in the case of the FDC, this norm is eroded by the fact 
that the party’s core is intrinsically connected to its founder – in that case Besigye. 
While financial concerns obviously play a role in explaining party endurance, it is not 
a straightforward relationship. Rather than the amount of money a party has, the origin 
of these resources matters more, because it influences how leverage is distributed 
within the party.  
While party endurance is a desirable outcome at the level of individual parties, the 
endurance of small parties is not necessarily a good thing for opposition performance 
overall. Indeed, as we have seen, in order to credibly challenge the incumbent, the 
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opposition needs to be united. Smaller but resilient parties have sometimes blocked 
coalition-building processes in order to protect their organisation’s identity and base, 
as Beardsworth (2018) found in the case of Uganda. Electoral coalitions are often 
difficult to sustain due to these concerns, and opposition parties may find it easier to 
work together without electoral pressures to consider. Indeed, opposition parties have 
collaborated through formal institutions, such as the LOP and the Shadow Cabinet in 
Uganda and the CFOP in Burkina Faso. They have also joined forces together and with 
civil society organisations during protests such as Trop c’est trop in Burkina Faso 
(1999) and Walk-to-Work in Uganda (2011). In Burkina Faso, the two dynamics have 
successfully nurtured each other, with the formal CFOP institution spearheading 
protests that led to the 2014 insurrection and Compaoré’s resignation. In Uganda, the 
situation has been markedly different, as protest initiatives and parliamentary 
frameworks have been at odds with each other, and the inter-party cooperation at play 
has only highlighted intra-party divisions rather than built bridges between them.  
Ultimately, the two regimes at hand have followed a different trajectory. In Burkina 
Faso, the opposition was able to cooperate through the CFOP framework and, in 
alliance with civil society organisations and regime defectors, to bring down 
Compaoré’s regime when he attempted to change the Constitution. In Uganda, the 
regime has been more repressive, while opposition parties have increasingly resorted 
to protests. However, while the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests saw an effective 
cooperation of parties and – to a certain extent – civil society, more recent movements 
have not yet managed to solve the problem of fragmentation.  
One reason why opposition parties tend to be dismissed as agents of change is that 
on many occasions, regime change tends to be precipitated by defecting ruling elite 
(Kelly 2020). In Burkina Faso, the defection of key CDP figures and the formation of 
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the MPP were indeed a critical juncture in bringing about the 2014 insurrection 
(Andrews & Honig 2019; Wienkoop 2019). This dynamic also explains why 
Mbabazi’s candidacy in the 2016 Ugandan election originally sparked hope in 
opposition circles, and worry in the NRM camp (Oloka-Onyango 2016: 112). Yet, 
such a split may not have occurred or had the same impact without a pre-existing 
opposition that had already been denouncing the regime and mobilising dissent, 
therefore making it less risky to defect and having already laid the foundations of the 






Studying opposition parties ‘without prejudice’55 
This dissertation has addressed various aspects of opposition party organisation, but 
the different nuances of my arguments all revolve around an overarching theme. The 
categorisation of opposition parties in these regimes as merely weak obscures a more 
complex story of how they operate and interact, and what their existence and 
endurance mean for democratisation prospects.  
The DP in Uganda is arguably weak: it retains a handful of MPs and support in its 
historical stronghold of Buganda, but elsewhere the party struggles to even have a local 
presence. The last time a DP candidate was on the presidential ticket, in 2011, Mao 
received less than 2% of the vote. Yet, the DP is also the oldest party in Uganda, and 
provides a rare example of longevity and partial institutionalisation. It retains some 
weight on the national political board, and ignoring its internal dynamics would 
prevent us from understanding the outcome of coalition-building processes, as 
illustrated by Beardsworth (2018).  
The Burkinabè opposition has also been characterised by weak electoral results and 
a low mobilisation capacity, exemplified by their inability to build an anti-incumbent 
movement from the disparate grievances of the 2011 crisis. Even the UPC, which was 
able to organise enough of a local presence ahead of the 2012 elections to gain a sizable 
foothold in the legislature and local councils, had insufficient time to establish solid 
 
55 Gazibo (2006). 
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organisational roots. And still, it was the political opposition under the leadership of 
Diabré which managed to topple Compaoré in a surprising twist to the term-limit 
debate rocking the country in 2014. While it does not by all means mean that these 
parties were necessarily strong, it does highlight the necessity to analyse opposition 
parties beyond such a frame. 
This conclusive chapter highlights the main findings of my research and its 
theoretical contribution, and outlines steps for further research. I start by summarising 
the key arguments developed throughout the seven chapters of this thesis. I then 
discuss in more detail the way my research contributes to our collective knowledge 
and understanding of opposition parties and hybrid regimes. Finally, I end with a short 
discussion of the broader implications of my work, the questions it raises, and the road 
still ahead. 
 Summary of the thesis 
In this dissertation, I set out to understand the role that opposition parties play 
within a hybrid regime in a broad manner. This endeavour stemmed from the 
realisation that opposition parties in hybrid regimes across Africa tended to be ignored, 
or dismissed as weak (Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; 
Mozaffar et al. 2003; Rakner & Van de Walle 2009). I believe that, as Riedl (2018: 
41) rightly points out, this assumption ‘is an error that has serious consequences for 
understanding contemporary politics’ on the continent. Despite a growing body of 
research on opposition parties driven by a new generation of scholars (e.g. LeBas 
2013; Beardsworth 2018; Bob-Milliar 2019; Kelly 2020), the question of how 
opposition parties emerge, operate, and endure within the perimeters of a hybrid 
regime had yet to be properly examined. With this ambition, I set out to analyse the 
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role of opposition parties in African hybrid regimes, using a qualitative, comparative, 
and inductive approach. I decided to go beyond classic regional clusters, and to cross 
linguistic and colonial lines in order to discuss hybrid regimes in their diversity. I 
selected two country-cases – Burkina Faso under Compaoré and Uganda under 
Museveni – and collected empirical data on four specific party-cases – selecting in 
each country one historical opponent (the DP in Uganda, the UNIR-PS in Burkina 
Faso), and one more recent party having emerged from the ruling elite (the Ugandan 
FDC and the Burkinabè UPC).  
The core of this thesis was laid out in five parts. First, I started by addressing the 
challenging context in which these opposition parties exist and operate. This context 
is characterised by a quasi-fusion of the state apparatus and the ruling party, both under 
the personal influence of the incumbent, namely Compaoré in Burkina Faso and 
Museveni in Uganda. This fused incumbent-state has a range of tools at its disposal to 
hamper opposition forces, from outright repression to subtle co-optation, election 
rigging, and covert infiltration. The ability of the regime to adjust its reaction, 
switching between a carrot and a stick depending on the circumstances, increases the 
level of uncertainty faced by opposition parties who have to adapt to this fluid and 
insecure environment (Lupu & Riedl 2013).  
With these contextual constraints in mind, I then set out to better understand the 
nature of opposition parties within these regimes. I looked at what these parties were, 
quite simply, all about: what they were created for, and the source of their identity and 
legitimacy in the eyes of their leaders and activists. I defined this as the party’s core – 
a slightly different concept from Lupu’s (2013) party brand or the more widespread 
notion of party goals (Strøm 1990). The existing types of opposition party foundations 
in the literature, such as ethnic identities (Horowitz 1985), rebel movements (Manning 
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1998) or labour movements (LeBas 2013) did not fit with the cases at hand. These 
parties cannot be reduced to either personal vehicles or clientelist endeavours. An 
inductive approach enabled me to identify two new types of party cores: historical 
values and credible change prospects. In the first case, opposition parties are formed 
to defend a set of historical values that resonate with their membership and, to some 
extent, to the society at large. This is illustrated by the DP in Uganda, whose motto of 
‘Truth and Justice’ is entrenched in party leaders’ and activists’ political engagement. 
It is also at play in the UNIR-PS in Burkina Faso which is built upon values attributed 
to Thomas Sankara: integrity, patriotism, hard work. Meanwhile, other parties are built 
around the idea of change, reform, alternance and the credible prospect of delivering 
on the same. Ironically, newer parties with roots in the ruling elite, such as the 
Burkinabè UPC and the Ugandan FDC, managed to position themselves as the most 
credible agents of change, building upon their resources and insider’s advantage.  
These findings enable us to understand the nature of political parties beyond the 
programmatic versus non-programmatic dichotomy. Even though these parties may 
not have clear traditional ideological leanings and their political manifestoes can be 
vague or similar to one another, this does not necessarily mean that they do not have 
an organisational identity and purpose going beyond ethnic ties, clientelist interests, or 
personal ambitions. Understanding the nature of parties is a necessary complement to 
the study of party activism motivations (e.g. Bob-Milliar 2012b) and is a key driver of 
party endurance, as I explained later (Chapter 7).  
The next step in my enquiry was to observe opposition party-building processes, 
and to analyse what these processes tell us about the nature of these parties and the 
power dynamics within them. The literature provides a few models of party 
organisation, such as Duverger’s (1981) mass and cadre party models, and Katz and 
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Mair’s (1995) cartel party. Opposition parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso appear to 
be elite-driven, yet are faced with the necessity to build local branches across the 
country to expand their mobilisation capacity. The fact that opposition parties do not 
have a strong presence across the country, that their local branches are inexistent or 
non-operational outside of electoral periods, and that they are poorly organised and 
institutionalised, are some of the reasons why parties are often branded as weak 
(Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 37).  
Observing these parties’ strategies to build local structures, the origin of their 
financial resources, and their decision-making processes allows us to analyse the 
relations between ‘the party on the ground’ and ‘the party in central office’ (Katz & 
Mair 1993). Parties whose financial resources are mostly tied to the party’s central 
leadership and, later on, an elected elite interested in maintaining their local 
constituency, may find it difficult to expand their network beyond their regional 
stronghold. Parties such as the Burkinabè UPC, that co-opt local figures and rely on 
them investing their own resources in building party structures, may be able to build a 
party organisation more quickly, but at a hidden cost: local structures may be more 
loyal to the local party elite than to the central leadership. The relationship between 
the central and local party elite is a dimension to consider when studying parties’ 
internal organisation, in addition to factionalism at play at the national level.  
I then turned my attention to what opposition parties actually do in hybrid regimes 
such as Uganda and Burkina Faso. One of the main reasons that opposition parties are 
considered weak is that they fail to perform classic party functions. But this analysis 
fails to consider the regime context: the opposition does not try and help sustain the 
broader system and serve as a loyal opposition within its perimeters. Instead, they are 
trying to push the boundaries of the system and topple the regime along with the 
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incumbent, the two being deeply connected. We therefore need a new framework of 
analysis that encompasses the contribution that these parties can make in this 
perspective. I identified three key functions opposition parties perform, based upon an 
analysis of opposition parties’ strategies in Uganda and Burkina Faso. I found that 
some of the things that opposition parties can do is denouncing the regime, mobilising 
dissent, and preparing for succession. They do so through a combination of activities, 
some of them involving their participation in the system (e.g. running for election, 
sitting in parliament), others a protest against it (e.g. boycott, social movements).  
These two approaches can be seen as contradictory and counter-productive: in 
Uganda, the fact that divided opposition parties were participating and protesting 
concurrently was used to criticise their inconsistency. However, the case of Burkina 
Faso demonstrates that protest and participation can be complementary and an 
effective way to challenge the regime, ultimately contributing to the popular 
insurrection that forced Compaoré’s resignation in October 2014. This mixed approach 
illustrates the blurred distinction between a ‘loyal’ and an ‘irresponsible’ opposition 
within these hybrid regimes. Just like incumbents create and manipulate formal 
institutions that they mix with informal practices in order to remain in power, 
opposition parties take part and manipulate these formal institutions and concomitantly 
use informal, anti-system strategies such as boycott, protests, or civil disobedience to 
maintain pressure on the incumbent.  
In the last chapter of this thesis, I analysed how the nature, organisation, and 
activities of opposition parties interact and influence individual parties’ capacity to 
endure, their collective capacity to cooperate, and what this means for the regime’s 
trajectory. Party endurance, institutionalisation, or adaptability are arguably a 
necessary condition of democratisation (Randall & Svåsand 2002b; Lindberg 2007). 
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Meanwhile, opposition unity is seen as necessary to effectively challenge the 
incumbent, which has led to a growing interest in opposition electoral coalitions (Van 
de Walle 2006; Arriola 2013; Souaré 2017; Beardsworth 2018). I argue that the 
endurance of opposition parties is largely informed by the sustainability of their core 
and the existence of a leadership turnover norm, both of which are influenced by the 
origins of their financial resources. Parties with a sustainable core and a circulation of 
elite are more likely to endure, even if they have low resources that restrict their spread. 
Parties without a sustainable core will be more reliant on their founder’s credibility, 
which erodes the chances of having a leadership turnover and makes the party less 
likely to endure beyond its founder’s lifespan. Parties with a sustainable core but no 
leadership turnover are more prone to fragmentation.  
While party endurance is desirable to allow for a stable party system, the endurance 
of small parties can actually be a challenge for opposition cooperation. Indeed, 
organisational interests (such as protecting their support base and seats) can come into 
conflict with the greater good (compromise over seats, supporting a common 
candidate). This echoes Beardsworth’s (2018) argument that newly-elected party 
presidents and internal factionalism can block coalition-building processes.  
Yet, while opposition coordination has systematically failed or collapsed in both 
Uganda and Burkina Faso, opposition parties have managed to work together and with 
other stakeholders – most notably civil society – for non-electoral purposes. While, in 
Uganda, formal institutions like the LOP have been weakened by the existence of 
parallel informal structures such as the People’s Government and, more broadly, by 
internal divisions within the FDC, in Burkina Faso, the CFOP institution has 
strengthened the opposition’s capacity to coordinate and mobilise, by linking 
opposition stakeholders within and outside parliament and fuelling a palliative 
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polarisation of the political landscape. This ultimately led to a regime change in 
Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, Uganda experienced a reverse trajectory, and has seen its 
status downgraded to ‘not free’ by Freedom House in 2019 amidst increased repression 
of political opponents. 
These regime trajectories cannot be understood solely on the basis of opposition 
parties’ actions, and have also been influenced – one way or another – by structural 
factors and the agency of other stakeholders, including civil society organisations, 
international organisations and foreign governments, and the incumbents and ruling 
parties themselves. Yet, the successful mobilisation of Burkinabè opposition parties in 
the face of democratic backsliding, and the subsequent resignation of Blaise 
Compaoré, tell us something about how opposition parties can contribute to 
democratisation. By investing and using institutions such as the CFOP to foster inter-
party cooperation, and by using both participation and protest in a mutually reinforcing 
fashion, Burkinabè opposition parties were able to lead a growing and ultimately 
successful anti-incumbent movement. They were able to invest in democratic 
processes and contribute to the protection of democratic norms – including 
constitutional term-limits and alternance – even while using civil disobedience and 
popular protests (Chapter 7).  
In contrast, in Uganda, opposition parties have so far been unable to make the most 
of the institutions they participate in, or of the civil disobedience campaigns they have 
launched. While they certainly face a repressive environment, their internal 
factionalism and inter-party rivalry have prevented coordination among and beyond 
opposition parties (Beardsworth 2016).  Whereas in Burkina Faso, institutions ‘took 
on a life of their own, and ultimately slipped beyond [Compaoré’s] control’ (Loada 
2020: 105), in Uganda Museveni has managed to retain a firm grip on institutions such 
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as the judiciary, the electoral commission, or the constitution. He has also responded 
to the opposition’s use of protests with increasing repression – illustrated by the 
adoption of legislation such as POMA and the blatant use of violence and arbitrary 
arrests (Chapter 3). In summary, the difference of outcome for each country’s regime 
trajectory can be explained by a mix of structure and agency, of both opposition and 
ruling parties, and by their interaction, in which opposition parties can play a 
significant – and too often overlooked – role.  
 Theoretical contribution 
This thesis makes a broad contribution to the scholarships on African politics, 
hybrid regimes, and political parties. The study of hybrid regimes has mostly focused 
on how incumbents create and manipulate formal institutions (e.g. Ottaway 2003; 
Levitsky & Way 2010a), and little attention has been given to the role opposition 
parties can perform towards democratisation. Meanwhile, opposition parties across 
sub-Saharan Africa – when they have not been simply ignored – tend to be considered 
universally weak (Olukoshi 1998a; Randall & Svåsand 2002c; Rakner & Van de Walle 
2009). In contrast to these tendencies, this dissertation has looked – not at what we 
might expect opposition parties to do – but at the constraints they face, how they 
operate, and what they actually do.  
I have argued that the fusion of the state and the incumbent which creates an unlevel 
playing field (Levitsky & Way 2010b) makes it impossible to categorise the opposition 
as either ‘legitimate’ (Parry 1997) or ‘irresponsible’ (Sartori 1966). Instead, the 
hybridity of the regime makes for a hybrid approach to opposition: opposition parties 
take part in formal institutions and attempt to manipulate them to their advantage, and 
concomitantly use informal, anti-system strategies to maintain pressure on the 
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incumbent. In this context, opposition parties are expected to perform classic party 
functions (Randall & Svåsand 2002c) and risk involuntarily helping to sustain the 
regime they oppose by performing legitimation and moderation functions (Albrecht 
2005). Yet, as LeBas (2013) has argued, ‘strong’ opposition parties can also prevent 
the incumbent from retaining total control over the pace of democratisation. I have 
analysed to what extent they can do so, by addressing the fact that the opposition has 
been universally considered ‘weak’ in these regimes.  
I assessed a range of dimensions of opposition party weakness found in the 
literature, such as their non-programmatic and short-lived nature, their lack of local 
structure and organisation outside of election periods, their under-performance, or 
their fragmentation and inability to unite. I have argued that these opposition parties 
derive their legitimacy from a certain ‘core’, such as historical values or the credible 
prospect of change for example, and have a more complex and grounded 
organisational identity than clientelist, ethnic, or personalistic ties. I have also 
demonstrated that opposition parties have different approaches to party-building, and 
that this is associated with different dynamics between the central party and local 
branches. I have observed a range of activities at the opposition’s disposal, and shown 
how these parties perform key functions within hybrid regimes. Despite weak 
organisations and limited national penetration, some parties endure. Opposition parties 
may not succeed in building electoral coalitions but manage to unite during protests 
and work together within institutions. By unpacking what opposition parties are 
formed around, how they are organised and how they operate, it becomes possible to 
analyse the complex dynamics driving opposition parties’ ability to endure and to 
coalesce in order to effectively challenge the incumbent.  
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My overall take is that even small, poorly organised, or ‘weak’ opposition parties 
should be considered and can play a part in challenging the incumbent’s control over 
institutions, and therefore contribute to a non-linear democratisation process. In the 
worst of times, they may be powerless to do more than ‘piss off the regime’ (int. BF28, 
Bokin, 06/04/2018). In other cases, they might ‘keep the dream alive’ (int. UG89, 
Constituency, 2016). On better days, they can be ‘the engine pulling the wagons’ of a 
popular insurrection toppling the regime (int. BF26, Yako, 05/04/2018). This 
contributes to theories presented by authors such as Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 59) 
and Loada (2020) that democratic institutions permitted by incumbents, including 
opposition parties, can take on a life of their own and generate uncontrollable 
expectations, ultimately testing the resilience of a hybrid regime.  
In making this argument, I have made four broad contributions. First, this 
dissertation contributes to our collective knowledge on African parties. As I have 
shown in Chapter 1, this topic is still under-explored despite generating growing 
interest. My research feeds our understanding of African parties by producing 
empirical knowledge on four specific parties in Burkina Faso and in Uganda, and by 
uncovering dynamics and raising questions applicable to other cases across the 
continent. My research feeds into the stream of work by authors such as Elischer, 
LeBas, Bob-Milliar, Paget, Riedl, and Beardsworth, and contributes to our 
understanding of what parties are, how they operate, and what they can achieve. In 
particular, in this dissertation I have brought forward the necessity to look at the 
internal organisation of parties, including the strategies parties employ to build local 
branches, and the relations between the central leadership and the local structures. This 
speaks to the recent work of Paget (2019b, 2020) on Chadema in Tanzania and 
Beardsworth (2020) on the UPND in Zambia. My research also offers new ways to 
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analyse opposition parties’ likelihood to endure – bringing forth the importance of 
parties’ organisational identity, interests, and internal dynamics – and to ponder the 
opposition’s ability to coalesce through formal and informal networks.  
My research addresses a common shortfall that has characterised the limited study 
of African parties, by going beyond a focus on elections. Because opposition parties 
are perceived as ephemeral organisations that close shop between elections, their 
organisation and mobilisation are mostly studied during campaign periods. Elections 
are, of course, important political moments for opposition parties, and can even be 
‘vehicles for change’ (Cheeseman 2010) or bring about ‘Liberalizing Electoral 
Outcomes’ (Howard & Roessler 2006). Yet, this focus has ignored what opposition 
parties do between elections, such as taking part in protests and sitting in parliament. 
My research has used a broader frame and analysed opposition parties’ organisational 
structures and financial mechanisms beyond the scope of campaigns. I have also 
looked at these parties’ organisation and operation across the timespan of the regime, 
allowing me to identify changes of strategy over time. This approach recognises the 
importance of historical legacies highlighted by Riedl (2014) and LeBas (2013), but 
also the internal complexities of party organisations.  
A second – and related – contribution is to move the debate on African parties 
beyond their reductionist classifications as weak, ethnic, personalistic, or (non-) 
programmatic. Hybrid regimes are characterised by a fusion of state institutions and 
the ruling party at the heart of the unlevel playing field (Levitsky & Way 2010b), 
which must be considered when assessing the strength or weakness of opposition 
parties. I demonstrate how this fusion is the source of many constraints facing 
opposition parties. More broadly, my research has unpacked the notion of opposition 
weakness by addressing various aspects of opposition parties’ operations that are 
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generally considered weak. My inductive approach has allowed me to move beyond 
the programmatic versus non-programmatic classification of parties, and has shown 
that even parties with a loose manifesto and no clear ideological attachment can have 
an organisational identity and legitimacy grounded in something that I have called a 
party’s ‘core’. The parties I have studied here can be seen to be grounded either in 
historical values, or in the credible promise to bring change. This expands our 
understanding of what opposition parties stand for, how they emerge, and around what 
they are formed (e.g. LeBas 2013).  
Third, my research contributes to democratisation debates by highlighting the role 
that opposition parties can play in bringing about regime change. The literature on the 
democratic transitions of the early 1990s tended to omit opposition parties for the good 
reason that few of them existed and operated during the military or single-party 
regimes of the previous decades across the African continent. This led authors such as 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) to focus their attention on civil society movements, 
incumbents, or the international community. Carothers (2006) later proclaimed 
political parties to be the ‘weakest link’ of democratisation, echoing the conclusions of 
Randall and Svåsand (2002c). Yet there cannot be accountability or choice without a 
credible alternative, which means that any hope for democratisation requires a credible 
and relevant opposition (Rakner & Van de Walle 2009: 109). This assumption has fed 
the work of international organisations that support opposition political parties as a 
way to strengthen or build democracy (Carothers 2006; Rakner & Svåsand 2010). Yet, 
this assistance has tended to assume that opposition parties can and should perform the 
same functions as in a consolidated democracy, and has sometimes ignored the specific 
constraints these parties face and their internal dynamics. As my dissertation shows, 
recalibrating our understanding of how parties are formed and organised; what their 
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identity, legitimacy, and endurance is based upon; how they operate; and what they 
can achieve is necessary in order to improve democracy promotion approaches.  
The fourth broad contribution that I make is to the study of hybrid regimes globally, 
both in terms of findings from my research likely to be replicable beyond my own 
cases, and in terms of methods and approaches to study such regimes and contexts. 
Scholars studying hybrid regimes have argued that incumbents allow for the creation 
of democratic institutions that they manipulate in order to remain in power. Yet 
opposition parties can in turn manipulate these institutions to push back against the 
regime and force through some reform. My dissertation contributes to the growing 
conversation about what parties actually do in these regimes. Bunce and Wolchik 
(2010) and LeBas (2013) have argued that strong opposition parties could play a part 
in disrupting the plans of, or even defeating, incumbents in hybrid systems. My 
research shows that opposition parties perform some important functions within these 
regimes. By denouncing the flaws of the system, mobilising dissent, and preparing for 
succession, they constrain – even if in limited ways – the incumbent’s actions. By 
organising and mobilising support, they show that an alternative is possible. By 
engaging the regime through a mix of protests and participation, they contribute to 
expose its authoritarian nature and weaken its foundations.  
Several of my findings are likely to be replicated beyond the two cases at hand. The 
party-building approaches I uncovered (Chapter 5), and their influence on a party’s 
internal organisation and likelihood to endure, may be significant in other countries. 
The UPC’s approach to co-opt local elite in a ‘franchising’ approach to party-building 
echoes the strategies used by other parties in Zambia (Beardsworth 2020) and Tanzania 
(Paget 2020). The functions that opposition parties perform in Uganda and Burkina 
Faso (Chapter 6) certainly inform us on opposition functions in hybrid regimes more 
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broadly. My argument that there is more to the opposition parties I study than the figure 
of their leaders, ethnic appeals, and empty manifestos (Chapter 4) sheds light on why 
other opposition parties elsewhere may endure against the odds. The important issues 
I discussed, including values, history, hope for change, and credibility, are important 
dimensions of political parties beyond my two case (LeBas 2013; Paget 2019; 
Sischuwa 2020), suggesting these types of core will matter for other parties than the 
four I have studied.  
This dissertation also has methodological implications for wider debates about 
hybrid regimes. It demonstrates the need to move beyond conceptual debates about 
various categorisations and terms used to describe and classify regimes, and to 
understand how these regimes work and how stakeholders and institutions operate 
within them, feeding a growing literature interested in explaining how things actually 
work (Bierschenk and De Sardan 2014; Cheeseman 2018). It also shows the need for 
more qualitative and inductive research in order to understand how institutions 
function within these kinds of regimes, something not sufficiently explored in 
quantitative or normative work. Finally, it argues that we should study opposition 
parties as meaningful actors, which endure despite the odds and influence of regime 
trajectories.  
Expanding this line of research across and beyond the African continent therefore 
appears necessary to further our collective understanding of opposition parties and 
their role within hybrid regimes, and to address the unavoidable limitations of this 
thesis. Though a qualitative approach has many benefits (Chapter 2), it necessarily 
limits the scope of data collection to a handful of cases, which has therefore curtailed 
my capacity to draw generalisations beyond the four parties or two countries at hand. 
Still, as I have discussed, my research has highlighted dynamics that can certainly 
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inform our understanding of the role of opposition parties in other hybrid regimes 
across the continent, and beyond. Additionally, the broad focus of my research, which 
covered many aspects of opposition parties’ formation, organisation, and operation, 
has meant that a few of these dynamics could not be adequately addressed to their full 
measure. This includes issues such as party funding and alternative party identities – 
two features that I intend to study further in future work. 
 The road ahead 
As this conclusion has shown, despite the broad range of issues covered in this 
dissertation, a lot remains to be uncovered in future research. On the basis of my 
inductive approach, this section outlines a few dynamics I would be particularly keen 
to investigate further, so as to better understand how opposition parties interact with 
other stakeholders and appropriate new political dynamics, and how this affects their 
role as agents of change.  
My work has focused almost exclusively on opposition parties, and more work 
needs to be done on their interactions with other stakeholders, including civil society 
organisations, religious and customary leaders, and international partners. As I have 
alluded to, coordination with civil society organisations – including trade unions, 
NGOs, student organisations, religious leaders, customary authorities, and others – is 
essential. As the case of Burkina Faso demonstrates, such coordination is possible, 
even when civil society and opposition parties have different roots (in contrast to the 
flagship cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe explored by LeBas (2013)) and when their 
relations are characterised by mistrust. As the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests showed in 
Uganda, civil society and religious leaders can become politically engaged and 
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denounce human rights abuses when the response from the state becomes too 
repressive.  
Meanwhile, the role of international stakeholders, though not addressed in detail 
here, is important to consider. Museveni’s power has been strengthened by the support, 
or at least benign neglect, of the international community motivated by strategic 
interests (Fisher 2013, 2014). Compaoré’s resignation in 2014 happened after France 
had offered him a way out – a helicopter ride to neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire (Jeune 
Afrique 04/11/2014). The interaction of opposition parties and regional organisations, 
such as the African Union, ECOWAS, or the East African Community, would also 
deserve some attention – for example through an examination of opposition parties’ 
participation in regional parliaments, legal challenges brought to regional courts, or 
regional mediation initiatives (see Salih 2013; Ouédraogo 2016; Saidou 2018). 
The dynamic and fast-changing nature of political and social dynamics in the 
countries at hand, and across the African continent more broadly, mean that new 
developments must be taken into account in future research. For example, the rapid 
expansion of social media offers new opportunities and challenges to opposition 
parties (Dwyer and Molony (eds) 2019). Meanwhile, the spread of jihadist 
insurgencies across the Sahel, affecting Burkina Faso since early 2015, also raises 
some questions regarding the state’s political response and opposition parties’ 
appropriation of, and mobilisation around, these issues. Finally, the question of what 
happens to the regime and to opposition parties after a political transition deserves 
further investigation: Compaoré’s regime was toppled in 2014, which opened the way 
for a one-year transition (Chouli 2015), and free and relatively fair elections in 
November 2015 (Ariotti 2016). The reconfiguration of the institutions and the party 
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system in the post-Compaoré era should be analysed to understand regime trajectories 
and democratisation prospects in the long run.  
My research has identified findings and analysed dynamics based upon the cases at 
hand – four parties across Uganda and Burkina Faso. These findings could be further 
compared with research on other parties and other countries, across and beyond sub-
Saharan Africa, in order to refine and strengthen my arguments and our collective 
understanding about the role of opposition parties in hybrid regimes and in Africa. The 
growing coverage of African parties in international datasets on political parties, such 
as the V-Party of the V-Dem Institute or the Political Party Database Project (PPDB), 
opens the door to further research using a broader range of methods. Meanwhile, 
further comparative research encompassing additional case studies would build a more 
comprehensive analysis of how opposition parties influence hybrid regimes’ 
trajectories and their democratisation prospects. 
Through this dissertation, I have heeded the call made by Mamoudou Gazibo (2006: 
12) to ‘study African parties without prejudice’. Following his prescription, I set out 
to observe opposition parties in Uganda and Burkina Faso in an inductive manner, with 
the purpose to ‘go and see what the field tells us’ (idem). In doing so, I have shown 
that more inductive research looking to analyse what political parties are and do is 
necessary. This will, I hope, pave the way for less prescriptive and more contextualised 
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1. List of interviews, discussions, and observed events 
 Semi-structured interviews 
int. BF01, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 15/03/2017 
int. BF02, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 17/03/2017 
int. BF03, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 23/03/2017 
int. BF04, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017 
int. BF05, international NGO representative, female, Ouagadougou, 27/03/2017 
int. BF06, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 28/03/2017 
int. BF07, Researcher and civil society activist, male, Ouagadougou, 05/04/2017 
int. BF08, party official, PDS-Metba, male, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017 
int. BF09, Researcher, male, Ouagadougou, 06/04/2017 
int. BF10, party official, RDS, male, Ouagadougou, 25/04/2017 
int. BF11, party activist, PDS-Metba, male, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017a 
int. BF12, party activist, PDS-Metba, male, Ouagadougou, 26/04/2017d 
int. BF13, party official, Le Faso Autrement, male, Ouagadougou, 27/04/2017 
int. BF14, foreign sankarist activist, male, Ouagadougou, 13/07/2017 
int. BF15, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 11/01/2018 
int. BF16, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 17/01/2018 
int. BF17, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 18/01/2018 
int. BF18, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 22/01/2018 
int. BF19, party official, UNIR-PS, female, Ouagadougou, 24/01/2018 
int. BF20, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 09/02/2018 
int. BF21, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 10/02/2018 
int. BF22, Journalist, male, Ouagadougou, 12/02/2018 
 
a Interviews conducted together. 
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int. BF23, civil society representative, male, Ouagadougou, 12/02/2018 
int. BF24, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Yako, 04/04/2018 
int. BF25, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Yako, 05/04/2018 
int. BF26, party activist, UPC, male, Yako, 05/04/2018 
int. BF27, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Bokin, 06/04/2018 
int. BF28, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Bokin, 06/04/2018 
int. BF29, local official, UNIR-PS, male, Bokin, 06/04/2018 
int. BF30, Member of Parliament, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou 10/04/2018 
int. BF31, party activist, UPC, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018 
int. BF32, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018b 
int. BF33, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018e 
int. BF34, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Koudougou, 17/04/2018e 
int. BF35, party official, FFS, male, Ouagadougou, 02/07/2018 
int. BF36, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 04/07/2018 
int. BF37, party official, ex-UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018 
int. BF38, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 05/07/2018 
int. BF39, party official, UNIR-PS, female, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018c 
int. BF40, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 10/07/2018f 
int. BF41, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 11/07/2018 
int. BF42, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 19/07/2018 
int. BF43, party official, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 24/07/2018 
int. BF44, Member of Parliament, UNIR-PS, male, Ouagadougou, 26/07/2018 
int. BF45, Member of Parliament, UPC, female, Ouagadougou, 31/07/2018 
int. BF46, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 02/08/2018 
int. BF47, Member of Parliament, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 08/08/2018 
int. BF48, party official, UNIR-PS, female, Ouagadougou, 10/12/2018 
int. BF49, party official, UPC, female, Ouagadougou, 14/12/2018 
int. BF50, local official, UPC, male, Garango, 17/12/2018d 
int. BF51, local official, UPC, male, Garango, 17/12/2018g 
int. BF52, party activist, UNIR-PS, male, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018e 
 
b Interviews conducted together. 
c Interviews conducted together. 
d Interviews conducted together. 
e Interviews conducted together. 
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int. BF53, party activist, UNIR-PS, female, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018h 
int. BF54, local official, UPC, male, Tenkodogo, 18/12/2018 
int. BF55, local official, UPC, male, Tenkodogo, 18/12/2018 
int. BF56, civil society representative, male, Tenkodogo, 18/12/2018 
int. BF57, party official, UPC, male, Ouagadougou, 19/12/2018 
 
int. UG01, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 06/04/2016. 
int. UG02, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 08/04/2016 
int. UG03, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 23/04/2016 
int. UG04, former Supreme Court justice, male, Kampala, 31/05/2016 
int. UG05, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 14/06/2016 
int. UG06, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 21/06/2016 
int. UG07, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 29/06/2016 
int. UG08, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 30/06/2016 
int. UG09, party activist, DP, male, Kampala, 30/06/2016 
int. UG10, civil society representative, male, Kampala, 07/07/2016 
int. UG11, party official, FDC, male, Kampala, 31/08/2016 
int. UG12, party official, FDC, female, Kampala, 31/08/2016 
int. UG13, civil society representative, female, Kampala, 19/09/2016 
int. UG14, party activist, DP, male, Kampala, 20/09/2016 
int. UG15, international NGO representative, male, Kampala, 21/09/2016 
int. UG16, party official, FDC, male, Kampala, 27/09/2016 
int. UG17, Member of Parliament, DP, male, Kampala, 04/10/2016 
int. UG18, Member of Parliament, DP, male, Kampala, 12/10/2016 
int. UG19, party official, FDC, female, Kampala, 07/11/2016 
int. UG20, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 15/11/2016 
int. UG21, local official, DP, male, Mukono, 16/11/2016 
int. UG22, local official, DP, male, Mukono, 16/11/2016 
int. UG23, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 17/11/2016f 
int. UG24, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 17/11/2016a 
int. UG25, party activist, FDC, male, Mukono, 17/11/2016 
 
f Interviews conducted together. 
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int. UG26, civil society representative, male, Kampala, 21/11/2016 
int. UG27, Member of Parliament, FDC, female, Kampala, 24/11/2016 
int. UG28, Member of Parliament, FDC, male, Kampala, 24/11/2016 
int. UG29, Member of Parliament, FDC, male, Kampala, 05/12/2016 
int. UG30, Researcher, male, Kampala, 06/12/2016 
int. UG31, Researcher, male, Kampala, 07/12/2016 
int. UG32, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 07/12/2016 
int. UG33, Member of Parliament, NRM, male, Kampala, 08/12/2016 
int. UG34, Member of Parliament, DP, female, Kampala, 14/12/2016 
int. UG35, party activist, DP, male, Namasuba, 04/05/2018 
int. UG36, local official, DP, male, Namasuba, 04/05/2018 
int. UG37, local official, DP, male, Namasuba, 04/05/2018 
int. UG38, civil society representative, male, Soroti, 07/05/2018 
int. UG39, religious figure, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018 
int. UG40, party activist, UPC, male, Soroti, 08/05/2018 
int. UG41, local official, FDC, male, Soroti, 08/05/2018 
int. UG42, party activist, FDC, female, Soroti, 08/05/2018 
int. UG43, local official, FDC, female, Soroti, 08/05/2018 
int. UG44, local official, NRM, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018 
int. UG45, local official, FDC, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018 
int. UG46, party activist, FDC, female, Soroti, 09/05/2018 
int. UG47, party activist, FDC, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018 
int. UG48, party activist, FDC, male, Soroti, 09/05/2018 
int. UG49, party activist, PDP, male, Soroti, 10/05/2018 
int. UG50, party activist, FDC, male, Soroti, 10/05/2018 
int. UG51, party activist, FDC, male, Soroti, 10/05/2018 
int. UG52, party activist, DP, male, Gulu, 11/05/2018 
int. UG53, local official, Independent, male, Gulu, 12/05/2018 
int. UG54, local official, FDC, male, Gulu, 12/05/2018 
int. UG55, local official, FDC, male, Gulu, 12/05/2018 
int. UG56, party activist, FDC, female, Gulu, 12/05/2018 
int. UG57, party activist, DP, male, Gulu, 12/05/2018 
int. UG58, civil society representative, male, Gulu, 12/05/2018 
int. UG59, party activist, FDC, male, Gulu, 13/05/2018 
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int. UG60, civil society activist, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018g 
int. UG61, civil society activist, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018b 
int. UG62, civil society activist, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018b 
int. UG63, religious figure, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018 
int. UG64, civil society activist, female, Kasese, 15/05/2018 
int. UG65, party activist, FDC, male, Kasese, 15/05/2018 
int. UG66, local official, NRM, male, Kasese, 16/05/2018 
int. UG67, local official, FDC, male, Kasese, 16/05/2018 
int. UG68, Member of Parliament, NRM, female, Kasese, 16/05/2018 
int. UG69, local official, FDC, male, Kasese, 17/05/2018 
int. UG70, civil society representative, male, Kasese, 17/05/2018 
int. UG71, local official, DP, male, Masaka, 18/05/2018 
int. UG72, local official, DP, male, Masaka, 18/05/2018 
int. UG73, Member of Parliament, DP, female, Masaka, 18/05/2018 
int. UG74, Member of Parliament, DP, female, Masaka, 19/05/2018 
int. UG75, local official, DP, male, Masaka, 19/05/2018 
int. UG76, local official, DP, male, Masaka, 19/05/2018 
int. UG77, local official, DP, male, Masaka, 19/05/2018 
int. UG78, local official, DP, female, Masaka, 19/05/2018 
int. UG79, local official, DP, male, Masaka, 19/05/2018 
int. UG80, local official, FDC, male, Masaka, 19/05/2018 
int. UG81, party activist, DP, male, Namasuba, 22/05/2018 
int. UG82, local official, DP, Ma, Wakiso, 22/05/2018 
int. UG83, local official, DP, male, Wakiso, 22/05/2018 
int. UG84, Member of Parliament, DP, male, Kampala, 24/05/2018 
int. UG85, local official, DP, male, Wakiso, 25/05/2018 
int. UG86, party activist, FDC, male, Kampala, 26/05/2018 
int. UG87, party official, DP, male, Kampala, 28/05/2018 
int. UG88, Member of Parliament, Independent, male, Kampala, 30/05/2018 
int. UG89, Member of Parliament, DP, female, Constituency, 2016h 
 
g Interviews conducted together. 
h Date and place not indicated to protect the interviewee’s anonymity. 
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 Focus group discussions 
dis. 1, UNIR-PS party activists, 2 women and 4 men, Yako, 04/04/2018 
dis. 2, UNIR-PS party activists, 3 women and 12 men, Minissia, 05/04/2018 
dis. 3, UNIR-PS party activists, 7 men, Bokin, 06/04/2018 
dis. 4, UPC party activists, 2 women and 4 men, Tenkodogo, 17/12/2018 
 Observation 
obs. 1, DP workshop for newly elected local councillors, Masaka, 09/04/2016 
obs. 2, DP training workshop for young leaders, Kampala, 23/06/2016 




Name Sources References 
Burkina post-2014 stuff 20 27 
Constraints 113 399 
External 99 224 
Corruption 25 29 
Electoral rules 3 3 
Fraud 11 11 
Fusion ruling party-State 35 48 
Monetisation of politics 32 42 
Repression 64 90 
Weak civil society 1 1 
Internal 86 174 
Factionalism 29 36 
Focus on individuals, leaders 14 15 
Lack of capacity 5 6 
Lack of funding 53 60 
Lack of grassroots presence 9 10 
Lack of ideological clarity 8 14 
Lack of loyalty 4 4 
Opposition division 22 26 
Refusal to use force 1 1 
Country case 0 0 
Burkina Faso 55 55 
Uganda 85 85 
Differences between parties 43 82 
Action, strategies 15 15 
Ethnicity, religion 10 11 
History 7 7 
Ideology, values 13 16 
Means, money 1 1 
No difference between ruling party and opposition 13 16 
Personalities, individuals 14 15 
Engagement of the regime 73 121 
Mobilisation strategies 0 0 
Discourse 10 17 
Local networks 9 12 
Media 22 24 
Rallies 6 6 
Social events 16 20 
Participation 69 114 
Court challenges 8 9 
Local government 19 23 
Other forms of participation 4 4 
Participation in elections 22 24 
Party-building 2 2 
Sitting in parliament 41 50 
Protest, activism 7 7 
Boycott 19 22 
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Defiance and civil disobedience 18 24 
People's government 8 8 
Rallies, demonstrations 11 14 
Strikes 1 1 
Golden quotes 8 12 
Intra-opposition dynamics 69 125 
CFOP and LOP 33 48 
Coalition building 17 21 
DP-FDC relationship, Besigye issue 10 14 
Sankaristes 11 14 
Key events 0 0 
1998 Zongo affair 5 5 
2014 Insurrection 21 30 
UYD reunion May 2018 1 1 
Kingdoms 0 0 
Buganda issue 6 6 
Rwenzururu 5 8 
Objectives of opposition parties 51 88 
Educate-sensitize voters 13 13 
Fight for independence (colonial times) 3 3 
Getting power 26 26 
Influencing the government 5 5 
Internal strengthening-reorganisation 5 5 
International visibility 2 2 
Obtain justice on specific issue 3 3 
Personal advantages 7 7 
Rectify governance 20 22 
Remove the regime 2 2 
OP type 11 18 
Coming from the regime 9 10 
Fake or bought 1 1 
Historical opponent 6 6 
Party building - structures 115 435 
Activities 26 31 
Candidate selection 26 29 
Core 43 53 
Decision-making processes 40 50 
Funding 37 44 
Gender and representation 8 11 
Ideology 16 19 
Institutionalisation 17 26 
Internal divisions 8 9 
Leadership 36 46 
Local structures & networks 53 75 
Manifesto 17 20 
Strategy 1 1 
Training 4 5 
Youth wings & women's leagues 10 13 
Party info 94 282 
CDP 1 1 
DP 33 66 
FDC 31 60 
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JEEMA 1 1 
NRM 16 21 
Others 7 10 
PCRV 10 13 
UNIR-PS 25 65 
UPC-B 18 34 
UPC-U 7 10 
People's expectations towards opposition 25 27 
Perception by ruling party 4 4 
Reason to join 80 153 
Actions, strategies 10 10 
Attracted by values 27 35 
History 9 9 
Convinced by friends or relatives 9 13 
Credible change opportunity 10 12 
Ethnicity, religion 2 2 
Family heritage 20 21 
Inspired by leaders 29 40 
Manifesto 3 3 
Necessity 2 2 
New faces 5 6 
Regime malpractice 9 9 
Regime 20 25 
Relations with civil society 37 56 
Church & politics 2 2 
Role of opposition parties 61 111 
Checking RP's accountability 25 29 
Fight for justice 2 2 
Legitimising the regime 10 14 
Making alternative propositions 34 41 
Mobilising people 21 24 
 
 
